Ir is now somewhat about half a century since a meditative man, of a mechanical genius, observing the manner in which the steam of a boiling tea-kettle moved the cover, and the force with which it issued from the spout, was led to entertain the notion that, by creating it in larger volume, this new power might, by skilful direction, be turned to good account as a means of abridging human labour. To this one idea what mighty changes owe their rise! How vastly has the power of machinery been augmented, even to the producing a sense of fearfulness and wonder in the observer, who beholds complex formations of wood and iron instinct, as it were, with a living soul! and how has the intercourse of society been facilitated, the face of the country changed, the facilities of inter-national communication augmented, the whole character of warfare, whether for defence or for aggression, altered, by that one element of steam power, as applied, in its various modifications, by human ingenuity, to purposes whether of national superiority, or of social convenience!

How would our ancestors stare at beholding the teeming productions of our power-looms, and the manner in which our vessels at sea are enabled to baffle wind and tide, and attain to something like the steadiness of continental travelling; whilst our locomotives by land would seem almost to outstrip the fleetness of the wind! But they would not, we may be well assured, rest satisfied with a mere expression of wonder. They would see also the altered relations which were thus produced between the different nations of the world; and that if, in some respects, we were largely benefitted, in others we were more posed to danger. And if the love of old England had not waxed marvellously cold, they would, undoubtedly, desire to see us in possession of means

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of defence which would give us something like the security of our old wooden walls against the perils of invasion.

Nor are there wanting, amongst ourselves, those by whom this important subject has been deeply pondered. We have before us a tract by Lord Ranelagh, which will well repay the attention of the authorities, to whom are entrusted our means of defence. His lordship justly observes that the unexampled successes of the British forces have given rise to such a prestige of victory, "that defeat has almost ceased to be reckoned amongst the chances of war, and invasion is regarded as an impossibility." This is a notion which his lordship deservedly derides. Not that he undervalues"the valour of our troops, the intrepidity and skill of our seamen, the loyal and patriotic devotion of both;" but because "the changes of the last five-and-twenty years are such that, without new combinations of these powers, and important mechanical additions to our defences, the bravery and zeal of our matchless navy and army have become altogether inadequate to the protection of the country."

And whilst Lord Ranelagh would warn his countrymen against the new dangers which they will have to encounter in any future hostilities, the Prince de Joinville thus seeks to impress upon the people of France the vast importance to them of the application of steam power to the purposes of naval warfare:

aggressive warfare of the most audacious nature may be carried on at sea. We are then certain of our movements; at liberty in our actions; the weather, the wind, the tides will no longer interfere with us, and we can calculate clearly and with precision."

And

again: "In the event of war, the most unexpected expeditions are possible. Who can doubt that, with a well-organized steam navy, we should possess the means of inflicting losses and unknown sufferings on an enemy's coast, which has never hitherto felt all the miseries that war can inflict? With her sufferings would arise the evil, till then unknown to her, of confidence destroyed. The riches accumulated on her coasts, and in her harbours, would cease to be in security. The struggle, then, would no longer be unequal. Our harbours might shelter a considerable force, which, putting to sea in the obscurity of night, might attempt most numerous and well-organized crusades. Nothing could hinder the force from re-uniting at a given point on the British coast, before daylight, and then it might act with impunity."

Nor are we permitted to suppose that the necessity for accumulating large bodies of men upon some point of the coast previously to embarkation, would interpose any insuperable obstacle to the meditated enterprise. The same agency which has vanquished the opposition of wind and tide at sea, is about to overcome the difficulties of tedious and exhausting marches by land :

"In three or four years from the prosent time, railways will, in all probability, radiate from Paris, as a centre, to every port on the French coast; an army of 100,000 men, or of any large number, may then be conveyed, in whatever proportions the exigencies or the strategy of the war may require, to the various harbours from which they are to sail, for that point of the English coast on which, according to the Prince de Joinville, they are to unite for the purpose of invasion."

The vastly-increased power of France, for aggressive purposes, in the event of hostilities, when the railways, either contemplated or in progress, shall have been completed, is thus described :

"In such a state of things-certain in event, and probably not distant in

time, (unless our defences are not only strengthened, but altogether changed,) a declaration of war, on the part of France, would be but another word for the conquest of England. The operation would be as short as it would be easy and decisive. The railways, previously, no doubt, furnished with sufficient power and capacity, could supply the various ports (of which the distance of the remotest from Paris would be reduced to a few hours) with the requisite number of troops. The steam ships-not, be it remembered, necessarily vessels of war, but the ordinary packet-boats-would receive them_on board, and the English ambassador, who left Paris on receipt of his passports, would not, on his safe arrival in London, anticipate by one week the equally safe arrival on the English coast of the French army, if necessary, of a hundred thousand men.

"I assume the war to be declared by France, suddenly, and, like all her sudden movements, not without due forethought and precaution. The transmission of the troops by railway to the various ports is an operation so simple as to require no illustration. The first objection which I shall have to meet will probably be to the facility of their conveyance across the channel, and it may be urged that so large a body of troops in war steamers would not easily escape the vigilance of our navy.

Now, as I have already hinted, it is not necessary, nor probable, that war steamers would be employed in this service. The vessels which would best convey the troops would be passageboats, not dissimilar to those which are at the present time daily running, and frequently carrying from 1,200 to 2,200 passengers each between England and Ireland. These vessels might move, not in one squadron, but in various numbers, as they would steer from various points: each flotilla being accompanied by war steamers for the purpose of protection, or distracting the attention of an adverse force.

"But what blockade would, under every circumstance, guard all the ports of France? What Channel fleet, how

ever well appointed, could detect, or, detecting, intercept, by any serious obstruction, a nuniber of vessels separated into groups, and holding their short course of from four to twelve hours' duration against wind and tide? The advantage of a two hours' start, under the cloud of night, or a channel fog, and the steam-propelled enemy is out of sight. In short, to prevent such vessels as I have described from leaving the French coast, nothing less would suffice than a complete blockade of every port, and that by war steamers in constant readiness for pursuit or engagement, which is impossible."

In all this we do not think the noble lord has used the least exagge ration, although he does not seem to us aware of the precautions already actually taken against the dangers which he apprehends. We will even add, that his case is understated. Before the application of steam to naval purposes, a strong blockading force might be relied on as a protection against invasion. Granting that, by stress of weather, the British fleet was blown off its station, and the enemy were enabled to get out, the course of the wind naturally indicates the direction which sailing vessels must take, in order to insure their capture, or be prepared against their designs. No such security can now be relied on. The liberated fleet, by means of steam, may take a course widely different from any that could be suspected, and thus it might happen that they would be able to make a descent upon some unprotected part of our coast, and inflict upon us irreparable injury, before any effective means of counteraction could be adopted.

"An invading force, say of 100,000 men, is thus landed on the coasts of Essex, Kent, and Sussex: what are our preparations on land for their reception? Our coast batteries, such as they are, are without artillerymen, unarmed, and useless. We have no trained militia, and our yeomanry are few, and necessarily slow in collection. Our population, even if they possessed arms, are ignorant of their use; and our regular troops, which are scattered at great distances over England and Scotland, would not, were their disposable numbers collected, muster more than 10,000

bayonets. To these we may add the very important and useful body of soldiers which have been enrolled from the pensioners, amounting to 10,000 men. But, while this defensive strength, amounting on the whole to about 20,000 men, is being summoned from all parts of the country, our arsenals, miserably deficient in fortifications, in soldiers, and in artillerymen, invite the enemy's attack; and, before we can give any thing like shape to our preparations, he has marched upon and destroyed Chatham, Sheerness, and Woolwich,-taken military possession of the Thames, and threatened, or laid, an embargo on London.

"I am well aware that on ears accustomed to hear only of the glories of British arms this sounds strangely improbable, yet it is here understated rather than exaggerated. I have said nothing of the military resources of France, of the discipline and acknowledged bravery of her troops,-of the tried skill and valour of her officers. I might have doubled the supposed numbers of the aggressive army, and diminished by half the time allowed for their presence on the English shores, without approaching the limits of impracticability."

It is, undoubtedly, important that the mind of the nation should be seriously directed to the bare and remote possibility of such a state of things. The genius of Wellington, which shaped our gallant army into an instrument by which he was enabled to break in pieces the colossal power of the great War Sovereign of France; the achievements of our naval warriors which have made the ocean almost a British domain, have but produced their natural effects when they inspire a sense of security which might at any moment be found delusive. Lord Ranelagh has, therefore, done good service in awakening public attention to contingencies, respecting which to be forewarned is to be forearmed, and from which, if we suffered them to take us by surprise, nothing short of a direct interference of Providence could

save us.

England should no longer consider herself simply as an insular power, protected by the ocean, and safe from attack as long as her naval superiority continues. She can no longer rely upon wind and tide for baffling the approach of an enemy. The sea has now become a great highway, to be

traversed with a certainty and celerity which greatly increases our exposure to invasion, as well as multiplies the chances of success which may attend the attempt of an enterprising enemy. When Napoleon congregated his great army of invasion at Boulogne, which was so long looking with wistful eyes in the direction of our sea-girt Isle, his sagacious mind led him to see difficulties in the enterprise, which, combined with other considerations, caused it to be abandoned. He knew the vigilance with which the British shores were guarded; he knew the uncertainty which must attend the attempt of a large fleet of sailing vessels, to attempt a landing at a given place in a given time; he knew that if fifty vessels made sail from any part of the coast of France for any port in England, the probability was that not five would be able to effect a landing at the same tide; he knew that a powerful concentration of force might be effected upon the menaced point before any serious mischief could be done; and that a baffled French armada might only result in augmenting our insular security, and scattering to the winds the proud invaders; and he therefore wisely withdrew his powerful squadrons, dispersed his collected vessels of war, and directed his mighty resources and his energetic mind to continental objects. But had he the same certainty which might now be calculated upon of effecting a sudden descent upon our coast, of which the first notice might be the landing of one hundred thousand men upon some point where we were unprepared to meet them, we may depend upon it that his vast army would not have resembled "the old cat in the adage,” and that an attempt would be made to bring the war into our own country, from which very disastrous consequences might be apprehended. We therefore entirely agree with Lord Ranelagh that it is high time for us to prepare for a state of things against which neither our insular position nor our maritime superiority can any longer afford us sufficient protection.

"It is, then, above all things incumbent upon every lover of his country to shake off the apathy and prejudice, with which, as a nation, we have too long regarded this question. The tu mults of the last war, whose horrors

never visited our own shores, have been succeeded by a peace, so profound, that we already begin to regard them with the interest which attaches to a romance of ages long gone by, the probability of whose recurrence we deem impossible. We forget that human nature is not changed, and that national rivalries are as powerful as before. But wherefore adduce general conclusions from the constitution of individual, or of national minds? Are we not fairly warned? Do not busy hammers in every dockyard of France proclaim the formation of a navy too strong for the wants of her limited commerce? Is it for peace

only, that, in addition to her municipal and national guards, sufficiently numerous for domestic controul, her disposable standing army is recruited to the strength of nearly five hundred thousand men? And if acts like these require interpretation, how runs the commentary of the Parisian journals? not M. Thiers, after alluding to Napoleon's intended descent upon England, written It is impossible to predict at present the part to be played by steam navigation in future events. That it

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gives additional force to France against England is probable. That it shall render the crossing of the channel more easy, will depend upon the efforts to be made by France for ensuring her superiority in this entirely new power?' And are not the words of the Prince de Joinville as follow:- The duty of steamers is not to fight-it is not a question of supremacy of the sea-a Nile or a Trafalgar. The duty of these steamers will be limited to less honourable struggles they will run under cover of the night and burn and plunder English merchant ships, and ruin England by the destruction of her foreign commerce?' But the Prince de Joinville, as a lover of peace, argues all this is une paix armee.' Is then the peace of France to stand thus- a goddess armed,' while that of England remains wholly unguarded?-No: however friendly the purposes of such preparation may be, it behoves us, as trustees of our country's rights, and of her honour, to see that, if her dispositions are equally amicable, her powers shall be at least equally strong."

France is doing, how wary, how active, how indefatigable; observe the vast disproportion between her fleet, and the commerce and colonies for which that fleet should be a protection; what but war purposes can be contemplated by the yearly accumulation of means so far beyond her peaceful necessities. On the other hand, what says the Prince de Joinville? He accuses his government of an indifference to what so greatly concerns the national safety. He says, that while they acknowledge the necessity of augmenting the national defences in theory, they are indifferent to it in practice. He contrasts his own country with England, where much is done and little said, while in France much is said and little done; and, upon the whole, he would have his readers to believe, that whilst England is becoming a giant in aggressive power, France is dwindling into a state of imbecility and insignificance, which may at any time render her a prey to her enemies.

Now, the natural effect of these opposite representations would be to neutralize each other; and the conclusion to which a prudent man might come, from a perusal of them would be, that both were led to exaggerate the deficiencies of national protection of which they complained, and that neither France nor England were in the exposed condition in which they were represented.

That the French government are alive to the importance of augmenting their marine, no one can entertain a doubt, who has been a close observer of their proceedings; although their efforts for that purpose may not have kept pace with the ardent desires of the royal sailor, who would fain have France as predominant at sea as she once was on land, and who can ill brook to be a spectator of the growing power of a hated rival. And that our own government have not been insensible to the necessity for such measures of defence as our increased exposure to aggression would seem to require, we now proceed to make manifest; and we trust that something will be done to calm Lord Ranelagh's fears, when he learns what has already been actually done towards securing our coasts against an invading enemy.

In 1843, a select committee of the House of Commons was appointed, to

inquire into the accidents to trading vessels off the coast of England; who, in their report, recommended the establishment of ports of refuge in the British Channel. They did not, themselves, specify the particular situations for such ports, but gave it as their opinion, that scientific persons should be specially appointed to inquire into that subject, and to indicate both the points of the coast, and the nature of the defences by which the requisite security might be best attained.

Accordingly, Sir Robert Peel, in conjunction with the Lords of the Treasury, appointed a commission, consisting of the following distinguished individuals, than whom, we venture to say, no more fitting persons could be found:-Sir Byam Martin, Sir Howard Douglas, Rear Admiral Sir Deans Dundas, Sir William Symonds, Colonel Colquhoun, Colonel Alderson, Sir H. Pelly, and Mr. Walker.

The instructions to the commission were as follows, viz :-.

"First-To determine whether it be advisable to have a port of refuge in the British Channel, with a view to the public benefits which such a work shall hold out; and, on the other hand, what would be the cost of executing the works to be recommended.

"Second-To determine the spot which will be best suited to a port of this description, so as to combine, in the highest degree, the three following capacities:

"1. That it may be entered with speed, at any tide, by vessels in danger

from bad weather.

"2. That the port be such as to be suited to a naval station in case of war, and may, at the same time serve for purposes of defence and attack.

3. That it may offer ready means of defence in case of attack from an enemy."

The commissioners were further instructed that, should they not find all those requisites in any one port, they should extend their surveys, and report upon the advantages peculiar to the different situations which they may deem it advisable to recommend, specifying those which they consider the most eligible.

So far, we think it will be allowed, the government have done their duty. We now proceed to show how the commissioners have discharged theirs.

The English coast and the ports on