CHAP. XXX.

Of Vertue and Vice, Self-denial and Education.

GOD bath, by an inseparable Connexion, join'd I Vertue and publick Happiness together, and made the Practice thereof neceffary to the Prefervation of Society, and visibly beneficial to all with whom the vertuous Man has to do. Mr. Lock, Effay, 1. 1. c. 3. §.6. The Laws that Men generally refer their Actions to, to judge of their Reititude and Obliquity, Seem to me to be thefe three; 1. The Divine Law. 2. The Civil Law. 3. The Law of Opinion or Reputation, if I may fo call it. By the relation they bear to the firft of thefe, Men judge whether their Actions are Sins or Duties; by the fecond, whether they be criminal or innocent, and by the third, whether they be Vertues or Vices. By Divine Law, I mean that Law which God has fet to the Actions of Men, whether promulgated to them by the Light of Nature, or the Voice of Revelation. Vertue and Vice are Names pretended and fuppos'd every where to ftand for Actions in their own nature right or wrong; and as far as they really are so apply'd, they fo far are coincident with the Divine Law above-mention'd. But yet whatever is pretended, this is vifible, that thefe Names of Vertue and Vice, in the particular Inftances of their Application through the feveral Nations and Societies of Men in the World, are conftantly attributed only to fuch Actions as in each Country or Society are in Reputation or Difcredit. Thus the measure of what is every where call'd and efteem'd Vertue and Vice, is this Approbation or Diflike, Praife or Blame, which by a fecret or tacit Confent establishes it felf in the feveral Societies, Tribes, and Clubs of Men in the

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World; whereby feveral Actions come to find Credit or Difgrace among them, according to the Fudgment, Maxims, and Fashions of that place. By this Approbation and Dislike they establish among themfelves what they will call Vertue and Vice. Efteem and Dif credit, Vertue and Vice, do yet in a great measure every where correfpond with the unchangeable Rule of Right and Wrong which the Law of God hath established, there being nothing that fo directly and vifibly fecures and advances the general Good of Mankind in this World, as Obedience to the Laws he hath fet them; and nothing that breeds fuch Mifchiefs and Confufion as the Neglect of them. And therefore Men, without renouncing all Senfe and Reafon, and their own Intereft, which they are fo conftantly true to, could not generally mistake in placing their Commendation and Blame on that fide that really deferv'd it not. Nay, even thofe Men whofe Practice was otherwise, fail'd not to give their Approbation right, few being deprav'd to that degree, as not to condemn at least in others the Faults they themselves were guilty of, whereby even in the Corruption of Manners, the true Boundaries of the Law of Nature, which ought to be the Rule of Vertue and Vice, were pretty well preServ'd. So that even the Exhortations of infpir'd Teachers have not fear'd to appeal to common Repute, Whatsoever is lovely, whatfoever is of good Report, if there be any Vertue, if there be any Praife, &c. Ibid. 1. 2. c. 28. §. 7, 8, 10, 11. The Foundation of Vice lies in wrong meafures of Good. Ibid. 1. 4. c. 19. §. 16. Reputation is not the true principle and meaJure of Vertue, for that is the knowledge of a Man's Duty, and the fatisfaction it is to obey his Maker in following the Dictates of that Light God has given him, with the hopes of Acceptation and Reward. I place Vertue as the first and most neceffary of thofe Endowments that belong to a Man or a Gentleman, as abfolutely requifite to make him valued and belov'd by

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others, acceptable or tolerable to himself; without that I think he will neither be happy in this nor the other World. Of Education, p. 61, 157. It Seems plain to me, that the Principle of all Vertue and Excellency lies in a Power of denying our felves the Satisfaction of our own Defires, where Reafon doth not authorize them. This Power is to be got and improved by Cuftom, made eafie and familiar by an early Practice. He that has not a Maftery over his Inclina tions, he that knows not how to refift the Importunity of prefent Pleafure and Pain for the fake of what, Reafon tells him is fit to be done, wants the true Principle of Vertue and Induftry. This Temper therefore, fo contrary to unguided Nature, is to be got betimes, and this Habit, as the true foundation of fu ture Ability and Happiness, is to be wrought into the Mind as early as may be, and fo to be confirm'd by all the Care and Ways imaginable. Ibid. p. 37, 38, 46. Christ commands Self-denial, and the expofing our felves to Suffering and Danger, rather than to deny or difown him. Reasonab. of Chriftian. p. 224. Aš the foundation of Vertue, there ought very early to be imprinted in the Minds of Children a true Notion of God, as of the independent fupreme Being, Author and Maker of all things, from whom we receive all our Good, that loves us, and gives us all things, hears and fees every thing, and does all manner of Good to thofe that love and obey him, and confequent to it a Love and Reverence of him. They must be taught also to pray to him. The Lord's Prayer, the Creeds, and ten Commandments, 'tis neceffary they Should learn perfectly by heart. The Knowledge of Vertue all along from the beginning, in all the Inftances they are capable of, being taught them more by Practice than Rules, I know not whether they should read any other Difcourfes of Morality but what they find in the Bible. Of Education, p. 157, 158, 1853 220 Thus Mr: Lock

OBSERVATIONS.

When Mr. Lock, in Essay 1. 2. c. 28. §. 7. having nam'd three diftin&t Laws, the Divine Law, the Civil Law, and the Law of Opinion or Reputation (as he calls it) fays, that by the first Men judge whether their Actions are Sins or Duties, by the fecond whether they be criminal or innocent, by the third whether they be Vertues or Vices, doth he not plainly diftinguifh Sins and Duties from Vices and Vertues? For, 1. He makes Men to judge of Vices and Vertues by one Law, of Sins and Duties by another. 2. They judge by an infallible Rule of the one, by a very fallible one of the other. 3. Criminal and Innocent, are plainly diftinct from Sins and Duties; and fo we cannot but judge, that according to Mr. Lock, Vices and Vertues are diftinct from both. Now if fo, it might not be amifs, if he would inform us where the Distinction between them lies; for I have always thought that there is a very near Affinity as between Vice and Sin on the one hand, fo between Vertue and Duty on the other hand. But tho', according to Mr. Lock, Men do judge of Vertue and Vice by his Law of Opinion and Reputation; yet he will not say that they ought to do fo. He tells us here, §. 11. that the Law of Nature ought to be the Rule of Vertue and Vice, and expreffes it more largely in his Epiftle to the Reader: The Law of Nature, fays he, is that ftanding and unalterable Rule by which Men ought to judge of the moral Reditude and Pravity of their Actions, and accordingly denominate them Vertues or Vices. But I had rather fay, that the Law which ought to be the Rule whereby Men judge of Sins and Duties, ought also to be the Rule by which they are to judge of Vices and Vertues, and that is the Divine Law, which (Mr. Lock himself being Judge) comprehends more than the Law of Nature.

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By the Divine Law (fays he here, §. 8.) I mean that Law which God has fet to the Actions of Men, whether promulgated to them by the Light of Nature, or the Voice of Revelation. So (fay 1) the Law of God comprehending both the Law of Nature and his revealed Law, is the Rule whereby Men ought to judge of Vertues and Vices.

But Mr. Lock will prove, that his Law of Opinion or Reputation, or (as he alfo expreffes it) Approbation or Diflike, Praife or Blame, is the common meafure of Vertue and Vice. This (fays he) will appear to any one who confiders that every where Vertue and Praife, Vice and Blame, go together. Vertue is every where that which is thought praife-worthy, and nothing else but that which has the Allowance of publick Efteem is call'd Vertue. Thus Mr. Lack here, viz. 1. 2. c. 28. §. II. But I would know whether he fpeaks of true and real, or of reputed Vertue: if of reputed, it is not to the purpose, fince every one will grant, without Proof, that his Law of Reputation is the Rule of reputed Vertue; and it fignifies no more than this, that that is reputed Vertue which is reputed fuch. Befides, how can it be worth the while to enquire after the Rule of reputed Vertue? If on the other fide, he fpeak of true real Vertue, I believe that no Man before him ever faid that true Vertue and Praise every where went together. Constant Experience may teach every Man the contrary. It is very rarely that true Vertue hath met with fuch Entertainment in the World: but, on the other hand, it would fill large Volumes, if we could fet down all the Inftances of reproach'd and defpis'd Vertue, which the several Ages of the World have afforded.

Mr. Lock goes on, and tells us, that Vertue and Praife are fo united, that they are call'd often by the Same name. His Meaning is, that Vertue is call'd often by the name of Praife; but he gives us only two Inftances of it. The one is out of Virgil, Eneid.

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