interfering with the feelings and prejudices of those over whom you ruled. In that point of view, also, this proposed Freedom of the Press became a subject of vast importance; and he thought the sentiments of his honourable friends with respect to it, were hasty and undigested; they were, he conceived, dangerous to go abroad, and therefore dangerous to be uttered in that Court without animadversion; he protested, therefore, against the sentiments which they avowed." *

* Asiatic Journal, XIII. pp. 69–80.

SECTION XII.

Effects of a Free Press on the Governments of the Subsidiary States.

A

"Whoever conceives it in his power to do unjustly, readily does so, each person concluding injustice to make much more for his private interest than justice would do. Compacts are therefore best ascertained when grounded on mutual advantage; or when it is in our power to force those with whom we treat to be just and honest."Plato.

THE state which places her military power in the hands of another state, surrenders herself to the worst species of government. Whether the substantive power controul the affairs of the dependency or not, she is equally regarded as an enemy. Such alliances are also fundamentally bad, because they lead inevitably to intrigues, extortion, oppression, and conquest.

In most of the Subsidiary States of British India, the sovereign power is nominally vested in the Native prince. Since, however, the whole military force is under the controul of the British Government, sovereignty is substantially, however speciously, exercised under its authority. The Resident being far removed from the Supreme Government, it is necessary to grant him large powers. These, indeed, are not exercised directly, but by the intervention of secret intrigues; yet in the administration of this delegated sovereignty, he is in reality almost absolute.

The Resident's objects are to monopolize all patronage

for his friends, and to amass as much money and to keep up as large a force as possible to support British interests. His measures are carried into execution by an agent, nominally the Pageant's Minister, but more properly his own. The business of this black hypocrite is by wily arts to delude the prince, and to obtain money from his subjects. Extortion and corruption prevail from the minister through all gradations even down to the peasant. When the landlord is called on to pay a heavy tribute to the treasury, he endeavours first by persuasion, and at last by violence, to obtain the money from the cultivator. Should he fail, to avoid being incarcerated or tortured, or both, he foments a rebellion. If the cultivators fall in arrear, either from failure of crops or over assessment, they are treated with horrid cruelty, Tyranny drives them to despair, and they often seek safety in the woods and hills, and embrace a savage life. Under this species of rule, the people of Hydrabad degenerated into a state of nature, with the vices of civilization engrafted on that condition. Nor should it be here forgotten, as the historian of British India has happily expressed himself, that "the misery produced by these Native Governments, which the Company upholds, is misery produced by the Company, and sheds disgrace upon the British name."

It may be imagined that these evils were justly imputable to the Resident. No, they had their root in a corrupt, intriguing, domineering, and extorting system, which placed too much power in the hands of man, by nature imperfect, and unprepared to resist the temptations offered by absolute rule.

Had this corrupt and oppressive course of administra→ tion been exposed to public animadversion, a better would have been pursued. The Supreme Government,

which derived no information but from the Resident, and which consequently remained quite ignorant of much of the vice which prevailed in these States, would have been disabused and enlightened. They would either have resolved not to interfere with their internal government, which is almost impracticable, or they would have interposed to do justice between prince and people. Some tried and eminent statesmen-an Elphinstone, a Munro, a Fullarton, or a Metcalf-would have been selected to fill the high office of Resident. He would have assumed a mild, but firm tone; he would have persuaded the sove reign to appoint an honest minister, to be satisfied with a moderate land tax, and to prevent his nobles from extorting from the cultivators. He would have entreated him to establish village, district, and supreme courts of justice. In short, he would have implored him to govern like a man, instead of destroying like a monster.

A Free Press might also have afforded the means of reforming the Subsidiary States, and might thus have prevented the wars which they waged with us. The States of Central India confederated against our power. There might not, indeed, exist any formal treaty, but there did exist a sense of suffering, and a determination to be avenged. When men are unanimous in feelings of hatred, they have formed a tacit compact which on a fit occasion will be signed with blood.

Our Residents were kings of Hydrabad, of Oude, of Nagpore, and Poonah. Some of them exercised mild, some despotic sway, but their governments were all odious to both prince and people. Had these kings exercised their power to prevent extortion, and to enforce a system of equal justice in every village, India would have lauded Lord Wellesley's conquests. Instead of this, they domi

neered over the Native princes, and, at the same time, indirectly supported by our troops the extortions of those Pageants. The Native Governments were limited - in their oppressions by their weakness, but they had no limits when assisted by British bayonets. This system of rule drove the people mad. Rebellion ensued, wars followed, and the result has been conquest. Against these conquests there has been much, but unjust, declamation. Mr. Canning, as I understand, stated at the public dinner given to Lord Amherst, that our empire in the East had already been extended beyond the bounds of prudence. If so, it had been too much aggrandized on its frontier; for no empire could be strong with millions of enemies in its centre. A great portion of our empire in the East consisted, in reality, of Subsidiary States. The subjects of these States, doomed to a dreadful anarchical despotism, were in consequence, impoverished, demoralized, rebellious, and exasperated against British interference. They were, in peace as in war, our rancorous enemies. It therefore became our policy to change a system so hazardous and so pregnant with human calamity. To abandon these States altogether would be an open avowal of weakness, which would ensure perpetual wars, and ultimately force upon us the extension of conquests. Not to interfere with their internal government, would be, on account of our pecuniary demands, next to impossible. The only alternative, then, is to govern them honestly. Pursue it, and order will be restored, the people will become rich and happy, and, in difficulty as in danger, will remain the firm friends of England.

The Pindarie system grew out of the misrule which had so long existed in Central India and in these Subsidiary States. The military classes were unemployed.