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'ment he had proposed, or the continued existence of 'an Administration so situated; and this intimation 'was reduced to writing, to prevent any misconception, 'and in order that His Majesty might relieve himself 'from the embarrassment of the verbal opening of a 'painful communication.' The King adds, that he 'knows that it is, or has been, the opinion of some that 'he has acted prematurely, and that if he had agreed 'to the arrangement proposed by Lord Melbourne 'the Administration would have fallen to pieces 'and dissolved itself soon after the opening of Parlia'ment.'1
The following words of Lord Palmerston, cited in Baron Stockmar's Memoirs, and reproduced in Mr. McCullagh Torrens' Life of Lord Melbourne, give a summary view of the real facts of this dismissal.
'The Government, therefore,' writes Lord Palmerston, 'have not resigned, but are dismissed; and they 'are dismissed not in consequence of having proposed 'any measure of which the King disapproved, and 'which they nevertheless would not give up, but be'cause it is thought they are not strong enough in the 'Commons to carry on the business of the country, and 'their places are to be filled by men who are noto'riously weak and unpopular in the Lower House, how'ever strong they may be in the Upper one. It is 'impossible not to conclude that this is a preconcerted 'measure, and therefore it may be taken for granted 'that the Duke of Wellington is prepared at once to 'undertake the task of forming a Government.' *
1 Memoirs of Baron Storhmar, vol. i. p. 314. * Mt-moirs of Baron Stockmar, vol. i. p. 309. Also Memoirs of Lord Melbourne, vol. ii. p. 38.
Mr. Gladstone on the Dismissal. 305
Mr. Gladstone is one of the most recent critics of William IV. in these transactions, though, in estimating the constitutional character of the King's act, he hardly displays his customary refinement of analysis in distinguishing the kind of formal legality which is mentioned in text-books of law, and can alone be tested in courts of justice, from the true constitutional legality which is outraged if that is done in a single instance which, if often repeated, must entirely impair the nature and working of the Constitution.
'The endeavour of King William IV., in 1834, to 'assert his personal choice in the appointment of a 'Ministry without reference to the will of Parliament, 'gave to the Conservative party a momentary tenure of 'office without power. But, in truth, that indiscreet 'proceeding of an honest and well-meaning man pro'duced a strong reaction in favour of the Liberals, and 'greatly prolonged the predominance which they were 'on the point of losing through the play of natural 'causes. Laying too great a stress on the instrument 'of Royal will, it tended not to strengthen the Throne, 'but to enfeeble it. Such was the upshot of an injudi'cious, though undoubtedly conscientious, use of power.'1 'There is, indeed, one great and critical act, the 'responsibility for which falls momentarily or provi'sionally on the Sovereign; it is the dismissal of an 'existing Ministry, and the appointment of a new one. 'This act is usually performed with the aid drawn from 'authentic manifestations of public opinion, mostly such 'as are obtained through the votes or conduct of the 'House of Commons. Since the reign of George III.
J Gleaningt of Pant Years, vol. i. p. 38.
'there has been but one change of Ministry in which 'the Monarch acted without the support of these 'indications. It was when William IV., in 1834, dis'missed the Government of Lord Melbourne, which 'was known to be supported, though after a lukewarm 'fashion, by a large majority of the existing House of 'Commons. It can hardly be said that the King's 'initiative left to Sir R. Peel a freedom perfectly un'impaired. And, most certainly, it was a very real 'exercise of personal power. The power did not suffice 'for its end, which was to overset the Liberal predomi'nance; but it very nearly sufficed. Unconditionally 'entitled to dismiss the Ministers, the Sovereign can, 'of course, choose his own opportunity. He may defy 'the Parliament, if he can count upon the people. 'William IV., in the year 1834, had neither Parliament 'nor people with him. His act was within the limits 'of the Constitution, for it was covered by the respon'sibility of the acceding Ministry. But it reduced the 'Liberal majority from a number considerably beyond 'three hundred to about thirty; and it constituted an ex'ceptional, but very real and large action on the politics 'of the country, by the direct will of the King. I speak 'of the immediate effects. Its eventual result may have 'been different, for it converted a large disjointed mass 'into a smaller but organised and sufficient force, which 'held the fortress of power for the six years 1835—41. 'On this view it may be said that, if the Royal inter'vention anticipated and averted decay from natural 'causes, then, with all its immediate success, it defeated 'its own real aim.'1
1 Gleanings of Past Years, vol. i. p. 231.
Nature of the Right Assumed. 307
It is obvious that the claim set up by William IV. was no less than a claim despotically and irresponsibly to dismiss any Ministry which would not pledge itself to advocate a policy of which the King personally approved, and to select in its place a Ministry which would so pledge itself. The result of a course of conduct such as this must be, to make the Sovereign a far more potent factor in the working of the Constitution than could be compatible with the free action of the two Houses of Parliament. The claim is one, indeed, which had been set up in a far more noxious form by so recent a Sovereign as George III.; and there were abundant precedents for the same claim in earlier history. But the whole movement of the Constitution up to 1834 had been in the direction of preferring the automatic action of the Houses of Parliament to the automatic action of the Sovereign. Of course, there might be crises when, owing to contests between the two Houses of Parliament, or to the fact of the House of Commons at the moment not really representing public opinion outside, a wary and astute Sovereign could not but succeed, even while complying with the form and spirit of the Constitution, in making his own personal will prevalent over all competing forces. But no statesman would recommend, nor political theorist erect into an ideal, a condition of things as permanent which could only draw its justification from precedents afforded by the accidental advantage obtained, either by the Sovereign or by the Houses of Parliament, in a spasm or chaos of a wholly exceptional kind. Did such periods of strained differences between the two Houses, or want of conformity between the representative House and the electoral body, become lengthened, or threaten to be permanent, the Constitution itself must undergo a vital change. But it is only on such an hypothesis that any justification can be found for conjuring up so violent a mechanism for governing the country in spite of the ascertained will of the House of Commons, and the substitution for that will of the will of the Sovereign. Even could the theory implicitly advocated by those who would call the conduct of William IV. legal be compatible with the working or existence of the Constitution, it is needless to point out how politically vicious it must be to substitute the possibly immature, uninformed, or prejudiced opinion of an hereditary Prince for the deliberate will of the country, as expressing itself in an incalculable number of more or less organised and articulate forms. That the act in question was at the best a constitutional anomaly, and Buch as could never bear repetition, even in what are called bad times, is proved from the utter disuse of such an exercise of the prerogative during the present reign, even when the interest of the Queen and the late Prince Consort in the strife of political parties,—not to say in the triumph of one party over another,—was as active as it well could be. The Prince Consort was a specimen of what may be looked for in a mind carefully trained and habituated to the duties of active kingship, and he was not without a knowledge of the limits of such activity in kingship imposed by the English Constitution. His direct practical concern in every political step taken or contemplated by the Government of the day, was unintermittent; and, as has been seen in a previous part of this chapter, the only defence of his position as a gratuitous counsellor of the Government was that he directly personated the Queen, and his acts must be