A railroad company which is located wholly within a state but carries interstate shipments for an express company operating over its lines is engaged in interstate commerce.-U. S. v. Colorado & N. W. R. Co., 157 Fed. 342.

A railroad wholly within one state is engaged in interstate commerce as to an interstate shipment which it handles as a connecting carrier.— U. S. v. Colorado & N. W. R. Co., 157 Fed. 342; U. S. v. Colorado & N. W. R. Co., 157 Fed. 321; U. S. v. Standard Oil Co., 155 Fed. 305. Where a belt line railroad operating within and around a city and wholly within a state, receives shipments of interstate freight consigned to or from local shippers on through bills of lading, it is, as to such shipments, subject to the provisions of the Interstate Commerce Act as to discrimination, even though the duty to furnish switch service to all shippers grows out of a local ordinance and a state statute.-Interstate Stock-yards Co. v. Indianapolis U. R. Co., 99 Fed. 472.

The interstate shipment of freight over several connecting lines, under a through rate, etc., makes a road subject to the Interstate Commerce Act, even though its line lies wholly within one state and its part of the joint charge is its regular local rate.-U. S. ex rel. Interst. Com. Commission v. Seaboard R. Co., 82 Fed. 563.

A railroad lying wholly within a state, which transports freight, whether coming from within or without the state, solely on local bills of lading, without any arrangements with connecting carriers, is not engaged in interstate commerce.-U. S. v. Ch. K. & S. R. Co., 81 Fed. 783.

A railroad lying wholly within a state, which transports freight, whether coming from within or without the state, solely on local bills of lading, under a special contract limited to its own line, and without dividing charges with any other carriers or assuming any other obligations to or for them, is not amenable to the Interstate Commerce Commission.-U. S. v. Ch. K. & S. R. Co., 81 Fed. 783.

A railroad company whose line is wholly within one state, and which, although it accepts freight for transportation interstate, never issues bills of lading to points beyond its own line, receives no freight on through bills of lading and has no arrangements with other roads for a division of charges or for a common control or management, is not under the jurisdiction of the Interstate Commerce Commission.- Interst. Com Com. v. Bellaire, Z. & C. R. Co., 77 Fed. 942.

A railway wholly within the bounds of a single state, when it voluntarily engages as a common carrier in interstate commerce by making an arrangement for a continuous carriage or shipment of goods, is subject, so far as such traffic is concerned, to the Interstate Commerce Act.— Pennsylvania Millers' Assn. v. Phila. & R. R. Co., 8 Inters. Com. R. 531.

A short road wholly within one state, which has never owned any rolling stock, but is used by companies conducting an interstate traffic in coal, is subject to the Interstate Commerce Act.- Heck v. E. Tenn. V. & G. R. Co., 1 Inters. Com. R. 498, 775, 1 I. C. C. R. 495.

[8] When the interstate transportation begins.

A dining car regularly employed in interstate traffic does not cease to be so when in the yards, pending the next trip of its train.-Johnson V. So. Pac. Co., 196 U. S. 1, 25 Sup. Ct. R. (U. S.) 158.

When a commodity has been delivered to a common carrier, to be transported on a continuous voyage or trip to a point beyond the limits of the state where delivered, the character of interstate or foreign commerce attaches thereto.- Coe v. Erroll, 116 U. S. 517, 6 Sup. Ct. R. (U. S.) 475, affg. s. c. 62 N. H. 303; The Daniel Ball, 10 Wall. (U. S.) 557; Ex parte Koehler, 30 Fed. 867; In re Greene, 52 Fed. 113; Houston Nav. Co. v. Ins. Co., 89 Tex. 1, 32 S. W. 889, 30 L. R. A. 713; Missouri Pac. R. Co. v. Sherwood, 84 Tex. 125, 19 S. W. 455, 17 L. R. A. 643n.

Goods intended for interstate transportation are not subjects of interstate commerce until actually started in course of transportation. The carrying of them to, and depositing them at, a depot, is no part of such transportation. Coe v. Erroll, 116 U. S. 517, 6 Sup. Ct. R. (U. S.) 475, affg. s. c. 62 N. H. 303.

When interstate commerce begins is determined not by the character of the commodity, nor by the intention of the owner to transfer it to another state for sale, nor by his preparation of it for transportation, but by its actual delivery to a common carrier for transportation, or the actual commencement of its transfer to another state.-U. S. v. Boyer, 85 Fed. 425; In re Greene, 52 Fed. 104.

It is a serious question whether, when property has been put in a car with the intent of shipping it outside the state, it has not already commenced its interstate journey, so that regulation of switching charges for it is an interference with interstate commerce.- Chicago, St. P. M. & O. R. Co. v. Becker, 35 Fed. 883.

A car being hauled from one of the carrier's yards to another, preparatory to going upon the main line bound for its destination in another state, is engaged in interstate commerce.-U. S. v. P. C. C. & St. L. R. Co., 11 Inters. Com. R. 696.

[9] When interstate transportation ends.

Where oil shipped interstate in tanks is stopped at a point for the purpose of separation, distribution and reshipment to fill small orders, there is a termination of the interstate shipment.- General Oil Co. v. Crain, 209 U. S. 211, 28 Sup. Ct. R. (U. S.) 475.

An interstate shipment, on reaching the destination specified in the original contract of shipment, so far loses its character as an interstate

shipment that its further transportation to another point in the same state, upon the directions of the consignee, is controlled by the laws of the state and not by the Interstate Commerce Act.- Gulf, C. & S. F. R. Co. v. Texas, 204 U. S. 403, 27 Sup. Ct. R. (U. S.) 360, affg. s. c. 97 Tex. 274, 78 S. W. 495.

Unless Congress has provided the contrary, goods moving in interstate commerce in the original package cease to be such commerce only after delivery and sale so long as they remain in such original package.- Heyman v. So. R. Co., 203 U. S. 270, 27 Sup. Ct. R. (U. S.) 104.

Where coal, transported from another state, has not been delivered to the consignee, but remains on the tracks of the railroad in the condition in which it was originally brought from the other state, the interstate transportation has not yet been completed.- McNeill v. So. R. Co., 202 U. S. 543, 26 Sup. Ct. R. (U. S.) 722.

Cattle shipped for sale to stockyards in the same state as the point of shipment, with the expectation that they will end their transit, after sale, in another state, and actually doing so, with only the interruption necessary to find a purchaser at the stockyards, are subjects of interstate commerce from the time of shipment.- Swift v. U. S., 196 U. S. 375, 25 Sup. Ct. R. (U. S.) 276.

Coal stored in a car in which it originally started on its interstate transit, is still under exclusive federal regulation.-Austin v. Tennessee, 179 U. S. 343, 21 Sup. Ct. R. (U. S.) 132.

An article of interstate commerce remains wholly free from state regulation as long as it is in the original package.—Austin v. Tennessee, 179 U. S. 343, 21 Sup. Ct. R. (U. S.) 132; Schollenberger v. Pennsylvania, 171 U. S. 1, 18 Sup. Ct. R. (U. S.) 757, revg. s. c. 170 Pa. 284, 33 Atl. 85, 30 L. R. A. 396; Rhodes v. Iowa, 170 U. S. 412, 18 Sup. Ct. R. (U. S.) 664, revg. s. c. 90 Iowa, 496, 58 N. W. 887, 24 L. R. A. 245; Scott v. Donald, 165 U. S. 58, 17 Sup. Ct. R. (U. S.) 265; Emert v. Missouri, 156 U. S. 296, 15 Sup. Ct. R. (U. S.) 367, affg. s. c. 103 Mo. 241, 15 S. W. 81, 11 L. R. A. 219; Leisy v. Hardin, 135 U. S. 100, 10 Sup. Ct. R. (U. S.) 681, revg. s. c. 78 Iowa, 286, 43 N. W. 188; Southern R. Co. v. Greensboro I. & C. Co., 134 Fed. 82; affd. 202 U. S. 543, 28 Sup. Ct. R. (U. S.) 722; McGwigan v. R. Co., 95 N. C. 428.

Carloads of coal shipped interstate remain subjects of interstate commerce until delivered to the consignee.- Southern R. Co. v. Greensboro I. & C. Co., 134 Fed. 82; affd. 202 U. S: 543, 26 Sup. Ct. R. (U. S.) 722.

Cattle shipped from, points without a state, consigned to stockyards within the state, are the subjects of interstate commerce and so remain until they reach their destination and are sold and mingled with the mass of state property.- Cotting v. Kansas City Stock Yards Co., 82 Fed. 839; revd. on other points, 183 U. S. 79, 22 Sup. Ct. R. (U. S.) 30.

A shipper billed goods from a point without a state to a point within said state, and then, without opening the car, reshipped to another point within said state consigned to himself. When the first shipment was made, the last point was the intended final point of destination.— Held, that the transportation was an interstate shipment so that the railroad could not be compelled to carry between the last two mentioned points at a rate fixed under state legislation.-Porter v. St. L. S. W. R., 78 Ark. 182, 95 S. W. 453.

Where coal was brought from Pennsylvania and stored in New Jersey, to be sold and delivered as contracts for that purpose were consummated, no definite point of trans-shipment being known, and the purchaser being unknown, such coal was not deemed to be coal in interstate commerce.Lehigh & W. Coal Co. v. Borough of Junction, N. J. L., 66 Atl. 923.

[10] Extent of state and federal regulative power.

What acts constitute a regulation of interstate commerce,- see post,

notes [13]-[17].

State and federal statute dealing with same subject,—see post, note

[19].

General power to regulate property devoted to public use,- see ante, § 1, notes [1]-[22].

General scope of police power of the state,- see ante, § 1, note [2]. Exemptions from public control,- see ante, § 1, notes [16]-[21]. Effect of receivership on power to regulate,— see ante, § 2, note [15]. State or federal control over switching charges,- see post, § 27, note [14].

Power of state to compel transfer of interstate shipments to connecting lines, see post, § 35, note [10].

Power of state to regulate limitation of liability,- see post, § 38, note [12].

Extent of state and federal power over bills of lading,- see post, § 38, note [13].

A law passed within the acknowledged power of a state is not unconstitutional because it may indirectly affect interstate commerce.- Asbell v. Kansas, 209 U. S. 251, 28 Sup. Ct. R. (U. S.) 485, affg. s. c. 60 Kan. 51.

Congress has power to regulate the relation of master and servant to the extent that regulations adopted by Congress on that subject are solely confined to interstate commerce.- - The Employers' Liability Cases, 207 U. S. 463, 28 Sup. Ct. R. (U. S.) 141.

A state, in the exercise of its police authority, may confer on an administrative agency the power to make reasonable regulations as to the place, manner and time of delivery of merchandise moving in the chan

nels of interstate commerce, but any such regulation which directly burdens interstate commerce is not within the power of the state.McNeill v. So. R. Co., 202 U. S. 543, 26 Sup. Ct. R. (U. S.) 722.

Although a railroad is largely engaged in interstate commerce, it is subject to state regulation as to any of its service performed wholly within a state and not as a part of interstate commerce.- - Pennsylvania R. Co. v. Knight, 192 U. S. 21, 24 Sup. Ct. R. (U. S.) 202.

An inspection law affecting interstate commerce is not for that reason invalid unless it is in conflict with an act of Congress or is an attempt to regulate interstate commerce.--Patapsco Guano Co. v. N. C. Board, 171 U. S. 345, 18 Sup. Ct. R. (U. S.) 862, affg. 52 Fed. 609; McLean v. Denver & R. G. R. Co., 203 U. S. 38, 27 Sup. Ct. R. (U. S.) 1.

A carrier exercising his calling in a particular state, though engaged in interstate commerce, is answerable according to the laws of the state, for acts of non-feasance and mis-feasance committed within its limits.Chicago, M. & St. P. R. Co. v. Solan, 169 U. S. 133, 18 Sup. Ct. R. (U. S.) 289, affg. s. c. 95 Iowa, 260, 63 N. W. 692.

The power of Congress over interstate commerce includes the prevention of any interference or obstruction of interstate commerce.In re Debs, 158 U. S. 564, 15 Sup. Ct. R. (U. S.) 900.

A Texas statute made it unlawful for a railroad to collect a greater sum than is specified in the bill of lading. Interst. Com. Act, § 6, forbids the charging of more or less than is specified in the published schedules.- Held, that the federal statute controls as to interstate shipments.- Gulf, C. & S. F. R. Co. v. Hefley, 158 U. S. 98, 15 Sup. Ct. R. (U. S.) 802.

That a railway is incorporated under a federal statute and charter, and derives therefrom the power to charge and collect tolls and rates for transportation, does not remove it from the operation of the act of the Texas legislature creating a railroad commission, as to business wholly within the state.- Reagan v. Mercantile Trust Co., 154 U. S. 413, 14 Sup. Ct. R. (U. S.) 1060.

The authority of a state is limited to fixing charges on such channels of commerce as are exclusively within its territory.- Covington & C. Bridge Co. v. Kentucky, 154 U. S. 204, 14 Sup. Ct. R. (U. S.) 1087.

A railroad corporation of one state, by leasing a railroad in another state, subjects itself to such local legislation in the latter state as would have been applicable to the corporation owning the road, if no lease had been made. Stone v. Ill. Cent. R. Co., 116 U. S. 347, 6 Sup. Ct. R. (U. S.) 348, 388, 1791.

Nothing can be done by a state which will operate as a burden on the interstate business of a carrier, or impair the usefulness of its facilities for interstate traffic.- Stone v. Farmers' L. & T. Co., 116 U. S. 307, 6 Sup. Ct. R. (U. S.) 334, 338, 1191.