the fecurity and favourable offers held out to them by Sir Henry Clinton, but, as an indelible mark of their irreconcileable enmity, delivered up to deftruction the unhappy men who had acted as his. agents. The ravages made by Arnold in Virginia, drew the attention of the Americans, as well as of the French at Rhode Illand, particularly to that quarter. The former were now attacked, in their most fenfible, as well as most vulnerable part. The havock made in that country, went directly to the deftruction of the very fources of the war, and to the annihilation of all their hopes of independency. With a numerous and warlike people; with confiderable refources, more perhaps than any province in America, that country, from its peculiar fituation, and from the modes of building, planting, and living, adopted by the inhabitants, is more open and expofed than any other, and, unless protected by a confiderable army, is exceedingly weak in every point of defence. In a word, it must in its prefent ftate, lie at the mercy, in all its moft valuable parts, of whatever enemy is mafter of the bay of Chefapeak, and confequently of the rivers. This circumftance was fo well understood, that thofe who cenfured the conduct of the British commanders, and the plan of the war, had frequently made it one of their principal grounds of attack, that they had not more early adopted operations of a fimilar nature. They pretended, that a powerful army was kept idle and ufelefs at New York, whilft a right application of a proper part of that force to the fouthward, would have brought the war to a speedy and happy conclufion. They went fo far back in their ftri&tures, as to the time of Lord Cornwallis's being left to prosecute the war in South Carolina, when, they fay, that he was not only left in too weak a state to profecute it with effect and decifion, but that he was particularly ftripped of the best and most active part of the forces; of that part which was peculiarly fuited to the nature of the war and of the country, and which, if not totally ufelefs, could not at all be wanted, in that quiet and defenfive kind of fervice which prevailed at New York. They likewife faid, that the expedition under Gen. Leflie fhould have taken place much earlier, and that the force fhould have been three times greater than it really was; by which means, as they pretend, Greene would not only have been prevented from paffing to the fouthward, but, if Lord Cornwallis had the force which he ought in the Carolinas, nothing could prevent his junction with Leflie in the heart of Virginia, and the reduction of all the fouthern colonies, muft have been the immediate and inevitable confequence. They even carried their ftrictures to the prefent expedition under Arnold; which, they faid, fhould have been committed to Gen. Philips, with a force adequate to the greatnefs and importance of the object; a meafure, according to them, which would in a very confiderable degree have compenfated for fome of the former errors and neglects. To this it has been anfwered, that the commander in chief could not not have known, when he returned Time and events have fhewn, that thefe divided operations, which were long called for by feveral military critics, when at length they were adopted, were far from making good the plaufible arguments on which they were undertaken. The diftreffes and danger of Virginia obliged Washington, notwithstanding his weaknefs, to detach 2000 of his best troops, under the command of the Marquis de la Fayette, to the relief of that, his native, country. The French at Rhode Island thought an opportunity now offered of atoning for their past inactivity, by a moft effential fervice to their allies, in cutting off the retreat of Arnold and his party from the Chesapeak; an event, in which the taking him prifoner would not, perhaps, have been the leaft pleafing part of the fervice. Befides fome late increase to their naval force, they were the farther encouraged to this enter prize, by the misfortune which the British fquadron had newly fuftained, in a dreadful tempeft. In this calamity, the Culloden, a fine new thip of 74 guns, was totally loft; the Bedford, of the fame force, was difmafted and much damaged; and the America had been feparated, and driven so far to sea, that her fituation, and even exiftence, were for fome time matters of uncertainty.. But previous to the intended expedition, in which 2000 land forces were to bear a part, the French difpatched a fhip of the line, with fome frigates, to the Chefapeak, with a view as well of furprizing the fmall marine force in that bay, as of difcovering the exact ftate of affairs in Virginia. This fmall fquadron, befides greatly alarming Arnold, who was returned from an expedition up the river James to his principal poft at Portfmouth, had the fortune to fall in with and take the Romulus man of war of 44 guns, which was totally unfufpicious of danger. The Bedford's mafts being speedily replaced by thofe of the Culloden, which had been fortunately' faved from the wreck, the British fleet, under the Admirals Arbuthnot and Graves, was much fooner in a condition to oppofe the defigns of the enemy, than they had by any means apprehended. Count Rochambeau, having embarked with the land forces, the French fleet, under M. de Ternay, failed from Rhode Island on the 8th of March, and were intercepted off Cape Henry on the 16th, by the English, who had departed two days later from Gardner's Bay. The oppofite fleets were well poif ed in point of ftrength; the fuperiority of a few guns on the fide of the English, being more than counterbalanced by the much greater number of men on the other. The line was compofed of eight fhips on each fide, including the Romulus of 40 guns in the one, and the Adamant of fifty in the other. A partial engagement took place, in which nearly the whole weight of the action fell upon the Robuft, Europe, and the Prudent. The coming up of the fhips in the center, at length relieved the van, who had been expofed to the whole of the enemy's fire. The French line being then foon broken, they gave way, and began to form a new one at fome diftance. The admiral endeavoured to pursue his advantage, by preffing upon the enemy, and renewing the action; but the three fhips which were firft engaged had fuffered fo much in their rigging, that two of them were become fo abfolutely unmanageable, as to be taken in tow, and even the third was too much difabled, in any degree to fuftain a parfait. Thefe circumstances prevented the admiral from being able to render the action decifive. The enemy, without an abfolute fight, had by their manœuvres gained a distance of three or four leagues in the forming of their line; and as they were determined not to come to close action, it was now out of his power to force them to it. He, however, obtained, in part, the effential benefits and the demonstrations of victory. He cut the enemy off from the Chesapeak, who were accordingly obliged to return without landing their troops, and without effecting any one of the purposes of the expedition; and they were reduced to fubmit to the hard neceffity and very grievous mortification of feeing the whole plan of the Virginia campaign difconcerted, and all the fanguine hopes and wishes of their allies fruftrated. Such was Arnold's escape from, probably, the moft imminent danger in which he had ever been involved. The lofs of men was but trifling on the British fide, and was almost entirely confined to the three ships which were first engaged; thirty only were flain, and about feventy wounded. This, like every other naval action in the war, underwent much criticifm. It appears that the weather ́ was very fqually and unfavourable; and, befides other, perhaps, more cogent reafons, it has or may be advanced, in favour of the admiral, that there are few circumftances, in which it is not exceedingly difficult to force an enemy to clofe and decifive action at fea, who is abfolutely determined to ufe all poffible means for evading that refult; and that all vigorous attempts for the purpose, must be liable to the rifque of engaging under fome disadvantage. The fleet were detained, by the badness of the weather, for fome time in the Chesapeak; which neceffarily delayed their purfuit of the enemy. During March 26. that interval, a convoy arrived from New York, with Major-Gen. Phillips, and about 2000 choice troops on board. The long durance which that distin guifhed officer, with his fellows of the convention army, had undergone, having been happily termi nated, nated, by a new cartel, which had been fome months before con cluded, he was now appointed to take the chief command in Virginia. The departure of Lord Cornwallis to Wilmington, having left South Carolina open, Gen. Greene did not neglect the opportunity of directing his views to that province. An experiment upon an untried enemy, was fatisfactory in the defign, and afforded room for hope in the execution; at the wort, he could not reasonably apprehend falling into rougher hands, than thofe which he had fo recently encountered. But it was alfo, in reality, that vulnerable part, to which a judicious commander must neceffarily have directed his operations. He had, however, still, a vigilant enemy to encounter, from whom no advantage could be cheaply purchased. The communications were fo entirely cut off, that Lord Rawdon had no manner of knowledge of the movements of the British army after the battle of Guildford; much lefs, could he have the most distant idea, of the hard neceffity which compelled Lord Cornwallis to fly from the arms of victory, abandon the line of operation, and by a moft difficult march of 200 miles, retire out of the way to Wilmington. He could not therefore but be aftonished at receiving intelligence, that Greene, whom he looked upon as ruined, or at least as having fled to Virginia, was in full march to South Carolina, with a view of attacking him at Camden. He was likewife informed, about the fame time, that Col. Lee had croffed the Pedee, and joined Marion on the Black Creek, or river, with an apparent view of entering the province on the eastern border. Lord Rawdon judiciously conceived, that this movement was only a feint, fubfervient to the principal design; intending thereby, to induce him to a divifion of his, fmall force, and to draw him away from Camden, whilst Greene fhould in the mean time, by forced marches through a deferted country, from whence no intelligence of his approach could be received, furprize that weakened poft in his abfence. From this right conception of the defign, the measure produced a directly contrary effect to that which was intended; for inftead of Lord Rawdon's going himfelf or detaching, to refift the diverfion on that fide, it occafioned his immediately recalling Lieut. Col. Watfon, who had been long employed with a confiderable detachment, for the protection of the eaftern frontier. In the mean time, the doubtful reports which had before reached him were now confirmed, and he received clear information of Greene's approach; and though he was totally ignorant of his force, yet being equally in the dark with refpect to Lord Cornwallis's fituation, and having no particular inftructions for his guidance, he thought it his duty, at all events, to maintain his poft. In thefe circumftances it was highly vexatious, that although fome of the militia fhewed great zeal and fidelity, in coming from confiderable diftances to offer their fervices, yet the fcanty state of provifions prevented him from being able to benefit of their affift ance, ance, excepting only thofe, whose particular fituation expofed them to fuffer from the enemy, and who were, on that account, received within the post. At length, Gen. April 19th. Greene appeared in full view. The paucity of troops, and the extenfiveness of the pofts which they had to defend, were fufficient motive's with the British commander, for not rifquing the lofs of men, by any attempt to harrafs the enemy in their approach. The fame caufes had obliged him to abandon the ferry on the Wateree, although the South Carolina regiment was on its way to join him from Ninety-Six, and that was its direct courfe. He had however taken his measures fo well, as to fecure the paffage of that regiment, upon its arrival, three days after. In thefe circumftances, he received a letter from Colonel Balfour at CharlesTown, acquainting him of Lord Cornwallis's fituation; and likewife fignifying to him, that the commander in chief, being fully fenfible of the danger to which he would be expofed in his prefent pofition, withed that he might abandon Camden, and retire for fecurity, within the cover of the great River Santee. The neceffity of the measure was, upon this information, fufficiently obvious; but the accomplishment of it, was not now within his power. 1 The efforts made by the enemy to examine the British works, and particularly an attempt to destroy their mill, neceffarily brought on fome fkirmishes. By the prifoners taken in these excurfions, Lord Rawdon had the fatisfaction to learn, that Gen. Greene's army VOL. XXIV. 1 was not by any means fo numerous as he had apprehended; but that confiderable reinforcements were daily expected. To balance this, he received the unfavourable intelligence, that Marion had taken. fuch a pofition, as rendered it impracticable for Col. Watfon to join him, whofe arrival he had till then impatiently expected. In this ftate of things, it feemed, that fome immediate and decifive effort was become little lefs than abfolutely neceffary, in order to evade much greater, and not far diftant, evil and danger. Greene himself had the fortune to make an opening for the operation of this neceffity, in a manner which was, in appearance, far from being confiftent with his ufual conduct. With a view of a general affault upon the British pofts, he had fent off his artillery and baggage, a day's march in the rear of the army; but foon after he abandoned that refolution, and detached all his militia to bring back the artillery. Such irrefolution, or indecifion of mind, can never be difplayed under the eye of a vigilant enemy, without great, if not certain danger. Lord Rawdon's intelligence was tardy; but he inftantly perceived the importance of the occafion, and determined as inftantly, if poffible, to feize it. By arming the musicians, drummers, and every being in the army that was able to carry a firelock, he muftered above nine hundred for the field, including fixty dragoons. With this force, and two fix pounders, he April 25th. boldly marched to attack the affailing enemy in their camp, in open daylight, at 10 o'clock in [F] the |