ANDERSON v. Colson. Anderson v. Colson. 1. MANDAMUS: A mandamus will not be allowed upon the hearing of the application for which the applicant's title to an office, in virtue whereof he claims the writ, is drawn in question. This was an original application to this court for the writ of mandamus, to be directed to the defendant Colson,. as treasurer of Dodge county. The applicant in his petition for the writ, states that a meeting of the electors of school district number one of Dodge county, was, on the 4th day of April, 1870, duly convened for the purpose, among other things, of electing members of the school board for the ensuing year: In the course of the proceedings, which are minutely detailed, a motion to adjourn to the eleventh of April was made, and having been put hy the moderator and voted upon by those present, was by that officer declared, in his opinion, carried. A division was called for, which being had, the presiding officer declared the meeting adjourned. An appeal from the moderator's decision to the meeting was claimed; but he refused to entertain it, and immediately left the chair and the room, the clerk going with him. Thereupon, Mr. E. H. Crosby was, by those remaining, elected president, and Mr. Robert Kettle, secretary of the meeting; they at once took the places of the officers who had left. Mr. Crosby entertained the appeal from the decision of the chair on the question of the adjournment, and put the question to the meeting, which did not sustain the decision; thereafter the business was proceeded with as if there had been no interruption; an election was held for members of the school board, which resulted in the election of five gentlemen. The applicant here was elected by this board as treasurer of the district, and claims to be such treasurer under this board. In the county treasury there are $2,750, ANDERSON v. COLSON. to which the school board is entitled. The object of the writ is to compel the county treasurer to pay this money to the applicant, as treasurer of the school board. The answer does not deny the facts alleged in the petition, as above stated, except as it claims that the meeting of the 4th was actually and fairly adjourned to the 11th of April, and that all the proceedings had on the day of the first meeting after the adjournment, were unauthorized and void. On the 11th, pursuant to the adjournment, the electors of said district again met, when they re-elected for the ensuing year the members of the old board. This board reorganized and elected its officers, and retained all the books, records, papers and funds of the district. To this answer there was no replication. The hearing was upon these pleadings. R. Kittle, for the application. E. F. Gray, contra. MASON, Ch. J. The pleadings show that there is a dispute who is treasurer of the school district. We cannot try that question upon an application for a mandamus. The applicant must first establish, by the proper process, his right to the office by which he claims the writ. Having done that, this application will be in order. Mr. Justice CURTIS in ex rel. Goodrich v. Guthrie, secretary of the treasury, 17 Howard, 305. The petition is dismissed. MONROE v. ELBURT. Monroe v. Elburt. 1. PRACTICE: Exceptions to charge. To make exceptions to the charge of the court to the jury available to the party excepting, the exception must be reduced to writing, together with so much of the charge as is necessary to explain it. 2. ·: Bill must be signea in term. If the bill of exceptions be not reducea to writing and tendered during the term at which the trial is had, it will be disregarded. The facts are fully stated in the opinion. A. J. Poppleton, for plaintiff in error. In representing the defence in this case, we would state : 1st. That in order for the court to take or consider the motion for a new trial in this case, the record must show that the plaintiff excepted to the overruling of the new trial by the court below at the time that it was done, which does not appear. Morgan v. Boyd, 13 Ohio State Reports, 281. 2d. That in order that the court consider any of the supposed errors that took place during the proceeding of this cause in the court below, it must appear that the said plaintiff, at the time each supposed error was made or each question was passed on, excepted to the ruling, and that a bill or bills of exceptions were made out and signed before the adjournment of that term of the court. Doe v. Brown, 6 Ohio State Reports, 12; Kline et al. v. Wyne, Haynes & Co., 10 Ohio State Reports, 221. No memorandum of the judge purporting to be the charge to the jury, can be considered in this case unless the plaintiff has embodied the same in his bill of exceptions which is not done in this case. Hallum v. Jacks, 11 Ohio State Reports, 692. LAKE, J. MONROE v. ELBURT. This case was tried in the District Court while we were yet a territory. The supposed errors consist in the refusal of the court below to give certain instructions asked by the defendant, as well as those actually given to the jury upon the trial. It is objected on the part of the defendants in error, that this court cannot consider the alleged errors for the reason that the record discloses the fact, that the bill of exceptions was not reduced to writing and signed by the presiding judge during the term at which the trial took place. To make exceptions to the charge of the court to the jury available to the party excepting, it is necessary that the exceptions be reduced to writing, together with so much of the evidence as is necessary to explain it. Vide Code, sec. 309. The record before us contains none of the testimony adduced upon the trial. The instructions asked may have been entirely irrelevant. If so, then, even though abstractly considered, they may have been correct legal propositions; it was not error to refuse to give them to the jury. Kugler v. Wiseman, 20 Ohio Reports, 361. But we cannot consider here the exceptions taken. The case was tried by a jury on the 14th day of April, 1866, and the court closed its term on the 18th day of the same month. The bill of exceptions was settled and signed by the judge on the 6th of September following. This was in direct violation of section 308 of the Code, which provides, that "time may be given to reduce the exceptions to writing, but not beyond the term. If not reduced to writing during the term, it must be regarded as no exception." Kline and Berry v. Wynne, Haynes & Co., 10 Ohio State, 223. There being no exceptions in the record which we can consider, the judgment of the court below must be affirmed Judgment affirmed. 1. POWER OF SCHOOL BOARD: To remove teachers. A statute empowering a school board to employ teachers and remove them at pleasure, enters into and forms part of a contract made by the board with a teacher for his services for one year; and he may be discharged within that time notwithstanding the terms of his employment. 2. JURISDICTION: To inquire the cause of removal. The court has not jurisdiction to inquire the cause of the removal, nor whether the cause alleged be sufficient. This was a petition in error filed to review a judgment of the District Court for Otoe county. The facts are sufficiently stated in the opinion. I. N. Shambaugh for Jones, plaintiff in error, among others not considered by the court, argued the following points: II. The contract was for one year's service for a fixed price for the term. It was an entire contract, and the defendants could not without some fault or misconduct of the plaintiff discharge him and terminate the contract before the end of the school year, and having dismissed the plaintiff before the end of the term and prevented him from rendering the service stipulated for the defendants, are liable to him for the balance of his year's wages which remains unpaid.—2 Parsons on Contr. 41 and note; 22 Ill. 63; 28 Ill. 257; 2 Parsons on Contr. 34, note I and cases cited; 9 Mo. 218; 3 Mo. 230, 233; 4 Mo. 41; 2 Denio 619; The case in Denio is directly in point, 20 Vt. 487; 9 U. S. Digest 393 Sec. 10; 3 Greenleaf (Maine) 450; 1 McAll (Cal.) 505; 18 U. S. Digest 54. III. In such cases the measure of damages is the contract price, unless the defendants show that during the time he was prevented from fulfilling his contract he was otherwise employed, or was offered employment of a similar kind in the same place. The burden is on the defendants to show |