and fweep them away; fo that, according to Mr. Lock, they fhall ceafe to be, i. e. be annihilated, for I can find out no other Senfe that these Words, Ceafe to be, are capable of: Tho' I confefs I do not fee that this Senfe can be confiftent with feveral other Expreffions which he ufes, viz. that dreadful Eftate of Mifery, the infinite Mifery, the exquifite Mifery of an immortal Soul, the perfect Mifery, the Indignation and Wrath, Tribulation and Anguifh, which fhall be after this Life. But it may be Mr. Lock can put fuch a Sense upon these Expreffions, and the like to them, viz. Everlasting Fire, and Everlafting Punishment, in the Words of our Saviour cited by him, Reafonab. of Chriftian. p. 244, 245. as may confift with ceafing to be, or being annihilated. When Mr. Lock fays, in Effay, 1. 2. c. 21. §. 60. that the measures of Good and Evil govern the Choice; and §. 70. that the Rewards and Punishments of another Life are of weight enough to determine the Choice against whatever Pleafure or Pain this Life can fhew; this feems to be not very confiftent with that which he had faid in the fame Chapter, §. 30. that the greater Good in view is not that which determines the Will, in regard to our Actions ; and again, §. 35. that Good, the greater Good, tho apprehended and acknowledged to be fo, does not determine the Will: For what is the meaning of the Meafures of Good and Evil, their governing the Choice, but that it is govern'd by the greater Good and greater Evil? Or why are the Rewards of another Life of weight enough to determine the Choice against the Pleasures of this, but because they are the greater Good? So that in the Expreffions which he ufes, §. 60. and 70. he feems to fay that the greater Good doth determine the Choice; whereas, §. 30. and 35: he is of the contrary Opinion, that it is not of Sufficient weight to determine the Choice, until our Defire rais'd "propor proportionably to it, makes us uneafie in the want of it. Let a Man (fays he) be never fo well perfuaded of the Advantages of Vertue, that it is as neceffary to a Man who hath any great Aims in this World, or Hopes in the next, as Food to Life; yet till he hungers and thirfts after Righteousness, till he feels an uneafinefs in the want of it, his Will will not be determined to any Action in perfuit of this confeffed greater Good. Thus Mr. Lock. And I readily grant that a bare View or Profpect of future Rewards and Punishments is not of Force to determine the Choice against present Pleasure and Pain; but it is neceffary that we firmly believe them, and be fully convinced of the Certainty of them; as alfo, that we have them frequently in our Thoughts, and ferioufly meditate upon the tranfcendent Happiness of the one, and the unspeakable Miseries of the other, that fo our Souls may be inflamed with an hearty Defire of the Rewards, and poffefs'd with a real Fear and ferious Dread of the Punishments, before we fhall apply cur felves in good earneft to work out our Salvation from the Unhappiness of the one, and to fecure our Enjoyment of the Felicity of the other. As to that which he fays, that Vertue is as neceffary to a Man who has any great Aims in this World, as Food to Life, tho it will feem a Paradox to fome, yet I fhall not contradict it; for I know that it is neceffary for all Men, yea, as neceffary as Food is for our Bodily Suftenance, but I wish that Mr. Lock could perfuade thofe that aim at great things in this World, that Vertue is fo abfolutely neceffary for them. A SPECIMEN CIMEN O F Mr. LOCK's Way of Out of his : ESSAY, 1. 1. c. 3. §. 15,16,17,18,19. M Book of his Essay, hath twice fet thefe Words R. Lock, in the Third Chapter of the Firft in his Margin, Lord Herbert's innate Principles examin'd, perhaps because he would have it taken notice of that he durft undertake to grapple with fo great a Perfon. I have therefore taken more especial Notice of that which he faith against that Excellent Writer, and alfo reprefented it at length to the Reader's View, that he may likewife take the more Notice of it; the rather, because it will afford him a Specimen of Mr. Lock's Way of Answering Authors. A Mr. Lock, in his Effay. 1. 1. c. 3. §. 15. When I had writ this, being inform'd that my Lord Herbert had in his Books de Veritate affign'd thefe thefe innate Principles, I prefently confulted him, boping to find in a Man of fo great Parts fomething that might fatisfie me in this Point, and put an end to my Enquiry. In his Chapter de Inftinctu Naturali, p.76. Edit. 1656. I met with thefe fix Marks of his Notitia Communes, 1. Prioritas, 2. Independentia, 3. Univerfalitas, 4. Certitudo, 5. Neceffitas, i. e. as he explains it, faciunt ad hominis confervationem, 6. Modus conformationis, i. e. affenfus nulla interpofita mora. And at the latter end of his little Treatise de Religione Laici, he fays this of these innate Principles, Adeo ut non uniufcujufvis Religionis confinio ar&tentur, quæ ubique vigent, veritatès. Sunt enim in ipfa mente cælitus defcriptæ, nullifque traditionibus five fcriptis five non fcriptis obnoxiæ, p. 3. And Veritates noftræ Catholicæ, quæ tanquam indubia Dei effata in foro interiori defcripta. Thus having given the Marks of the innate Principles or common Notions, and afferted their being imprinted on the Minds of Men by the Hand of God, he proceeds to fer them down, and they are thefe: 1. Effe aliquod fupremum numen, 2. Numen illud coli debere, 3. Virtutem cum pietate conjunctam optimam effe rationem cultus divini, 4. Refipifcendum effe a peccatis, 5. Dari præmium vel poenam poft hanc vitam tranfactam. Thefe, tho I allow them to be clear Truths, and fuch as, if rightly explain'd, a rational Creature can hardly avoid giving his Affent to, yet I think he is far from proving that they are innate Impreffions in foro interiori defcripta: For I must take leave to obferve, 5. 16. First, that thefe five Propofitions are either not all, or more than all, thofe common Notions writ on our Minds by the Finger of God, if it were rea fonable to believe any at all to be fo written. Since There are other Propofitions which even by his own Rules have as juft a Pretence to fuch an Original, and may be as well admitted for innate Principles, as at leaft fome Some of thefe Five he enumerates, viz. Do as thou wouldft be done unto, and perhaps fome Hundreds of others when well confider'd §. 17. Secondly, That all his Marks are not to be found in each of his five Propofitions, viz. his first, Second, and third Marks agree perfectly to neither of them; and the firft, Second, third, fourth and fixth Marks agree but ill to his third, fourth, and fifth Propofitions: For befides that we are affur'd from Hiftory of many Men, nay, whole Nations, who doubt or disbelieve fome or all of them, I cannot fee how the third, viz. That Vertue join'd with Piety is the best Worthip of God, can be an innate Principle, when the Name or Sound Vertue is fo hard to be understood, liable to fo much Uncertainty in its Signification, and the thing it ftands for fo much contended about, and difficult to be known. And therefore this can be but a very uncertain Rule of Humane Practice, and ferve but very little to the Conduct of our Lives, and is therefore very unfit to be affign'd as an innate practical Principle.. 18. For let us confider this Propofition as to its meaning (for it is the Senfe, and not found, that is and must be the Principle or common Notion,) viz. Vertue is the beft Worship of God, i. e. is moft acceptable to him, which if Vertue be taken, as moft commonly it is, for thofe Actions, which according to the different Opinions of feveral Countries are accounted laudable, will be a Propofition So far from being certain, that it will not be true. If Vertue be Taken for Actions conformable to God's Will, or to the Rule prefcribed by God, which is the true and only Meafure of Vertue; when Vertue is us'd to fignifie what is in its own Nature right and good, then this Propofition, That Vertue is the beft Worship of God, will be most true and certain, but of very little ufe in Humane Life, fince it will amount to no more but this, viz. That God is pleafed with the doing of what he commands; which a Man may cer tainly |