to pursue

yond a cer

tain point.

Not obliged fulfilled his engagements towards an unfortunate his right be- monarch, when he has done in his defence, or to his restoration, all he was obliged to perprocure form in virtue of the alliance; if his efforts are ineffectual, the dethroned prince cannot require him to support an endless war in his favour, or expect that he will eternally remain the enemy of the nation, or of the sovereign who has deprived him of the throne. He must think of peace, abandon the ally, and consider him as having himself abandoned his right, through necessity. Thus Louis XIV. was obliged to abandon James the Second, and to acknowledge king William, though he had at first treated him as a usurper.

fence

jects.

The same question presents itself in real alliances, and in general, in all alliances made with the state, and not in particular with a king for the Case of de- defence of his person. An ally ought, doubtless, against sub- to be defended against every invasion, against every foreign violence, and even against his rebellious subjects; in the same manner a republick ought to be defended against the enterprizes of one who attempts to destroy the publick liberty. But it ought to be remembered, that an ally of the state, or the nation, is not its judge. If the nation has deposed its king in form; if the people of a republick have driven out their magistrates and set themselves at liberty, or acknowledged the authority of an usurper, either expressly or

tacitly;

tacitly to oppose these domestick regulations, by disputing their justice or validity, would be to interfere in the government of the nation, and to do it an injury, (see § 54, and following of this book). The ally remains the ally of the state, notwithstanding the change that has happened in it. However, when this change renders Case where the alliance useless, dangerous or disagreeable, it andes may may renounce it: for it may say, upon a good foun- ed." dation, that it would not have entered into an alliance with that nation, had it been under the present form of government.

real alli

be renounc

eternal

war.

We may say here, what we have said on a personal alliance: however just the cause of that king may be, who is driven from the throne, either by his subjects or by a foreign usurper; his allies are not obliged to support an eternal war in Not an his favour. After having made ineffectual efforts to restore him, they must at length give peace to their people, and come to an accommodation with the usurper, and for that purpose treat with him as with a lawful sovereign. Louis XIV. exhausted by a bloody and unsuccessful war, offered at Gertruydenburgh to abandon his grandson, whom he had placed on the throne of Spain: and when affairs had changed their appearance, Charles of Austria, the rival of Philip, saw himself, in his turn, abandoned by his allies. They grew weary of exhausting their states, in order to give him the possession of a crown, which they VOL. VH. believed

P

believed to be his due, but which to all appearance, they should never be able to procure for him.

All nations may join.

DANGEROUS POWER.

BOOK III. CHAP. III. § 45.

It is still easier to prove, that should this formidable power betray any unjust and ambitious dispositions, by doing the least injustice to another, every nation may avail themselves of the occasion, and join their forces to those of the party injured, in order to reduce that ambitious power, and disable it from so easily oppressing its neighbours, or keeping them in continual awe and fear. For an injury gives a nation a right to provide for its future safety, by taking away from the violator the means of oppression. It is lawful, and even praise-worthy, to assist those who are oppressed, or unjustly attacked.

SYSTEM OF EUROPE.

$47. Europe forms a political system, a body, where the whole is connected by the relations and different interests of nations inhabiting this part of the world. It is not, as antiently, a confused heap of detached pieces, each of which thought itself very little concerned in the fate of others, and seldom regarded things which did not immediately

relate to it. The continual attention of sovereigns to what is on the carpet, the constant residence of ministers, and the perpetual negociations, make Europe a kind of a republick, the members of which, though independent, unite, through the ties of common interest, for the maintenance of order and liberty. Hence arose that famous scheme of the political equilibrium, or balance of power; by which is understood such a disposition of things, as no power is able absolutely to predominate, or to prescribe laws to others,

§ 49. Confederacies would be a sure way of preserving the equilibrium, and supporting the liberty of nations, did all princes thoroughly understand their true interests, and regulate all their steps for the good of the state.

CONTRIBUTIONS IN THE ENEMY'S
COUNTRY.

BOOK III. CHAP. IX. § 165.

Instead of the pillage of the country, and defenceless places, a custom has been substituted more humane and more advantageous to the sovereign making war: I mean that of contributions.

Whoever carries on a just war,* has a

* Contributions raised by the Duke of Brunswick in France. Compare these with the contributions raised by the French in the Netherlands.-EDIT.

To be mo derate.

right of making the enemy's country contribute to the support of the army, and towards defraying all the charges of the war. Thus he obtains a part of what is due to him, and the subjects of the enemy, on submitting to this imposition, are secured from pillage, and the country is preserved: but a general who would not sully his reputation, is to moderate his contributions, and proportion them to those on whom they are imposed. An excess in this point, is not without the reproach of cruelty and inhumanity: if it shews less feroeity than ravage and destruction, it glares with

avarice.

ASYLUM.

BOOK I. CHAP. XIX. 232.

If an exile or banished man is driven from his country for any crime, it does not belong to the nation in which he has taken refuge to punish him for a fault committed in a foreign country. For nature gives to mankind and to nations the right of punishing only for their defence and safety; whence it follows that he can only be punished by those whom he has offended.

§ 233. But this reason shews, that if the justice of each nation ought in general to be confined to the punishment of crimes committed within its own territories, we ought to except from this

rule