A state has power to limit the amount of charges by railroad companies for the transportation of persons and property within its own jurisdiction, unless restrained by some contract in the charter or unless what is done amounts to a regulation of foreign or interstate commerce.-Stone v. Farmers' L. & T. Co., 116 U. S. 307, 6 Sup. Ct. R. (U. S.) 334, 388, 1191.

For the purpose of promoting a consolidation between a railroad organized under the laws of Wisconsin and one organized under the laws of Illinois, the legislature of Wisconsin passed an act providing that the consolidated company should remain subject to the laws of Wisconsin and Illinois, respectively, and should have the same privileges as though the consolidation had not taken place; provided that the laws of Illinois should have no effect in Wisconsin.- Held, that the new company was subject to legislative control in Wisconsin in the same manner as the original Wisconsin corporation, and the fact that an act regulating the fares and freights in Wisconsin so far as they are of domestic concern may incidentally affect interstate commerce does not make the act invalid, in the absence of any regulation by Congress.- Peik v. Ch. & N. W. R. Co., 94 U. S. 164.

All commercial action within the limits of a state, and which does not extend to any other state or foreign country, is exclusively under state regulation.- The Passenger Cases, 7 How. (U. S.) 283, revg. s. c. 4 Denio (N. Y.), 475, 4 Metc. (Mass.) 283.

The completely internal commerce of a state may be considered as reserved to the regulation of the state itself.— Gibbons v. Ogden, 9 Wheaton (U. S.), 1, revg. 17 Johns. (N. Y.) 488.

Congress has the unlimited power to regulate interstate commerce, and if that power cannot be effectually exercised without affecting interstate commerce, then Congress may undoubtedly in that sense regulate interstate commerce so far as necessary to fully and effectually regulate the interstate traffic.-U. S. v. Colorado & N. W. R. Co., 157 Fed. 321.

In prescribing the terms on which a foreign corporation, engaged in both interstate and intrastate commerce, may do business within a state, the latter may make regulations or may impose conditions and restrictions which amount to a regulation of the intrastate commerce to be carried on by such corporation, but not of its interstate commerce.Butler Bros. Co. v. U. S. Rubber Co., 156 Fed. 1.

Any prohibition, obstruction or burden on interstate commerce by a state by any method is unconstitutional. Interstate commerce may not, directly or indirectly, be regulated by a state.- Butler Bros. Co. v. U. S. Rubber Co., 156 Fed. 1.

Congress may take the regulation of safety appliances and employers' liability, as to common carriers, entirely out of the scope of state regu

lation, even as to carriers and employees engaged in both state and interstate traffic.- Kelly v. Gt. Northern R. Co., 152 Fed. 211.

That the employees engaged in interstate traffic also handle intrastate traffic, does not destroy the power of Congress to enact employers' liability and safety appliance laws for their protection.- Snead v. Central of Ga. R. Co., 151 Fed. 608.

Until an article shipped interstate ceases to be interstate commerce, Congress having assumed to regulate such commerce, no state regulations can apply.- Southern R. Co. v. Greensboro I. & C. Co., 134 Fed. 82; affd. 202 U. S. 543; Gulf, C. & S. F. R. Co. v. Hefley, 158 U. S. 98, 15 Sup. Ct. R. (U. S.) 802; Gulf, C. & S. F. R. Co. v. Miami S. S. Co., 86 Fed. 407; Interst. Com. Commission v. C. B. & Q. R. Co., 186 U. S. 320, 22 Sup. Ct. R. (U. S.) 824.

The application of local freight rates as instrumentalities of warfare between railroads as to interstate or foreign through freights, unless such rates are actually reasonable for the services rendered, is clearly within the ban of the national law, even though the railroad lies wholly within one state.- Augusta S. R. Co. v. Wrightsville & T. R. Co., 74 Fed. 522.

Any regulation of an interstate shipment by a state law is invalid.Baird v. St. L. I. M. & S. R. Co., 41 Fed. 592.

A state cannot regulate rates, etc., on that part of a continuous interstate shipment which lies wholly within that state.- Louisville & N. R. Co. v. R. R. Commission of Tenn., 19 Fed. 679.

A state cannot make a regulation of interstate commerce by exercising its power over corporations of its own creation, if it permits them to engage in interstate commerce. Possibly it may bind the corporations permitted to engage in interstate commerce to schedules of rates agreed upon by them; but this is binding only by force of the contract of the carrier to be so bound, and not as a regulation of the rates under any municipal power of the states over commerce. A regulation of interstate commerce, as such, is as invalid in a charter as in any state statute.Louisville & N. R. Co. v. R. R. Commission of Tenn., 19 Fed. 679.

A state cannot regulate the transportation of merchandise from a place in one state to a place in another.- Kaeiser v. Ill. Cent. R. Co., 18 Fed. 151.

A state board cannot regulate transportation by an ocean route between two points in the same state.- Pacific Coast Ss. Co. v. Board of R. R. Comrs., 18 Fed. 10.

The California Board of Railroad Commissioners has no power to regulate or interfere with the transportation of persons or merchandise by a steamship company between ports within the state, if they are in

transit to or from other states, or if the transportation consists of voyages upon the ocean, bringing the steamships under the control of Congress.Pacific Coast Ss. Co. v. Board of R. R. Comrs., 9 Sawyer (U. S.), 253.

The power of the federal government to regulate interstate commerce cannot be narrowed or encroached upon by state authority, either directly or indirectly. State action will always be treated with the highest deference and respect, but cannot be allowed to control in matters within the federal jurisdiction. That one or more states have adopted a particular regulation as to carload lots, etc., is not a reason for applying it to interstate traffic if it does not seem just and politic.- Leonard v. Ch. & A. R. Co., 2 Inters. Com. R. 416, 491, 599, 3 I. C. C. R. 241.

Although it is the general rule that a contract for the transportation of goods from one state to another is governed by the law of the place where it is made, such rule can have no application where the subject matter of the contract is one of national cognizance and Congress has assumed exclusive control of it by enacting a law for its complete regulation.- Southern R. Co. v. Harrison, 119 Ala. 539, 23 So. 552, 43 L. R. A. 385.

A state may regulate discrimination in rates on shipments beginning within that state, even though such shipments are into other states.People v. Wabash, St. L. & P. R. Co., 104 Ill. 476; affd. 105 Ill. 236.

A railroad built under the authority of a state, whether an interstate carrier or not, must, so long as Congress does not interfere, submit to reasonable local regulations in the use of its property.- Pittsburg, C. C. & St. L. R. Co. v. Hartford City, — Ind. —, 82 N. E. 787.

That a railroad is engaged in interstate commerce, does not put it beyond state regulation as to all business done therein not directly connected with commerce between the states.- McGuire v. C. B. & Q. R. Co., 131 Iowa, 340, 108 N. W. 902.

Regulation in respect to the transfer of freight or passengers in their transit from one state to another upon railroads, or in respect to railroads engaged in the transportation of interstate commerce, is a regulation of interstate commerce and the power to make such regulations is vested in Congress.- Council Bluffs v. K. C. St. J. & B. R. Co., 45 Iowa, 338.

Regulation of ferry rates between New York and New Jersey is not within the power of either state.- New York C. & H. R. R. Co. v. Board of Freeholders, 74 N. J. L. 367, 65 Atl. 860.

If the installing of a connecting switch to facilitate the transfer of cars from one road to another at an intersection point, would facilitate both interstate and intrastate traffic, either the federal or state commission may order such switch.-Jacobson v. Wisconsin, M. & P. R. Co., 71 Minn. 519, 74 N. W. 893.

That the tracks of a carrier extend into another state and that it does interstate business, does not relieve it from state regulation as to shipments beginning and ending within the state.- Missouri Pac. R. Co. v. Sherwood, 84 Tex. 125, 19 S. W. 455, 17 L. R. A. 643.

A state can make no law regulating the rate for carriage of goods between that state and another state, although the regulation be construed as applying only to so much of the line of transit as lies within its own borders.— Gulf, C. & S. F. R. Co. v. Dwyer, 75 Tex. 572, 12 S. W. 1001, 7 L. R. A. 478.

The sole power to prescribe the rules by which interstate commerce shall be governed is vested in Congress.- Barnhard Bros. v. Morrison, 13 Tex. Ct. R. 168, 87 S. W. 376.

[11] Effect of failure of Congress to exercise its regulative powers.

The transportation of live stock from one state to another is interstate commerce, and when the entire subject of such transportation is taken under direct national supervision, all local or state regulations in respect of such matters and covering the same ground will cease to have any force, whether formerly abrogated or not. The power which the states might thus exercise in the absence of congressional action is in this way suspended until national control is abandoned, if ever, and the subject thereby returned to the power of the states.- Reid v. Colorado, 187 U. S. 137, 23 Sup. Ct. R. (U. S.) 92.

In the absence of congressional legislation on the subject the states may regulate the consolidation of interstate railway corporations.Boardman v. L. S. & M. S. R. Co., 84 N. Y. 157.

Until Congress has passed laws on a given subject, under the powers conferred by the commerce clause, the state may pass regulative legis lation. Phelps v. Racey, 60 N. Y. 10, affg. s. c. 5 Daly (N. Y.), 235.

A statute which incidentally affects interstate commerce is valid, unless it is clearly shown that Congress has legislated on the same subject. American Exp. Co. v. So. Ind. Exp. Co., 167 Ind. 292, 78 N. E. 1021.

All interstate and foreign traffic is under the exclusive control of Congress, and even if Congress has not seen fit to prescribe any specific rules to govern interstate commerce, that does not affect the question.- Hardy v. A. T. & S. F. R. Co., 32 Kan. 698, 5 Pac. 6.

The jurisdiction of Congress to regulate interstate commerce is not conferred upon the states merely by a failure of Congress to act as to such matters.- Railroad Comrs. v. R. Co., 22 S. C. 220.

The commercial power of Congress is exclusive of the state authority only when the subjects upon which it is exerted are national in their

character and admit and require uniformity of regulations applying alike in all states, and when the subjects within that power are local in their nature and operation, or constitute mere aids to commerce, the states may provide for their regulation until Congress intervenes and supersedes their action.- St. Louis S. W. R. Co. v. Ark. & T. Grain Co., 15 Tex. Ct. R. 372, 95 S. W. 656.

[12] Extent of police power of states.

Review of acts done pursuant to police power,— see ante, § 23, note [8]. While a state may, in the exercise of its police authority, confer upon an administrative agency the power to make many reasonable regulations concerning the places, manner and time of delivery of merchandise moving in the channels of interstate commerce, any regulation of such subject made by the state or under its authority, which directly burdens interstate commerce, is a regulation of interstate commerce and repugnant to the U. S. Constitution.- McNeil v. So. R. Co., 202 U. S. 543, 26 Sup. Ct. R. (U. S.) 722.

A state may make all needful regulations of a police character for the government of railroad companies while operating their roads within the state.-Stone v. Farmers' L. & T. Co., 116 U. S. 307, 6 Sup. Ct. R. (U. S.) 334, 388, 1191.

Where a state police regulation has for its main purpose the promotion of the welfare of its citizens, it is not invalid although it may incidentally affect interstate commerce.- Logan v. Postal T. & C. Co., 157 Fed. 570.

A fencing act is a police regulation to which railroads are subjected by the sovereignty of the state. Ohio & M. R. Co. v. Russell, 115 Ill. 52, 3 N. E. 561.

In the exercise of police powers, a state may enact laws which, though they affect commerce between states, are not to be considered regulations of that commerce within the meaning of the U. S. Constitution.— Gulf, C. & S. F. R. Co. v. Dwyer, 75 Tex. 572, 12 S. W. 1001, 7 L. R. A. 478.

[13] What acts constitute a regulation of interstate commerce - In general.

General extent of state and federal control,- see ante, note [10]. Rules of construction,- see post, note [18].

State statutes not to be construed as applying to interstate commerce,- see post, note [18.]

A state act, providing that it shall be unlawful for any person, not authorized by the act, to sell or transfer the whole or any part of a ticket or other evidence of the holder's right to travel, is not a regulation of interstate commerce.- Fry v. State, 63 Ind. 552.