had satisfied the honourable gentleman, that there was nothing contradictory in his answer. His lordship gave his evidence, one of the days, he could not recollect which, under the disadvantage of indisposition. He was fatigued by the length of the examination. In fact he was quite done up.

On a division of the House, which had become exceedingly clamorous for the question, there appeared,

For the previous question, 188.
Against it, 221.

Mr. Whitbread's first motion was carried, and he waved the second. Mr. Canning then proposed the amendment mentioned in his speech; and Mr. Whitbread seconded it. This motion being also carried, Mr. Whitbread moved that the resolutions agreed to, be laid before his majesty, by such

members as were of his majesty's most honourable privy council: on which some members exclaimed, "By the whole House." This proposition called up Mr. Wilberforce, and Mr. B. Bathurst, both of whom concurred in the wish, that nothing of heat or personality might appear upon the proceedings of the House. The main object had been obtained, by recording on the journals the sense the House entertained of the transaction in a constitutional point of view; and proceeding any further would not be for the dignity of the House. Mr. Whitbread coincided entirely with this observation, and, with the consent of the House, withdrew his motion.

In consequence of these resolutions, lord Chatham resigned his office of master-general of the ordnance.

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ever way Antwerp was to be approached or taken, the service was one of very great risk, and in which the safe return of the army so employed might be very precarious, from the opposition made, and the time consumed in the operation, which enabled the enemy, in a short time, to assem. ble a great force, from every part of the Netherlands, and Holland, and even from Westphalia, and from the course of the Rhine, as well as from the frontier of France. - General Calvert had stated the -utter impossibility of laying down any thing in the shape of detailed reasoning, without a knowledge of local circumstances, and to what extent those circumstances would admit of a naval co-operation. Colonel Gordon had given it as his opinion, so far back as the 29th of May, that the first operation necessary, would be to get possession of Cadsand and South Beveland. And yet it was not until the expedition had actually failed, that it had occurred to his majesty's ministers, to consider of the necessity of taking possession of these places, or of hinting at it, in the instructions given to the officers entrusted with the execution of this project. The inference, with which colonel Gordon concluded his observations was, "that this attempt would be a most desperate enterprise, cannot be doubted; and that in the attempt, whether successful or otherwise, a very large portion of our navy would be put to imminent hazard."

The next opinion taken by the commander-in-chief, was that of general Brownrigg, whose opinion respecting the ulterior and main

object of the expedition, the destruction of the arsenals at Antwerp, was, "That a force passing over from Walcheren to South Beveland, would take possession of Landvliet, on the main land; and the distance from thence to Antwerp being only six leagues, might succeed in taking the latter place by a coup de main." Of all the plans proposed, lord Porchester considered this as by far the most extravagant and impracticable. The next opinion taken was that of general Hope, who was of opinion, that an attempt to take Antwerp by a coup de main, in the only way which was at all practicable, would be "attended with great risk to the force employed, without, perhaps, any adequate security for the attainment of its object."

Here then were five military opinions, four of them decidedly adverse, and the fifth not favourable to the expedition. His majesty's government next applied to two naval officers, sir Home Popham and sir Richard Strachan. Sir Home Popham, in his memoranda, particularly pressed two points, namely, "That the troops should be embarked in ships of war, as transports were a great impediment to promptitude inattack; and that, as the season was advancing, the expedition should be ready to sail by the 26th or 27th of June, about the time of the full moon." The ships of war were not to proceed up the Scheldt, and the hopes of promptitude were enlivened by the vast number of horses sent out, as well as by not dispatching the expedition, which ought to have sailed on the 27th of June, till the 27th of July. Sir

Richard Strachan assured the noble lord at the head of the admiralty, that he entertained but very little hope of ultimate success at Antwerp. Nothing was communicated to him on the subject of the difficulties of going up to Ant werp: but he remembered, that when he remarked, that all he thought could be done, would be the reduction of Walcheren, lord Mulgrave replied, that the country would be little satisfied with doing nothing more with such an armament than taking Walcheren. Upon the repetition of his fears, the noble lord assured him that he had the fullest confidence of success; and that he had reason to think they should do very well.As to the plan of the expedition, lord Porchester confessed that, with all his anxiety and industry to obtain information, he had not been able to learn what was the nature of the arrangement propos. ed. His own conviction was, that there were as many plans, as departments, engaged in the expedition. Lord Castlereagh's plan, if one might guess from the outline, was to make a dash, which disdained to stop at even the most desperate risks and appalling dangers. The plan of the admiralty, at least that fixed on at the sailing, was much more prudent, as it did not hazard the navy in a most intricate navigation. The chancellor of the Exchequer's whole attention was absorbed in calculating on that arrangement which should convey the expedition with the least possible quantity of dollars. To what plan the secretary for foreign affairs (Mr. Canning) was more particularly attached, he could not tell. But it was prob

able that he, too, just at that time, had some little plan of his own, which he did not communicate to his colleagues. The admiral appeared to have a plan; but the commander-in-chief appeared to have had no plan. From the whole of his examination it was clear that he had not, at any time during the campaign, considered of any plan at all. Neither was there any pointed out to him in the instructions of government. It was difficult, therefore, lord P. declared, for him to settle what plan he should proceed to discuss; but he should, at all events, endeavour to follow up what seemed to have been the intention of the government. The general understanding, he said, of the business seemed to be, that part of the army was, in the first place, to take possession of the island of Walcheren, and another corps to take Cadsand: the main body was to advance to Landvliet. This was so far the apparent plan, which, however, in some of the documents before the House, was said, in not very intelligible language, to relate to a second, ulterior, simultaneous, and subsequent operation.". But this ulterior, simultaneous, and subsequent operation was given up, because the commander-in-chief apprehended that, before he could proceed in it, he should have to undertake, perhaps, two or three preliminary sieges. Lord Porchester proceeded to point out, and comment on, those parts of the evidence before the House, that bore most directly on the present question, and from all the data that formed the foundation of the expedition against Antwerp, contended

that it was morally impossible that it should succeed. Ministers had calculated on every circumstance, as if it had been fixed beforehand that it should be in favour of their project. The whole of the disas ters and disgrace of the expedition arose from its having been sent out without knowing that it could not succeed but after several sieges; when the only chance of success rested upon the possibility of accomplishing its object without such previous siege, or rather without any siege at all.

Lord Porchester having considered the expedition in a military point of view, came to the retention of our troops in the pernieious climate of Walcheren, after the ulterior and main objects of the expedition were abandoned. When lord Chatham relinquished those objects, why had not Flushing been completely destroyed, and the army withdrawn from that frightful scene of contagion and death, whilst it could yet be called an army? Why were our soldiery left to the ravages of the peculiar malady of the marshes of Walcheren without immediate relief? Ministry were informed by sir Eyre Coote, that there were 8,000 sick in the island in the month of September. How could the delay in sending out relief have happened, when sir Eyre Coote had written so pressingly for blankets, and warm clothing and medicines.? With regard to the idea of the expedition operating as a great diversion in favour of Austria, it was most extravagant to suppose that any feeble efforts of ours, at that dreadful period, could have controlled the destinies of the continent. The

only instance of its having operated at all in that way, that he could learn, was the return of a battalion or two from Louvain. At the very moment that our ministers were speculating in diversions, France had every where as great a force as was necessary for the complete defence of her vast empire. Even the gazette proved that the expedition was not intended as a diversion in favour of Austria. That country was sensible that it was never intended as such. The world knew it was not; and there was not a cabinet in Europe that did not laugh at those who could be so weak and silly as to have projected it. Under all these considerations, he submitted to the House two sets of resolutions; the first relating to the impolicy or folly of the expedition; the second to the retention of the island of Walcheren, after the great object of the expedition had been abandoned as impracticable.

No. I.-1st. "That on the 28th of July last, and subsequent days, an armament, consisting of 39,000 land-forces, thirty-seven sail of the line, two ships of fifty, three of forty-four guns, twenty-four frigates, thirty-one sloops, five bomb-vessels, twenty-three gunbrigs, sailed on the late expedition to the Scheldt, having for its object the capture or destruction of the enemy's ships, either building at Antwerp or Flushing, or afloat on the Scheldt, the destruction of the arsenals and dock-yards at Antwerp, Torneaux, and Flushing, the reduction of the island of Walcheren, and the rendering, if possible, the Scheldt no longer navigable for ships of war..

2nd. "That Flushing surrender.