Mr. Stephenson, he added, was present in the room, ready to answer any questions which might be put to him on the subject; and "it would be better that he should be asked questions than required to make a speech; for, though a very good engineer, he was a bad speaker." One of the questions then put to Mr. Stephenson related to the mode by which he proposed to haul the passenger carriages over the Menai Bridge by horse-power; and he was asked whether he knew the pressure the bridge was capable of sustaining. His answer was, that "he had not yet made any calculations; but he proposed getting data which would enable him to arrive at an accurate calculation of the actual strain upon the bridge during the late gale. But he had no hesitation in saying that it was more than twenty times as much as the strain of a train of carriages and a locomotive engine. The only reason why he proposed to convey the carriages over by horses, was in order that he might, by distributing the weight, not increase the waving motion. All the train would be on at once; but distributed. This he thought better than passing them linked together by a locomotive engine."

Mr. Vignolles, in the course of the same month, published a defence of his mode of effecting a communication between London and Dublin, although he confessed that to impugn Mr. Stephenson's statements in reference to his measure, or to enter into a professional contest with such high authority, was almost "bearding the lion in his den." The Dublin Chamber of Commerce decided in favour of Mr. Stephenson's plan; and at a meeting of members of Parliament held in London in May, 1839, a series of resolutions was adopted in favour of the scheme. At that meeting Mr. Stephenson was present, and gave explanations on many of its essential points. Notwithstanding, however, these important demonstrations of opinion in its favour, Mr. Stephenson's plan of a railway from Chester to Holyhead, like many others projected about the same time, was allowed to drop; and it was not resumed until several years after, when it was taken up by his son, and brought to a successful completion, with certain modifications, including the grand original feature of the tubular bridge across the Menai Straits.*

The completion of a main line of railway communication between London and Glasgow by the western side of the *The Chester and Holyhead Act was obtained in the session of 1844.

island, was another of the great projects on which Mr. Stephenson was now engaged. In 1837, he was requested by the Calédonian Railway Committee, and also by the Whitehaven, Workington, and Maryport Railway Committee, to make an examination of the country, and report to them as to the best line that could be formed. With this object he made a careful survey of the entire country between Lancaster and Carlisle, by Ulverstone and Whitehaven, and also by Kirby, Lonsdale, and Penrith. As on the eastern coast, here also he reported in favour of the coast route. Besides the flatness of such a line, and the consequent superiority of the gradients-a point to which he always attached the greatest importance-the coast line could be formed at comparatively small expense; valuable iron mines would be opened out, from which a large traffic might be anticipated, while, as a collateral advantage, an extensive tract of valuable land would be reclaimed by the formation of his proposed embankment across Ulverston sands at the head of Morecombe Bay. There would also be fifteen miles less of new railway to be constructed by the coast line than by the more direct inland route across Shap Fell. The latter route-planned by Mr. Locke-was twenty miles shorter between Lancaster and Carlisle; but the gradients were much heavier, and the works far more difficult and costly. It was, however, eventually preferred to the west coast line of Mr. Stephenson, which was, for a time, lost sight of. Nevertheless it has since been formed; the large traffic in iron ore which he anticipated has been obtained; and his favourite scheme of reclaiming the immense tract of land at the head of Morecombe Bay-from forty to fifty thousand acres in extent-by means of the railway embankment necessary to complete the connection with the Lancaster and Carlisle line, has recently been carried into effect in a modified form, and to some extent after his plans.*

The Leeds and Bradford Railway, surveyed by Mr. Stephenson in 1838, was a line of comparatively small extent, but of considerable importance in a local point of view, as connecting the two principal manufacturing towns of Yorkshire. The scheme was brought out in the following year, under very favourable auspices; but like most of the railway

† See Reports by Mr. Stephenson on the subject, dated October 12th, 1836; March 13th, 1837; and August 16th, 1837.

projects of the same period, it was suspended in consequence of the financial embarrassment of the country, which was to some extent caused by the large investments of capital in railways during the few preceding years.

The rapidity with which railways had been extended between the years 1836 and 1839 was extraordinary, although not to be compared with the railway mania of a subsequent period. There was quite a rush for railway acts in the sessions of 1836 and 1837. In the former year, thirty-four bills passed the legislature, authorizing the formation of 994 miles of new railway, at an estimated cost of 17,595,000l. The traffic cases got up by the promoters of some of the bills, were very strong. Traffic-taking had become a lucrative trade; and ingenious arithmeticians who devoted themselves to the art of getting up traffic, soon became able to "prove" whatever the promoters of railways wanted. Thus, the traffic case of the Eastern Counties Railway showed that there would be a clear profit on the outlay of 23 per cent. ! The North Midland "proved" a traffic which would yield them a profit of 10 per cent.; the York and North Midland, of 13; and the London and Cambridge, of 14 per cent. Other companies made out equally "strong" traffic cases.

In the following session of 1837, not fewer than 118 notices of new railway bills were given. Seventy-nine of these were actually introduced to Parliament; and forty-two acts were obtained, the principal of which, however, were extensions of previous acts. Fourteen new companies were incorporated, and authorized to construct 464 miles of railway at a cost of 8,087,000%. During this session the traffic-takers grew bolder, and reached their highest flights. Thus, the promoters of the Sheffield and Manchester Bill “proved” a traffic which was to yield a net profit of 184 per cent. on the outlay. One of the fortunate shareholders in the company, in a letter to the "Railway Magazine," even went so far beyond the traffic-taker, as to calculate on a dividend of 80 per cent. !

But the prodigious extent of railway works already authorized was not enough to satisfy the rage for railway extension which still prevailed; for, by the end of 1837, notices were given of seventy-five new bills, to authorize the construction of some 1230 miles of additional railway, at an estimated cost of above nineteen millions sterling. By this time, thirty

millions had actually been expended, and nearly 1500 miles of railway constructed and opened, in the course of a very few years; and several hundred thousand labourers and mechanics were still occupied in the making of railways and the manufacture of railway stock. It was estimated that the railways in course of construction would cost twenty-two millions more before they were ready for traffic. Heavy calls were

made from time to time upon the holders of the shares to enable the works to proceed. The monetary pressure which had already set in, was thereby increased; shares fell in price; and the railway interest began to be severely discouraged. Railway extension was thus effectually checked for a time; and a sort of collapse ensued, which, together with the restrictions imposed by Parliament on the obtaining of new acts, placed a severe and indeed wholesome restraint upon speculation; and many of the most recent railway projects were consequently abandoned, or for a time lay dormant. Amongst this latter class, were Mr. Stephenson's East and West Coast lines to Scotland, the Chester and Holyhead Railway, and the line from Leeds to Bradford. During the two sessions of 1838 and 1839 only five new railway companies obtained acts of incorporation. In 1840, not a single railway act was obtained; and in 1841 only the Hertford and Ware branch, 5 miles in length, was authorized; and even that was not constructed. In 1842 the Newcastle and Darlington Railway (part of the original Great North of England, which could not be completed for want of capital) was authorized under this new name; and in the same session, the Yarmouth and Norwich and Warwick and Leamington branches were authorized. The year 1843 was also a quiet railway session, only a few new branches of established lines having been then authorized; and it was not until 1844 that the tide of railway enterprise suddenly rose again, and in the following year fairly burst all bounds, breaking out in the wildest fury of speculation.

CHAPTER XXIX.

MR. STEPHENSON AND THE NEW SCHOOL OF FAST
ENGINEERS.

THE general demand for railways which sprang up shortly after the successful opening of the Liverpool and Manchester line, brought into existence a large number of engineers of great ability, distinguished by their practical skill and their high standing as scientific men. In this country of free industrial competition, no sooner does the demand for a particular class of talent arise, than it is supplied as if by magic. The laissez faire course of action adopted by the government with reference to railways, though it led to much bungling and enormous expense, nevertheless gave full scope to the genius and enterprise of English engineers. So long as the prospect of dividends ranging from 8 to 15 per cent. was held out, there was to be found a numerous class of private capitalists ready to invest money in iron roads, and to find capital for the construction of new lines. Much rivalry thus arose, the engineers usually appearing as the leaders of the battle on opposing sides, when two or more lines were started between the same points. A considerable amount of personal feeling was occasionally evoked in these engineering contests, which were as often trials of individual ambition as of professional skill. Aspiring juniors sought to supplant their elder brethren at boards of directors, or to defeat their schemes before parliamentary committees; and many new men laboured to mature and bring out railway projects more striking and original than anything that had before been proposed.

Whilst continental governments, early recognizing the great national advantages of railways, were appointing state engineers for the purpose of determining by preliminary sur