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sacrifice present in it has been the atoning virtue of Christ's sacrifice is a form of this conception of merit which commends itself to some, though perhaps rather as a part of the man-ward aspect of the atonement, than as its power to prevail with God. Love is the life in which the atonement was made, and self-sacrifice, which is of the essence of love (though self-sacrifice is not an adequate definition of love), is the form in which love is seen in the atonement. But the atonement is such, not because of the self-sacrificing love manifested in it, but as that love taking a form determined by our need as God's offspring, alienated from Him by sin.” 1
The latter portion of this extract does not call for much comment here. It is obvious that self-sacrifice is not identical with love, though it is, under the conditions of this life, one of its most essential expressions, and, as the author admits, is the form which it took in the atonement. Neither, of course, would it suffice to constitute an atonement in itself, and apart from the method of exercising it. It was not the self-sacrifice but the moral element of the Sacrifice of Christ, to which I ascribed its atoning virtue;' the self-sacrifice I spoke of chiefly in its relation to man. But Mr. Campbell speaks of Catholic writers dwelling on the excellence of Christ as related to our demerits in a way
1 Nature of the Atonement, p. 399. ? A few words have indeed been inserted (at p. 6), to bring out this idea more clearly, but they do not add to it, and I wrote them before seeing Mr. Campbell's comment.
that has in it the essence of the imputation of righteousness with which they reproach the Reformers. I am not sure that I clearly understand the charge. It is certainly Catholic doctrine, that all human merit is accepted for Christ's sake only, and derives its whole efficacy from His Cross and Passion. But this differs toto cælo from the Lutheran view of a transfer or imputation of righteousness, and of merit counterbalancing demerit. It is just the difference between saying that His merit and obedience is taken as a substitute for ours, and saying that He has merited for His brethren, as the Second Adam and Head of the family of the regenerate, forgiveness of the past and grace henceforth to serve God, not as slaves, but sons. It is a real though imperfect righteousness which “the just Judge” rewards, yet in bestowing that crown of righteousness, He is, in St. Augustine's words, crowning His own gifts. We can neither be justified without the righteousness of Christ, whereby all grace
is won for us, nor is it by that righteousness, in the words
of the Tridentine Council, that we are "formally just.” A substituted righteousness is even more alien from the Catholic idea of the Atonement than a substituted punishment. The author, I think, misapprehends that idea from failing to realise the infusion of sanctifying grace through sacramental union with our Lord, as an integral part of it. At all events his objections to it seem ultimately to run up into the difficulty, which he elsewhere expressly recognises and dwells upon, in conceiving of any atonement being required at all, rather than a mere announcement of the Divine mercy.?
It will be seen that I have confined myself to noticing in detail those passages of Mr. Campbell's book which bear directly on my own, and seemed, therefore, to call for a reply. Criticism on living writers does not (as was observed in my original preface) fall properly within the scope of a treatise on the history of doctrine. But it is impossible not to sympathise with the spirit of Mr. Campbell's book and with much of its positive teaching, especially as to what he calls the “expiatory confession of our sins by Christ,” which seems to be its leading idea. My criticisms, were I to undertake the task of criticising,
1 Nature of Atonement, pp. 20, 899.
would probably refer mainly to the negative aspects of his theology, partly in the way of denials, and still more of omissions.
One conspicuous omission must at once strike every Catholic reader, though under the circumstances it is only natural. No view of the Atonement, either in relation to God or man, can be other than incomplete, which ignores its perpetuation in the Eucharistic Sacrifice,' and application through the sacraments to the individual soul.
In the present edition, I have made more frequent use of contemporary English writers in illustration of my argument, both in the Introductory Essay on Development and in the body of the work. It will of course be understood, in such cases, that I do not necessarily commit myself to agreement with every syllable of passages, quoted on the whole with approval, still less to any opinions expresse:l elsewhere by the same authors; as neither, on the other hand, does my using their testimony imply any agreement with me on their part, beyond what is conveyed in their own words. But it is instructive to observe how
'In one place the author seems unconsciously to be touching on this, where he speaks of “the perfection of humanity in Christ" being “a pleading, even were it silent, for all humanity.” It is such a silent pleading, where He presents it continually in heaven-for in words He prays po more—and on the altars of His earthly Church in the mystery of the Eucharist.
much there often is in common between those who are widely separated in position or belief, and how many differences, long and bitterly cherished, have their root in mutual misunderstandings. There is, perhaps, no theological controversy to which this remark applies with greater force than to that concerning justification. What Luther puts forward as the articulus stantis vel cadentis Ecclesiæ, is in reality maintained by no theologian of name at the present day, either in his own country or in ours. Those who most highly honour the Reformer himself, even those who still accept the formularies which bear his name, are often the furthest removed from teaching what he taught. The doctrine of justification preached in the majority of Anglican pulpits is, at least in its main features, the doctrine, not of Luther, but of the Council of Trent. And so, to take a very different instance, it is remarkable how those, who not long ago were strongly opposed to it, are coming to acknowledge, in the words of one of my Anglican critics, and by no means the most favourably disposed to my view, “that every student of theology must admit some kind of development of doctrine,” and that “in a certain sense it underlies the theology of all Churches, for wherever there is any action of mind upon truth, there is a development