The Interstate Commerce Commission may, by a general order, require carriers to state in their tariffs what free storage is granted and the terms and conditions on which it will be granted.— American Warehousemen's Assn. v. Ill. Cent. R. Co., 7 Inters. Com. R. 556.

[24]

Ordering through routes and through rates.

Power of Interstate Commerce Commission to establish through routes and joint rates, and prescribe the division of such rates and the terms and conditions under which such through routes shall be operated,- see Interst. Com. Act, § 15, post, Appendix B.

When Commission will order through routes and rates,- see post, note [28].

Power to compel railroads to contract for joint through route and rate,- see ante, § 35, note [9].

The Interstate Commerce Commission may compel the establishment of a through route and through rate.- Cattle Raisers' Assn. v. Galveston, H. & S. A. R. Co., 12 Inters. Com. R. 21; Enterprise Transp. Co. v. Pa. R. Co., 12 Inters. Com. R. 373.

The Interstate Commerce Commission has no power to order a through route or through rate; through routes and rates are matters of agreement between the carriers themselves.- New York, N. H. & H. R. Co. v. Platt, 7 Inters. Com. R. 323.

The Interstate Commerce Act, as it stood Nov. 17, 1902, gave the Interstate Commerce Commission no power to establish through routes. - Diamond Mills v. Boston & M. R. Co., 9 Inters. Com. R. 311.

The Interstate Commerce Commission has no power to compel a carrier to enter into arrangements for through rates or billing.Capehart v. L. & N. R. Co., 3 Inters. Com. R. 278, 4 I. C. C. R. 265.

A state railroad commission has no power to compel the establishment of a joint route.— State v. Wrightsville & T. R. Co., 104 Ga. 437, 30 S. E. 891.

In a Georgia statute authorizing the railroad commission to make "joint rates," the term "joint rates," means a rate prescribed to be charged for the transportation of goods or passengers over the connecting lines of two or more railroads, and to be divided among them for the service rendered by each respectively.- Hill v. Wadley So. R. Co., 128 Ga. 705, 57 S. E. 795.

A statute authorizing carriers to establish schedules of joint through rates to be filed with a state commission, does not give the commission any powers to fix such rates.-State v. C. B. & Q. R. Co., 90 Iowa, 594, 58 N. W. 1060.

No distinctions in principle exist which deprive the state of authority and power to establish "joint through rates," while it may, in the exercise of its constitutional authority, fix rates of freight charges for each separate railroad.- Burlington, C. R. & N. R. Co. v. Dey, 82 Iowa, 312, 48 N. W. 98, 12 L. R. A. 436n.

The objection that a statute which authorizes a railroad commission to fix joint rates between carriers compels two or more railroads to enter involuntarily into contractual relations with each other is untenable, since the commission, under the statute, merely prescribes rates and the railroads are not permitted to charge more. The railroad is not bound by an obligation as of a contract but under an obligation imposed by law.- Burlington, C. R. & N. R. Co. v. Dey, 82 Iowa, 312, 48 N. W. 98, 12 L. R. A. 436n.

The Interstate Commerce Commission has no jurisdiction over violations of anti-trust laws by interstate carriers, but only over unreasonable rates resulting from such violations.- Warren Mfg. Co. v. Sɔ. R. Co., 12 Inters. Com. R. 447.

The Interstate Commerce Commission has no jurisdiction, directly or indirectly, to enforce the anti-trust laws, nor does it acquire any jurisdiction by those laws or their violation.- Sprigg v. B. & O. R. Co., 8 Inters. Com. R. 443.

[26] General rules and principles governing Commission.

In passing upon rates and promulgating orders, the Interstate Commerce Commission must consider that the purpose of the Interstate Commerce Act is to promote and facilitate trade and commerce.- Texas & P. R. Co. v. Interst. Com. Commission, 162 U. S. 197, 16 Sup. Ct. R. (U. S.) 666, revg. s. c. 57 Fed. 948, affg. s. c. 52 Fed. 187.

If the Interstate Commerce Commission, instead of confining its action to redressing, on complaint made by some particular persons or locality, some specific disregard of the provisions of the Interstate Commerce Act, proposes to promulgate general orders, which thereby become rules of action to the carrying companies, the spirit and letter of the Act requires that such orders should have in view the purpose of promoting and facilitating commerce, and the welfare of all to be affected, as well the carriers as the traders and consumers of the country.- Texas & P. R. Co. v. Interst. Com. Commission, 162 U. S. 197, 16 Sup. Ct. R. (U. S.) 666, revg. s. c. 57 Fed. 948, affg. s. c. 52 Fed. 948.

The effort of the Interstate Commerce Commission to deprive inland consumers of the advantage of through rates is contrary to the purpose of the Interstate Commerce Act, which is to promote and facilitate

commerce.- Texas & P. R. Co. v. Interst. Com. Commission, 162 U. S. 197, 16 Sup. Ct. R. (U. S.) 666, revg. s. c. 57 Fed. 948, affg. s. c. 52 Fed. 187.

It is only when, upon complaint, the Interstate Commerce Commission finds that a carrier is demanding, charging or collecting rates in violation of law, that it has power to interfere with rates.-Jewett v. Ch. M. & St. P. R. Co., 156 Fed. 160.

The spirit and letter of the Interstate Commerce Act require that orders made by the Interstate Commerce Commission should have in view the promoting and facilitating of commerce.- Interst. Com. Commission v. Ala. Mid. R. Co., 74 Fed. 715, affg. 69 Fed. 227; affd. 168 U. S. 144, 18 Sup. Ct. R. (U. S.) 45.

The carrier's business of transporting goods involves the rights of, and the necessity of doing justice to, three parties: the seller at the point of consignment, the carrier and the trader or consumer at the point of delivery The interests of all these must be duly weighed by a commission or court in the decision of any case involving the carrier's freight tariff.—Interst. Com. Commission v. L. & N. R. Co., 73 Fed. 409.

It may often happen that a single rate out of an entire system of rates may, when examined by itself, appear to be unreasonable, even though, when considered as a part of the whole system, it is justifiable. To reduce this single rate would perhaps disarrange the entire system of rates in effect, and in a case of this sort the Interstate Commerce Commission ought not to interfere unless strong reasons are presented.— Hastings Co. v. Ch. M. & St. P. R. Co., 11 Inters. Com. R. 675.

The Interstate Commerce Commission hesitates to require the establishment of carload rates where none exist, especially where the normal and accustomed unit of shipment is less than a carload.— Kindel v. Boston & A. R. Co., 11 Inters. Com. R. 495.

If rates are exorbitant, oppressive and unreasonable, or if discriminations made are unjust and work hardship, it is the province of the Interstate Commerce Commission to interfere and secure, if possible, a fair adjustment, but it is no more its object or duty to place competing manufacturers of one kind in two different states on precisely the same footing, than to equalize conditions in all localities and in every industry.— Mayor of Wichita v. Mo. Pac. R. Co., 10 Inters. Com. R. 35.

The Interstate Commerce Commission will not compel a carrier to disregard distance in order to put two localities on a commercial equality.— Savannah Bureau v. Charleston & S. R. Co., 7 Inters. Com. R. 458; Commercial Club v. Ch. R. I. & P. R. Co., 6 Inters. Com. R. 647; Cincinnati Freight Bureau v. C. N. O. & T. P. R. Co., 7 Inters. Com. R. 180.

The Interstate Commerce Commission should not interfere with rates except when necessary to protect public interests.- Commercial Club v. Ch. & N. W. R. Co., 7 Inters. Com. R. 387.

Where a carrier has been enforcing an arbitrary and variable scale of minimum carload weights which operate prejudicially to shippers, the Interstate Commerce Commission will order that the carrier shall establish a fixed, reasonable and just scale of minimum weights.- Suffern, H. & Co. v. Indiana, D. & W. R. Co., 7 Inters. Com. 255.

Rates on various commodities must bear a just relation to each other as well as be reasonable per se.- Page v. D. L. & W. R. Co., 6 Inters. Com. R. 548.

The Interstate Commerce Commission will act to prevent a considerable advance in rates which the carrier cannot sufficiently justify.— R. R. Com. of Florida v. Savannah F. & W. R. Co., 3 Inters. Com. R. 414, 688, 5 I. C. C. R. 13.

The Interstate Commerce Commission will act to prevent the charging of arbitrary differentials which result in discriminations between places.- Toledo Prod. Exch. & E. Kemble v. L. S. & M. S. R. Co., 2 Inters. Com. R. 492, 3 Inters. Com. R. 830, 5 I. C. C. R. 166.

The relation of rates ought to rest upon fixed and stable conditions.— Squire v. Mich. Cent. R. Co., 2 Inters. Com. R. 303, 484, 3 Inters. Com. R. 515, 4 I. C. C. R. 611.

The Interstate Commerce Commission cannot undertake to adjust rates so as to overcome geographical or other conditions, and give competitors equality in the common market.- Squire v. Mich. Cent. R. Co., 2 Inters. Com. R. 303, 484, 3 Inters. Com. R. 515, 4 I. C. C. R. 611.

The only fair and practicable plan for making up an export rate is to add the current ocean rate to the regular inland rate to the seaboard.N. Y. Prod. Exch. v. N. Y. C. & H. R. R. Co., 2 Inters. Com. P. 13, 28, 553, 3 I. C. C. R. 137.

The Interstate Commerce Commission will not order a change in rates at one point, which necessitates many changes and throws the entire transportation situation into confusion, unless such a change is absolutely necessary for enforcement of the law and the ends of substantial justice. - Detroit Board of Trade v. Grand Trunk R. Co., 1 Inters. Com. R. 698, 701, 2 Inters. Com. R. 199, 2 I. C. C. R. 315.

Rates should not be fixed to equalize natural advantages and commercial conditions.- Eau Claire v. Ch. M. & St. P. R. Co., 3 Inters. Com. R. 174, 314, 4 Inters. Com. R. 65, 5 I. C. C. R. 264.

When the Interstate Commerce Commission is asked to set aside a rate, consideration should be made of the consequences of a modification or rejection of the rate-making principles on which it is based.- Lincoln Board of Trade v. Mo. Pac. R. Co., 1 Inters. Com. R. 648, 2 Inters. Com. R. 98, 2 I. C. C. R. 155.

Whether the elevated and steam surface railroads within a city should be placed upon the same basis with street surface railroads as to fares

and the transfer of passengers, is for the determination of the legislature, not the courts. People v. Brooklyn Heights R. Co., 187 N. Y. 48, 79 N. E. 838.

The railroad commissioners of Florida, in fixing a rate, must make it general, applicable to all persons or corporations under like circumstances and not applicable to certain persons or corporations only.- State v. Atlantic C. L. R. Co., 51 Fla. 578, 40 So. 875.

In making a particular rate lower than a general one, a commission is not necessarily making an unjust discrimination.-State v. Atlantic C. L. R. Co., 48 Fla. 114, 37 So. 652.

When the question presented to a railroad commission is what is just and right between two railways who must bear the expense of a crossing, if there is a contract existing between the companies, by which one of them is under obligation to bear all the expenses, the commission may not properly ignore the contract, for it is bound by the same rules of law that would govern a court in deciding the same question.- Grand Trunk W. R. Co. v. Hunt, Ind. App., 81 N. E. 524.

A state railroad commission cannot ignore the comfort and convenience of numbers of its citizens, to base its action exclusively upon a consideration of the amount of dollars and cents which may be involved.— Morgan's L. & T. R. & S. S. Co. v. R. R. Commission, 109 La. 247, 33 So. 214.

[27] Classification of freight.

Power of Commission to correct classifications,- see ante, note [20]. Method of determining whether there is discrimination in classification,- see ante, § 31, note [79].

Keeping hay and straw in a certain class for thirteen years furnishes evidence that such classification was reasonable, and while the evidence is not conclusive, it is an admission against the need for any increase in such classification and rates.- National Hay Assn. v. L. S. & M. S. R. Co., 9 Inters. Com. R. 264.

The fixing of a classification determines the relation of rates, not the rate itself. Myer v. C. C. C. & St. L. R. Co., 9 Inters. Com. R. 78. Changing the classification of commodities is not fixing a rate for the future. Myer v. C. C. C. & St. L. R. Co., 9 Inters. Com. R. 78.

The Interstate Commerce Commission will correct injustice in the classification of freight.— Pyle v. T. & V. R. Co., 1 Inters. Com. R. 600, 767, 1 I. C. C. R. 465.

A railroad commission cannot be compelled to give a special classification and rate of plaintiff's high-pressured cotton sufficient to maintain the advantage over their competitors represented by the superiority of