to this town, from the Lee; but molt of the heavy fhips top a few miles below, and fend up their goods in lighter craft. This town carries on a confiderable trade with the West Indies: the manufactures are trifling; a little fail cloth is made, and fomething done in cotton printing a good many hips are built here, and fome excellent cabinet work done. Lancafter contains about Sooo fouis. This was the laft place in my tour, where I propofed continuing the political enquiry, and therefore felt fome mortification on being denied access to the parish regifters, for the first time.

(To be continued.}

To the Editor of the Monthly Magazine.

SIR,

PERMIT

me to correct an error, which unintentionally crept into my letter of February last, on" the antivenereal qualities of the nitrous acid;" wherein I ftated, that this remedy was recommended to our notice by Mr. William Scott of Bombay, whereas, I meant to have faid, Helenas Scott; and I have to acknowledge my obligations to a lady in Scotland, who has kindly informed me, in a letter from Dundee, dated May 1ft, that there is no furgeon, on the Bengal cftablishment, of the name of William Scott. Hatton Garden Yours, &c. May 16th, 1799. CHARLES BROWN.

To the Editor of the Monthly Magazine.

TH

HE fubject of hat making by engines, Mr. Editor, not being yet noticed by any of your other corre

Ipondents, I wish, through the medium of

of

your Magazine, to give an answer to one of the queries propofed in the 355th page your 6th volume. In that letter, I afk your correfpondents, " if any engines for that purpofe had been erected?" I find in the courfe of my enquiries fince that, that at least two are at prefent at work; one belonging to Meffrs. COOPER, BIBBY, and DowNAT, at Lea Wood, near Cromford, in Derbyshire; and the fecond, the property of Meffrs. WELLS and CHATERTON, Brenchly, in Kent, what the plans are of either of thefe, or how far they go in the process, I could with to be informed through the medium of your mifcellanyit is faid, that Mr. Saxton, Queen Street, Southwark, has alto a concern in one; he will, no doubt, oblige fome of your correfpondents, by his information.-Looking over the

No. 45,

article "hat," in various Encyclopædias, as fuggefted by your correfpondent, W. H. in your Magazine for Jan. 1799, p. 27, I could not help remarking the very great difference between the accounts, as exhibited in thofe publications, and alfo in the Univerfal Magazine, for 1750, and the process of that manufactory at present: I with any of your correfpondents, who are hat makers, would give us a regular account of that bufinefs; for, I may fay with truth, that the contributors of that article, in the above publications, have, comparatively speaking, known nothing of the bufinefs they took upon them to lay before the public. I find the fame account is copied, or nearly fo, by Prifcilla Wakefield, in the 94th and following pages of her "Mental Recreations," zd edition.-The friend, whofe manufactory I went to fee, in confequence of my enquiries, informed me, that Dr. Aikin, in his "Hiftory of Manchester," in the 162d page, of the edition of 1795, whilft he is giving an account of the hat making there, ufes this expreffion (after informing us, that the hats are bowed and bafoned), he fays, that they are boiled in "common afringents of native growth." My friend oberved, that he did not understand that fentence; but it might perhaps be explained to him by fome of your correfpondents. Pray, Sir, can you inform me, if there be any engines conftructed for cutting the fur from hair, rabbit, or beaver fkins?

Amoting the too much neglected

ftudy of practical, or economical botany, I have long cherished the defign of publifhing a felection of thofe untranflated papers from the "Amanitates Academica,” which are either connected with, or illuftrative of, this interefting department of botanical fcience. While I was arranging the plan of my work, and preparing to tranflate the papers which I had felected for the purpose, a profpectus appeared from "a member of the University of Oxford," ftating his intention of publishing a tranflation* (with modern difcoveries and improvements,) of the Genera and Species Plantarum, of Linnæus, which was to be followed by a fupplementary

*Notice of this work likewife appeared in the Monthly Magazine, Vol. iii. p. 59.

work,

work, explanatory of the properties and ufes of plants, and forming a comprehenfive fyftem of practical botany; in confequence of which latter defign, I thought proper to fufpend my own work till I could gain fuch fatisfactory intelligence refpecting the other, as would enable me to judge how far our refpective undertakings might clash with each other. As a confiderable time has elapfed fince the publication of that profpectus, and no material progrefs having been made, as far as I can learn, in the work, I am at a lofs to conceive whether it has been relinquished from want of patronage and fupport, which is too often the cafe with works of any magnitude and importance; or whether it has been retarded by any other accidental or unforeseen circumftances. I fhall be obliged, therefore, to the author, fhould this letter fall under his obfervation, to acquaint me whether he is ftill occupied on this undertaking; and, in particular, whether he abides in his original intention of publishing a fyftem of practical botany. That he may form a judgment of the nature and extent of my work, I fubjoin a lift of the treatifes which I had proposed to tranflate, previously remarking, that in order to render the work as complete and authentic as poffible, each differtation would have been enlarged by various additions and annotations, illuftrative of the difcoveries that have been made fince the publication of the Amænitates Academicæ.

places with the other treatifes, and perhaps mature confideration might have induced me to have gone upon a fimilar plan with fome of the papers in the above lift, more particularly in the one intituled, Planta Officinales, which is barely a lift of officinal plants, and muft neceffarily, without fome additional obfervations, prove extremely uninterefting. As I by no means with to interfere with the defign of another person, and prior, perhaps, to my own, I am particularly defirous of gaining intelligence, both with regard to the precife nature of, and progrefs that has been made in the work, fo long fince announced for publication, by a member of the Univerfity of Oxford, that I may have an opportunity of judging whether it would be expedient to refume my plan, or entirely relinquish it.

I was much gratified by obferving a tranflation of Gmelin's edition of the Syftema Natura, with the fubfequent difcoveries, announced in your last Magazine, p. 319, and am happy a work of this importance has fallen into fuch able hands. As the refpectable author of this tranflation propofes to include the dif coveries made fince the publication of the original work, which are both numerous and interefting, I hope he will, at the fame time, pay particular attention in correcting the multifarious errors with which Gmelin's work, more particularly in the botanical department, abounds. There is likewife an improvement I would recommend in the tranflation of this work, and which will not be attended with much trouble; that is, the feparation of the two claffes, Icofandria and Polyandria, which have been fo unfyftematically united by Gmelin. Other occafional improvements will doubtless occur to the tranflator in the progress of his undertaking. Withing him fuccefs in the execution of it, I remain, Yours, &c.

May 10th, 1799.

R. H. C.

trine and the objection to it.-All our more feeble impreffions or ideas are the copies of our more lively and immediate impreffions. The idea of caufe is derived froin no fingle inftance of the operation of bodies, but from a fucceffion of them, which produces a new impreffion of accustomed connection. And this impreffion is the parent of the idea of neceffary connection-thus far Mr. Hume. But, fays Mr. Richter, acccustomed connection and neceflary connection are effentially different; hence we have an idea which is not a copy of a previous impreffion. Now though I am fatisfied with this reafoning, I am by no means contented with the general inference which Mr. RICHTER forms; for he firit identifies Hume's theory with the whole body of our national metaphyficks, and thence determines that as our own nation contains no "reafonable and confiftent theory" of the origin of ideas, we fhould have recourfe to the fyftem of the famous German profellor Kant. When I confider the general character of Kant's Philofophy, and that is exprefsly eftablished on the notion of innate ideas*, I am anxious to fhew that we are not driven to the neceffity of reviving the buried controverfies of the last century, and that we need not raife the fpirit of antient metaphyfics which the powerful wand of Locke has been thought to have for ever laid.

Grofsly and indiftinctly examined, the philofophy of Hume nearly resembles that taught in the fchool of Hartley, and the modern French philofophers. But the character of his writings does not authoFife their being the reprefentative of the modern fchool. In felicity of definition, in familiar illuftration, and in perfpicuity of narrative, we muft in candour allow the preference to our continental neighbours; but their works are more fpecious than profound, they rather ftate plaufibly than prove fkilfully; and though they fatisfy the willing ftudent, they are not rich in that variety and depth of proof which the fceptic requires. Hartley, on the contrary, with few exterior extractions, is at once profound and folid: he furnies an armoury offenfive and defenfive, and the minute detail of proof which he difplays, makes a permanent impreffion. Of Hume, I fear, that in fpite of his palt renown, a fevere analyfis will difcover, that though, from the influence of much tafte, he could diffufe over a broad

*See Dr. Beddoes' very excellent effay on the Nature of Demonftrative Evidence.

furface a general air of elegance; and from the acuteness of his mind, detect errors, inconfiftencies, and abfurdities in the popular opinions, as in his exquifite dialogues, the fceptic, &c. yet that from the want of clofe and correct thought, or not having the habit of attending minutely to the meaning of words (which means the fame) he was not able to write with that precifion and correctnefs which can fatisfy the learned critic or the subtle dif putant.

Whilft then I allow that Mr. Richter has in ftrictnefs refuted Hume, I must oppofe the fpirit of his argument. For the affertion by Hume, that all our ideas are copies of our impreffions, is in fubftance the fame as the generally received notion that all our ideas are derived from the fenfes. Let us difmifs for the present Hume's diftinction between impreffions and ideas, and adopt one that promises a clear elucidation. "Senfations, perceptions, and ideas, are the changes produced in the interior organ by the impreffions on the exterior organ. Thefe changes confidered in themselves are called fenfations; when the interior organs perceives them, they are termed preceptions, and they are called ideas when the interior organ refers thefe changes to the objects producing them." I have an idea of neceffary connection at this moment, that I am enquiring into the object that produced it. But when first excited, it was only a perception, that is, (as in propriety all ideas are) an involuntary change in my internal organ, produced by the tranfmiffion of a fenfation by the external to the internal organ, and there modified by all the affociated previous fenfations which that organ had received. It is reasonable that the perception of caufe fhould not be generated by the first inftance of coexistence or fucceffion of event; but by a repetition of fuch inftances. But Mr. Hume has unhappily accounted for it. "There is nothing in a number of inftances different from every single infiance which is fuppofed to be exactly fimilar, except only that after a repetition, the mind by habit expects," &c. Now in truth, every inftance is really different, in the fame manner as if two perfons are taken to a view which one of them has feen formerly, or in landfcape, his fenfation fimply in itself, though complex in its caufes, will be very different from that of him to whom the object was altogether novel. If it is asked, when, and in what manner, this percep

Systeme de la Nature.

tion

that term.

tion is excited, I answer, that the celerity of all intellectual affociations juftifies our fuppofing that it takes place very early in life, long before the term itfelf could be made intelligible. A child, for instance, kicks a ball, it rolls, he lays his hand upon it, and it ftops. An obfcure perception of caufe or neceffary connection rifes in his mind, and, like the gradual perception of objects at day break, his organs are flowly quickened, till he fees clearly and diftinctly all around him. One of the great axioms of modern philofophy is, that general terms are not expreffive of any particular idea, but that they are calculated to call up or excite indifferently many diftinct ideas. In the abstract we can have no idea of caufe, but from our earlieft infancy we have had frequent experience of what is fignified by The child is very foon made fenfible that he must stoop to pick up his toy, and that if he does not grafp his hand it will fall; this perception is fufficiently explained by the law of affociation, which establishes the connection in idea between the end to be attained and the means to be employed. This great truth Mr. Hume has endeavoured to ftate, but with an inaccuracy which alone gave his opponent a decided fuperiority. "We "then feel a new fentiment or impreffion, "to wit, a customary connection in the "thought;" and then obferves, that this fuggefts the idea of neceffary connection. Now, though it was a cuftomary connection in fact which produced the connection in thought, yet, in the mind of the child, the cuflom or habit of the connection formed no part of the perception or rather fenfation. The idea that it did, fuppofes much fuperfluous and uncauied reflection. The connection was at first perhaps faint and unconfcious, and as it grew, received additional and fupplemental circumstances, fuch as the idea of the caufe of its own existence. From the great law of affociation, by which the appearance of one object excites in the mind the idea of others connected with it, and also revives fenfations (excited by thofe objects) which are not by any one fuppofed to be copies of any thing external, have arifen all ideas of reflection; and it has ultimately given birth, in a being purely paffive and mechanical, to that leries of motions the vigour, rapidity, and fortunate connections of which, produce the sublime energies of the POET and the PHILOSOPHER.

But however, Hume's diftinction beween impreffions and ideas must be t rown MONTHLY MAG. No. XLV.

afide; because it seems to imply a diftinction in nature; whilft the definitions of the French philofopher establish distinctions which are purely relative, and founded on different views of the fame fubject; and do not clafh in the leaft with BERKELEY: and if this objection were not fatal, the arrangement would be found imperfect, applying only to thofe ideas of fenfation which may be faintly excited in the ab. fence of the original external object. But the impreffion of neceffary connection having arifen from an external object, fimulated with a mind impregnated with certain previous impreffions, it ever remains an impreffion, loting by reflection none of its original force and livelinefs, and therefore never becoming, in Mr. Hume's fenfe, an idea.

But Mr. Hume, though fometimes acquainted with the law of affociation, denies that the external objects excite the idea of caufe. It would exceed the limits of a paper to review his 7th fection. Thofe who examine it, will find, that he has grofsly confounded the perception of a connection in fact, between certain events, as the fenfe of pain after blows: with a knowledge of that energy in nature by which the conection is preferved, fuch as the occult principles of animal irritation and fenfation, operating, through the fuppofed agency of the nerves: a knowledge which is beyond the limits of human intellect.

Left Mr. RICHTER fhould reply that there is still a distinction between an uniformly experienced connection and a neceffary connection; I would remark, that the neceffity in future is fuggefted inceffantly to the child, by the frequent cccafion for renewed efforts in his little occupations, and in the obstacles attending his exertions. And, that when once neceffity in individual cafes is apparent, it fuppofes no greater exertion of what is popularly called active power, than all theories allow; to extend in thought fuch neceflity to past events: and finally by a train of fimple and demonstrative reafoning, to arrive at one of the most valuable truths in philofophy, the fubjection of the intellectual as well as the material world to the irrefiftible laws of neceffity.

It may feem that I have not reasoned, but rather afferted, in thefe remarks; but argument muft in all cafes termina te in the affertion of facts, which those who hear them, will variously receive as they agree with their own obfervation. reafons beft, who appeals to the facts most generally admitted; and on that ground 3 C

He

I have