as Providence, Augusta, Hartford, Lowell. The system more or less exists in all of these, but the bosses have not ventured to exclude respectable outsiders from office, nor have they robbed the city, debauched the legislature, retained their power by election frauds after the manner of their great models in New York and Philadelphia. And this seems to hold true also of the Western and Southern cities of moderate size. As regards Ohio a judicious authority says "Rings are much less likely to exist in the smaller cities, though a population of 30,000 or 40,000 may occasionally support them. We should hardly find them in a city below 10,000: any corruption there would be occasional, not systematic." As regards Missouri I am informed that "We have few or no Rings in cities under 60,000 inhabitants. The smaller cities are not favourable to such kinds of control. Men know one another too well. There is no large floating irresponsible following as in large cities." A similar answer from Kentucky adds that Rings have nevertheless been heard of in cities so small as Lexington (25,000 inhabitants) and Frankfort (6500). In quite small towns and in the rural districts-in fact, wherever there is not a municipality, but government is either by a town meeting and selectmen or by township or county officials-the dangerous conditions are reduced to their minimum. The new immigrants are not generally planted in large masses but scattered among the native population, whose habits and modes of thinking they soon acquire. The Germans and Scandinavians who settle in the country districts have been (for the quality of the most recent immigrants is lower) among the best of their race, and have formed a valuable element. The country voter, whether native or foreign, is exposed to fewer tempta tions than his brother of the city, and is less easy either to lead or to drive. He is parsimonious, and pays his county or town officials on a niggardly scale. A boss has therefore no occupation in such a place. His talents would be wasted. If a ring exists in a small city it is little more than a clique of local lawyers who combine to get hold of the local offices, each in his turn, and to secure a seat for one of themselves in the State legislature, where there may be pickings to be had. It is not easy to draw the line between such a clique, which one may find all the world over, and a true Ring: but by whichever name we call the weed, it does little harm to the crop. Here and there, however, one meets with a genuine Boss even in these seats of rural innocence. I know a New England Town, with a population of about ten thousand people, which has long been ruled by such a local wirepuller. I do not think he steals. But he has gathered a party of voters round him, by whose help he carries the offices, and gets a chance of perpetrating jobs which enrich himself and supply work for his supporters. The circumstances, however, are exceptional. Within the taxing area of the Town there lie many villas of wealthy merchants, who do business in a neighbouring city, but are taxed on their summer residences here. Hence the funds which this Town has to deal with are much larger than would be the case in most towns of its size, while many of the rich tax-payers are not citizens here, but vote in the city where they live during the winter. Hence they cannot go to the town meeting to beard the boss, but must grin and pay while they watch his gambols. 1 It will be remembered that in the United States, though a man may pay taxes on his real estate in any number of States or counties or cities, he can vote, even in purely local elections or on purely local matters, in one place only-that in which he is held to reside. Speaking generally, the country places and the smaller cities are not ring-ridden. There is a tendency everywhere for the local party organizations to fall into the hands of a few men, perhaps of one man. But this happens not so much from an intent to exclude others and misuse power, as because the work is left to those who have some sort of interest in doing it, that, namely, of being themselves nominated to an office. Such persons are seldom professional office-seekers, but lawyers, farmers, or store-keepers, who are glad to add something to their income, and have the importance, not so contemptible in a village, of sitting in the State legislature. Nor does much harm result. The administration is fairly good; the tax-payers are not robbed. If a leading citizen, who does not belong to the managing circle, wishes to get a nomination, he will probably succeed; in fact, no one will care to exclude him. In many places there is a non-party "citizens' committee " which takes things out of the hands of the two organizations by running as candidates respectable men irrespective of party. Such candidates are often carried, and will be carried if the local party managers have offended public sentiment by bad nominations. In short, the materials for real ring government do not exist, and its methods are inapplicable, outside the large cities. No one needs to fear it, or does fear it. What has been said refers chiefly to the Northern, Middle, and Western States. The circumstances of the South are different, but they illustrate equally well the general laws of ring growth. In the Southern cities there is scarcely any population of European immigrants. The lowest class consists of negroes and " and "poor whites." The negroes are ignorant, and would be dangerously plastic material in the hands of unscrupulous wirepullers, as was amply shown after the Civil War. But they have hitherto mostly belonged to the Republican party, and the Democratic party has so completely regained its ascendency that the bosses who controlled the negro vote can do nothing. In most parts of the South the men of ability and standing have interested themselves in politics so far as to dictate the lines of party action. Their position when self-government was restored and the carpetbaggers had to be overthrown forced them to exertions. Sometimes they use or tolerate a ring, but they do not suffer it to do serious mischief, and it is usually glad to nominate one of them, or any one whom they recommend. The old traditions of social leadership survive better in the South than in the North, so that the poorer part of the white population is more apt to follow the suggestions of eminent local citizens and to place them at its head when they will accept the position. Moreover, the South is a comparatively poor country. Less is to be gained from office (including membership of a legislature), either in the way of salary or indirectly through jobbing contracts influencing legislation. The prizes in the profession of politics being fewer, the profession is not prosecuted with the same earnestness and perfection of organization. There are, however, some cities where conditions similar to those of large Northern cities reappear, and there Ring-and-bossdom reappears also. New Orleans is the best example, and in Arkansas and Texas, where there never was a plantation aristocracy like that of the Atlantic Slave States, rings are pretty numerous, though, as the cities are small and seldom rich, their exploits attract little attention. CHAPTER LXV SPOILS AN illustration of the familiar dictum regarding the wisdom with which the world is governed may be found in the fact that the greatest changes are often those introduced with the least notion of their consequence, and the most fatal those which encounter least resistance. So the system of removals from Federal office which began some sixty years ago, though disapproved of by some of the leading statesmen of the time, including Clay, Webster, and Calhoun, excited comparatively little attention in the country, nor did its advocates foresee a tithe of its far-reaching results. The Constitution of the United States vests the right of appointing to Federal offices in the President, requiring the consent of the Senate in the case of the more important, and permitting Congress to vest the appointment of inferior officers in the President alone, in the courts, or in the heads of departments. It was assumed that this clause gave officials a tenure at the pleasure of the President-i.e. that he had the legal right of removing them without cause assigned. But the earlier Presidents considered the tenure as being practically for life or during good behaviour, and did not remove, except for some solid reason, persons appointed by their predecessors. Washington |