is a member of the race.1 Sin, then, has a direct effect in dissolving, ipso facto, the organization of humanity. The parts lose their proper relationship and union with each other, and both are accordingly dishonoured, the spiritual enslaved to the material, the material itself made subject to a law of decay and death extending over the whole physical creation. The earth is cursed for man's sake.

But in the very ground of the curse lay also the possibility of redemption. The generic transmission of our fallen humanity, compounded of free spirit and unfree matter, which was the channel of sin, might prove the means of restoration, whenever a sinless descendant of the first Adam should appear, to become the Second Head and Father of the race, the Source to them of original merit (Erbverdienst) instead of original sin (Erbsünde). But this could only be One who was God as well as man. The Spirit, who is the Bond of Love in the Holy Trinity and had been at first the Principle of union between the creature and the Creator, immediately departed on the entrance of sin into the world. But the Divine Logos, by whom all things were made, as immediately took His place, and began at once to speak with authority in the conscience, so that man's life, amid manifold errors and darkness, remained a religious one, and was never wholly cut off from God even amid the deepest gloom of Heathendom. Conscience, as was shown in the case of Corne

The author alludes to 'Creationism' as opposed to 'Traducianism.'

" I need hardly remind the reader of the famous argument for the supremacy of conscience in Butler's Sermons on the Constitution of Human Nature.

lius, contained in itself the germ of redemption, and indeed of the future Church. We may say with Justin Martyr, "Those, like Socrates and Heraclitus, who lived according to the Logos (inwardly revealed) were Christians." Or, in the author's own words, "Conscience in its objectivity is the beginning of the external Church, and the Church is the objective perfection of conscience, having attained its outward fulfilment." But, inasmuch as this inward revelation to the individual conscience proved insufficient, an outward revelation was added, and that, being addressed to fallen man, could only be a revelation of the Redeemer. It was given first in the Covenant with Abraham, then in the Law of Sinai, which "fixed the categorical imperative of conscience in tables of stone." In the life of His chosen people God revealed a type of His dealings with mankind, and their history exhibited, as in a picture, the history and the judgment of the world. The Levitical priesthood recalled the reality of sin, the Prophetic Order spoke out with growing distinctness, as time went on, the promise of redemption.

We have seen that the created spirit had realised its creaturely freedom in the choice of evil, through what must be considered a second creative act. Restoration, therefore, could only be brought about through a new creative act, not to annihilate the first, which in itself is irreversible, but to abolish its results (dass sich dieselbe......obschon nicht in ihrem Seyn, doch in ihrem Daseyn aufhebt und auslöscht). And this

was a fresh revelation of God, not, like the first, as absolute Being, but as the Redeemer and Atoner who came to renew that life, originally derived from Himself, which the creature had lost by sin. It was to be at once an act of satisfaction wrought out through the perfect obedience of a sinless Child of the fallen race, and an act of creation and revelation vouchsafed by God; therefore only the God-Man could accomplish it. This double work of restoration has necessarily a gradual development, with various epochs and periods, and this, as we have seen, was actually the case. First the still small voice of God spoke, 'as from afar,' to the conscience of man; next He revealed Himself more intimately through the covenant with Abraham, and the Jewish ritual; and at last in the fulness of time the Divine fiat went forth, and the Word made Flesh proclaimed Himself the Way, the Truth, and the Life. He by whom all things were made at the beginning, came to remake them. The union of God and man in One Person finds a type and analogy in the union of spirit and material nature in man, which is also an organic union of life; and in the God-Man each nature remains perfect and entire.' In His birth

1 I omit the author's account of the hypostatic union, which does not materially differ from that in the ordinary manuals. He rejects, as inconsistent with the perfection of manhood, the common opinion of a full infusion of beatific and other knowledge into our Lord's Human Soul from the first, and holds, with the majority of the Fathers, that there was a real growth in wisdom, not only in its outward manifestations. The question will be found discussed in Wilberforce's Incarnation, ch. iv., Kuhn's Leben Jesu, i. 5. See also Petav. De Incarn. xi. 2-4, with the notes of Alethinus, who takes the same view as Pabst, and on the same grounds, as most consistent with the entire κévwσis of

of a Virgin we read both His identity with our common humanity and His distinction from it. He is a member, not a product, of the race. The Second Adam, like the first, is (as Man) an immediate creation of God, but, unlike the first, takes root in the soil of humanity, as not being formed from the ground, but from the consecrated substance of a virgin daughter of Eve. The thirty years of His hidden life represent His fellowship with our nature, as Son of Man; the three years of His public ministry represent His manifestation, as the Son of God with power, in His threefold office of King, Priest, and Prophet. In His character as Second Adam and Head of the race, He passed, like the first Adam, through the trial and probation of free-will, not for Himself but for us. The first man was placed for probation in the 'Paradise of pleasure,' where every need was satisfied; the Second was driven into the wilderness which brought forth thorns and thistles, the heritage of Adam's sin, to be tempted of the devil after fasting forty days. Each of the three Temptations was an attempt in different forms to make Him deny or doubt, if but for a moment, the perfect union of His human will with God. In His victory over the Tempter through the free exercise of that human will, though He was impeccable by virtue of the hypostatic union, He asserted, what

the Incarnation. This certainly appears to have been the general opinion of the Fathers. Cf. Klee, Dogmengeschichte, ii., 4, 7. The question does not, of course, relate to omniscience, which can in no case be ascribed to our Lord's Human Soul, being inconsistent with the conditions of human nature. Cf. Klee, Dogmatik, p. 511.

Adam's sin had denied, the absolute dependence of the creature on the Creator, and proclaimed before Heaven and Hell the entire conformity of His creaturely will with the will of God. And thus the work of redemption was begun.'

Since man by wilful disobedience had incurred the debt of sin, only through willing obedience of the whole life and being could that debt be paid. And in order to profit the whole race, the payment must take the shape of what in man is the natural consequence and fruit of sin. The entire life of the Redeemer, in great things as in small, must fulfil the ideal of penance, which in mankind is an inevitable necessity, but in Him was a voluntary sacrifice. This self-oblation, inaugurated in John's baptism of repentance, was consummated in the dereliction and the Cross. But His merit (Erbverdienst) can only be applied to His members individually by their own co-operation. Redemption is universal, justification depends on the human will; and as all are lost, whether under the law of nature, or of Moses, or of grace, who by personal act make the common sin of the race their own, so those alone can partake of the common merit who by voluntary union with the life of Christ, the ideal Man, make His merit theirs; so that what before were fruitless sufferings become in them a meritorious

There is an interesting discussion in Adam und Christus (pp. 76-83) on the relations of the freedom of Christ's human will to His impeccability, but it would take us too far from our proper subject to introduce it here. Cf. Kuhn's Leben Jesu (Mainz, 1838), vol. i. ch. 4.