country, in such a manner as makes him now think that his appointment cannot even be postponed without discredit to himself, and that he cannot any longer continue in the King's service in any other situation than that of Lord-Lieutenant of Ireland.

If this difficulty stood alone, it would be sufficiently great. The principle on which Pitt had always acted in forming this junction, and the justification which he has used to those of his friends who disapproved or doubted about the measure, was, that he sacrificed to it the situation of none of the former Government, or its supporters; but that he used such openings as presented themselves, and such as he could create without removals, for the purpose of bringing into the public service a large and respectable description of persons, actuated by the same view as himself of the present state and circumstances of the country. Yet it hardly seems possible that, without breaking in upon this principle, Lord F. could now be appointed. I am, however, persuaded that if this had been the only difficulty, some expedient would have been found to remove it, though it is not easy to say what that expedient could have been. But certainly for such an object as the maintenance of a system on which the fate of the country seems so much to rest, great sacrifices would and ought to have been made.

But it now appears that the reports which had reached us were in a very great degree, if not indeed wholly, founded in the real truth of what had happened. There is, I fear, no reason to doubt that some of the very expressions I have mentioned have actually been used, and that Lord F. has pledged himself too far to recede, with respect to a total new system, both of men and measures. The first point of this system goes to no less than the dismission of the Chancellor, who was, as I understand, to be replaced by Adair. On this subject, Pitt and myself cannot but feel that the only ground on which the Ponsonbys can desire the Chancellor's removal, is the conduct he

held during the Regency in support of Lord Buckingham's Government, and that our consent to such a step must therefore be utterly dishonourable and degrading to us. But independent of this consideration, it is my sincere opinion that there cannot be adopted any measure more certainly destructive of the peace and tranquillity of that country. The system of introducing English party into Ireland, the principle of connecting changes of Government here with the removal of persons high in office there, and particularly the marking that system in the instance of a person of Fitzgibbon's situation, weight, and character, are all so utterly irreconcilable with every view that I have of the state of that country, that I should really be inexcusable if I could make myself a party to such a measure; and in this opinion Pitt entirely concurs.

On every principle, therefore, of duty and character, we are obliged to say that we cannot consent to this step, and we can only regret that, if it was originally intended, so capital a feature in the new arrangement was not brought forward earlier. The same observation applies to the whole idea of holding out a new system of men and measures in Ireland. If that was meant before the junction was made, it ought surely to have been stated then, in order that we might judge whether it did not oppose an insurmountable bar to the whole scheme. If it has only been conceived since that period, it ought certainly to have been communicated and concerted here, before any pledge or assurance was given to individuals who might be concerned in it there.

When I say this, you must not suppose that there enters into our minds anything like warmth or resentment on the subject. The manner in which everything else has been conducted since we acted together, convinces me that the evil has arisen from precipitation and indiscretion, and not from any concerted plan of committing us, without our knowledge, to measures which we could not be supposed willing to adopt.

And if it were still possible that the thing could be settled without discredit to either party, not only my sense of the public interest, but my personal feeling towards them, would make me think that no means ought to be left untried for that purpose. I am, however, obliged to confess to myself that I see no possibility of this. The publicity which has been given to the whole business seems to render it utterly impracticable. The assurances which have been given are well known, and the breach or performance of them must be discreditable to one of the two parties, for such, unfortunately, they now are again.

I never can enough regret your absence from this country while this has been going on. I am sure if you had been here the whole thing would have been avoided. As it is, what determination you will take respecting your own line I know not, and I feel myself too deeply interested in it to think myself a fair or competent adviser.

Nothing can be more unfortunate to the public interest than this incident; but the sense of it would certainly be very much. aggravated to me if it were to lead, which I still hope it may not, to the placing us two again on different lines, and in opposite systems. Whatever you decide in that respect, I cannot help flattering myself that you will do justice to our conduct; and without calling upon you to condemn others, I cannot help entertaining the belief that you will think no part of this great misfortune imputable to us. With respect to my own personal opinions of the importance of forming and maintaining the union, you were, I am sure, enough a witness to them to make it very unnecessary for me, in writing to you, to dwell much on that point.

I have written this to you, though the thing has not yet taken its final turn, because any delay might possibly prevent your receiving it before your arrival here, for which I now look with increased impatience and anxiety.

God bless you, my dearest brother.

-a

The weak point of the Government was its combination of opposite parties; and the consideration which finally determined the course of Ministers, was the necessity of preventing their differences from coming to an open rupture —a result that would have jeopardized the very existence of the Administration. With that paramount object in view, Lord Grenville, writing again to his brother, analyses the difficulties of the situation, and points out the only paths that could be opened to an honourable and creditable accommodation.

LORD GRENVILLE TO MR. THOMAS GRENVILLE.

Dover Street, Oct. 24th, 1794.

MY DEAREST BROTHER,

Since I wrote my last letter I have received yours, written the day of your leaving Vienna, and I calculate that this will probably find you at the Hague. Our situation, with respect to the point on which I wrote to you so much at large, has been a little, and but a little, improved by a conversation between the Duke of P. and Pitt. Nothing having since passed, we conclude that there is a desire to wait for the benefit of your opinion and Lord Spencer's upon this difficult and distressing subject—a desire in which I need not say we most heartily

concur.

As far as anything can be concluded from a conversation which did not lead to any decisive issue, I hope that we have been too easily alarmed by Irish reports on the subject of a new system, and that, probably in the imagination of those who have first given rise to those reports, some loose and general expressions have been construed into pointed and specific assurances. Be this however as it may, it is certain that infinite mischief has already been done by the prevalence of

those reports, and both the settlement of the points in discussion here, and the subsequent task of the future Governor of Ireland, whoever he may be, have been rendered much more difficult than they would have been if more reserve and caution had been used. It is, however, useless to regret what is past, and all our endeavours ought to be applied to remedy the present evil. I most anxiously wait for the moment of talking over with you the means of doing this, which I am confident every one concerned joins in wishing, though all are obliged to confess the difficulty of it.

Three points are to be considered-Has Lord F. still kept himself sufficiently open with respect to his engagements with Grattan and the Ponsonbys, as to be able to undertake the Irish Government with honour and satisfaction to himself, without displacing the old tenants of Government to make room for their opponents, and without giving to the Ponsonbys in particular more influence and power than belongs to their situation as one among several of the great connexions in that country? If not, there seems no hope of any permanent agreement on this subject, even if it were so patched up for the present as that he could go to Ireland. The next is whether it is possible for him to undertake the Government without insisting on the removal of Fitzgibbon? If this cannot be done, the thing must come to an immediate stop, as we are more and more convinced that we cannot in honour or duty accede to that measure. And lastly, supposing any or all of these considerations to oppose an insurmountable obstacle in the way of his going, ought that to prevent his continuing to hold his present situation? and can the Duke of P., Lord F., and others, be justified in bringing on the country the infinite mischiefs of the dissolution of the present united Government, on no stronger ground than because alterations, however desirable in their opinion, in the system of governing Ireland cannot be adopted.

I have said nothing in all this of the question about Lord