tion. In both cases we have the judgment of individual men as to what is right or wrong, but still only the judgment of men; and are, therefore, no nearer the truth than we were before such a system existed. Nor can the phrenological moralist escape here, by saying that we have in "a properly balanced brain" a fair standard of moral right; for we turn upon him with the question, What is "a properly balanced brain?" and who is to judge on this question? Among all the millions of human brains that exist or that have existed, each has been regarded by its possessor as the standard of perfection by which all others were to be tested; and each would pronounce that of any other man to be properly constructed. in proportion as it approximated to the balance of his own. As a matter of fact, it must be abundantly evident to all readers of the volumes before us, that their authors regard their own phrenological conformations as the very quintessence of fitness, and the standard by which all other craniological developments ought to be adjusted. Where, then, is the legitimate standard? If you erect any other test, you must, of course, admit the superiority of the umpire, and then all the boasted advance made by this science in the study of mental and moral philosophy and religious duty is at an end. Hence, we repeat, in phrenology we have only what each man judges to be right.

But there is another point, which is, if possible, yet more vital, to be regarded here. Does phrenology reveal the character of man in its original purity, or only in its present state of sinfulness and of consequent derangement? This inquiry, it will be at once perceived, is vital to the whole system of morals which the aid of this science is invoked to discover and confirm. If the powers and propensities of men, as learned from the organization of the brain, be such, both in kind and degree, as belonged to man before the influence of sin, then indeed may we hope for no inconsiderable light to be derived from this source, in respect to his character and duty. If, on the other hand, this science exhibits man only in his state of depravity, then is it evident that it can never reveal any infallible guide, in reference either to his obligations or his prospects. This is obvious from the simple fact

that it is utterly unable to affirm what is the dictate of his original nature, and what the result of departure from his primeval rectitude. To this question, easy of solution as it appears to us, our authors afford directly contradictory replies. On the one hand Mr. Combe says:

"If it be asserted that men's delinquencies offended the Deity, and brought his wrath on the offenders; and that the present condition of the world is the consequence of that displeasure; philosophy offers no answer to this proposition."-Moral Philosophy, p. 35.

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Again:

Religious persons will at once recognize that the instructions communicated to us in the Scriptures, may be classed under two heads. The first class embraces events that occurred before the existing state of nature commenced. . . In regard to all these, science and philosophy are silent, and the Bible is the only rule and direction that is possessed."-Moral Philosophy, pp. 47, 48.

In these extracts, Mr. Combe, although apparently contradicting himself at other times, acknowledges that "the existing state of nature" is not the primitive one; and that, if it be alleged that the present system is materially modified and changed by transgression, philosophy has no answer to give to such a declaration; from all of which it must follow that we are now studying humanity in its fallen state, and not in its pristine purity. Mr. Combe indeed contends abund antly that in studying the 'human constitution and external nature, we are studying the work of God; but he nowhere affirms that we are viewing it in its original rectitude and its early glory.

Mr. Fowler, on the other hand, says:

"By what standard shall we try all our creeds, all our practices? By the standard of the nature of man. That nature is all right--is perfection itself, as perfect as even a God could make it.”—Phrenology and Religion, p. 43.

Again, speaking of man, he says:

"His original constitution was perfection itself. That constitution, Phrenology unfolds. It reveals it all-every shade. Every phase. Every line. Every item. It teaches every doctrine man needs to know. Every duty he is required to perform. Of course this remark excepts every doctrine and duty connected with the fall. And if man will but fulfill all the precepts, and obey all the requirements of his original nature-of Phrenology, the fall and all its effects will pass him by. He will need no Savior, for he will commit no sin."*—P. 25.

*The punctuation in these extracts is Mr. Fowler's, and not ours.

Much more might be adduced to the same effect, but this is enough.

Thus, then, are these gentlemen at perfect antipodes in regard to this fundamental question, What is the nature which Phrenology opens to our study? The one declares that it reveals human nature as it now is, in its fallen and corrupted state; the other affirms that it exhibits man as he was when the crown of glory was upon his head; when he needed no Savior, because he committed no sin.

It is important to settle which of these views of Phrenology is correct, because it is a matter of vast consequence whether we are studying human nature in its purity, or in its corruption; as it emanated from God, or as it has been modified and contaminated by sin; and the theory of morals which we educe must be fundamentally characterized by the answer which we give to this question.

We have said that to us this seems a very plain matter. We now add, that to our apprehension Mr. Combe is clearly right when he affirms, in effect, that it is the nature of man as it now exists, that Phrenology discovers. If the brain, being the organ of the mind, reveals the peculiarities of mental construction, it must exhibit the mind as it is at present. To suppose it to be the organ of the mind as it existed six thousand years ago, is to rob it of its entire value-a value of which phrenologists boast so largely—as an expositor of human character as that character actually develops itself at present. To suppose it to reveal Adam in his purity, rather than man as he is now, is to affirm that it is the same in all individuals, and among all rations, and in all time, and this is to contradict the fundamental principles upon which the whole science is based, for it proceeds throughout upon the assumption that there are idiosyncrasies of character which can be ascertained through its agency; and of course it must exhibit man in his present character, and with his actually existing faculties.

This being clearly the case, it necessarily follows that Phrenology can give us no satisfactory evidence as to what was the original condition of human nature, or with what powers it was at first invested. It cannot assure us that the

faculties which we now find pertaining to humanity, are all which it possessed in its purity, or that some have not been added as the result of transgression, or that those which we now find actually in being and exercise, have not been variously modified, alike in their individual character, their relative strength, and their resultant influence, by the entrance and the reign of sin. We know how uniformly it is taken for granted, by all the leading writers on Phrenology, that the faculties which they now find in existence, and these only, belonged to man in his original innocency. Thus, Mr. Fowler says:

"No one supposes that man's alleged fall took away any original moral element, or added any new element or faculty of depravity. It could not possibly either add or destroy one jot or tittle of nature. It took away no limb, no muscle, no physical organ. It added no phrenological or other mental or moral faculty or power. As far as his original constitution was concerned, it left him just where it found him."-Pp. 24, 25.

Passing the incautious admission, which is at least implied in this extract, that man has mental or moral powers which Phrenology does not embrace nor exhibit, we submit that its leading thought is a most palpable instance of petitio principii. The principle here insisted upon we are not disposed to grant, except upon evidence which our authors will probably be long in finding. For aught they or we can tell, man, in his original state of purity, may have possessed intellectual and moral faculties which his transgression has obliterated.. Sin may have added others to the catalogue, which before had no place there, and it may have completely disarranged the appropriate balance and harmony of those which remain. It is not necessary for our purpose that we should prove that this process has actually taken place, in the intellectual and moral history of our race. It is enough for our argument that such may have been the case. When Adam conversed with God, and enjoyed the blessings of complete obedience, he may have been endowed with faculties which have no longer an existThe consequences of sin, or the direct punitive justice of God, may have obliterated them, and thus there may be far more meaning in the solemn and awful phrase, "spiritual death," and a far more literal fulfillment of the sanction of the Divine law, "In the day thou eatest thereof thou shalt

ence.

surely die," than men are wont to imagine. That such may have been the fact is rendered yet more probable, when we remember that, in the case of idiots, a certain portion of our race are entirely deprived of a whole class of faculties, which are possessed and exercised by men in general. The difference which exists between ordinary men and idiotic minds, seems to be altogether less than that, which obtains between man in his state of holiness, and in his present condition of depravity and sin. Hence it is not only possible, but, to our minds, highly probable that the fall of Man may have removed a whole class of faculties,—and that the highest and best of them all, from his intellectual and moral nature. But whether this be thus, or otherwise, the assumption that in mind, as it now exists, we have all the original powers which appertained to humanity, and these alone, clearly wants proof which is not likely to be afforded us at present. It is curious to notice how even Mr. Fowler himself makes admissions, which in reality involve the same conclusion. Thus he says:

"For aught we know the Deity may have other attributes as conspicuous in his character as his benevolence, or justice or wisdom which man has now no faculty for perceiving, and to which he has no faculty adapted, just as the brute creation have no faculty adapted to or capable of perceiving either his existence or any of his attributes."-Page 58.

But if it is admitted that God may have attributes which we have at present no faculties capable of cognizing, or appreciating, it is, at least, possible, not to say probable, that man as originally constituted may have been endowed with powers for understanding, and rejoicing in these attributes. Thus the admissions of our author himself, involve the recognition of the fact, that man's original nature may have been gifted with endowments which sin has utterly obliterated from the human constitution.

So, also, in regard to the faculties which yet exist in humanity. There is a manifest derangement, both among themselves, and in the relations which they sustain to the world around them. How else does it occur, for instance, that Acquisitiveness so often wars with Conscientiousness and Benevolence; nay more, that Benevolence often dictates what Conscientiousness forbids? How happens it that the Love of