which there was no stockade was to be occupied by Thompson's detachment, who moved off in the night, and late in the morning arrived near the first stockade, but delayed carrying it by a coup-de-main; he therefore moved on and occupied a ridge about eight hundred yards distant from a stone work thrown up by the enemy, and which was within a few hundred yards of the second stockade to be attacked. Here he halted for his guns to come up; on their arrival opened on the Deboo ki Tibia stockade until dark, hoping to effect a breach, but the rude defences of this nature quickly thrown up by the Nepaulese are often proof against light artillery, consequently no great impression was made, and Colonel Thompson was obliged to be satisfied by establishing himself on the ridge.

The Nepaulese not liking his close proximity, evacuated this stockade in the night, which was accordingly taken possession of by a party of our troops unopposed. The Nepaulese, however, employed themselves during the night in

THE RAMGURH STOCKADE.

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concentrating their force, preparatory to a determined effort to dislodge our detachment. Accordingly, at the Nepaulese favourite hour of attack, viz., just before daybreak, they made a simultaneous rush from a stockade which crowned the heights of the Ramgurh ridge, at the point where it was joined by that on which Deboo was situated. The detachment, however, was well prepared for them, and drove back the Nepaulese with considerable loss, killing and wounding nearly three hundred of them, our loss being very small, twelve only killed, and fifty wounded, without an officer being touched. Sir David, on hearing the firing, sent a small force to reinforce the post. By the end of December, it was re-stockaded and well secured.

It must here be noticed that Ramgurh formed the Goorkha commander's right, as his position fronted the plains. Colonel Thompson's post was in the rear of his centre, so as almost entirely to intercept his supplies and interfere with his communications. On

ascertaining this, the Nepaulese general changed his ground, leaving all his stockades to the left of Ramgarh, and keeping that fort still at his right, took up a reversed position on the other side of it, so as to show a new front to our force, which had turned his left. The Goorkha commander likewise strengthened his headquarters, Mungoo ki Dar. It was soon ascertained that the ridge which Thompson had occupied did not afford any means of approaching the enemy's main position, in consequence of the ground being particularly rugged; consequently, a different plan of operations became necessary; and about the middle of January, Ochterlony, still wishing to straighten the enemy's supplies, which, since the occupation of the Urkee and Subathoo roads, had been entirely drawn from Belaspore, executed a most masterly movement, by which he subsequently reduced Rutungurh, a fort, although separated from the ridge, lying directly between the heights of Maloun and Belaspore. Much time was consumed in reducing the Ramgurh forts, and

THE BELASPORE RAJAH.

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Ochterlony employed himself during the interval in bringing over the Belaspore Rajah; who, after some unsuccessful attempts to help the Goorkhas, had fled across the Sutlej. This Rajah, though connected with the Goorkha commander's family by a recent marriage, was at last induced, through the fear of losing his capital, to make terms and submit.

CHAPTER XI.

THE WAR CONTINUED.

I MUST now return to the more interesting operations in the Turais of Goruckpore and Tirhoot, with one parting word regarding Umur Sing, who not only proved himself a brave soldier, but often a very sagacious one, by the in which he had often met and sometimes defeated the plans of the British commanders.

way

The division assembled at Goruckpore, was ordered to take the field by the middle of November, but was delayed in consequence of the great difficulty of obtaining hill-porters in that then thinly peopled district. It was there