profpect of things, which had been defcribed by the honourable gentleman who spoke before him. Our difficulties were certainly great, but he trusted they were by no means infuperable. He was neither defirous of concealing their magnitude, nor afraid. to meet them, great as they must be acknowledged; because he was convinced, that when the force of this country was fully exerted, it was equal to the conteft; and that the only means of obtaining an honourable and just peace, was to fhew ourselves capable of carrying on the war with fpirit and vigour. In taking notice of what Mr. Burke had faid relative to the adjournment, he declared, that it would have been as agreeable to him that the house had fat out the whole intermediate time as not; that the breaking out of the war at all, or the time of its commencement, were matters by no means fo clear within the view of the king's fervants, as to render it incumbent on them to ftate the fituation of affairs to parliament, as a reason for their continuing affembled during the customary season of a recefs, which, he knew, would for various reafons be highly inconvenient. The laft efficient caufe of the rupture, the anfwer of the states, was not received from Sir Jofeph Yorke, untill after the adjournment. The noble lord then moved an address of thanks for his majesty's moft gracious meffage; with an affurance of the fincere part which they took in the concern and regret his majefty expreffed, for the unavoidable neceffity of hoftile measures against the antient friends and natural allies of his kingdoms; an acknowledgement, in the warmeft fentiments of gratitude, of the wisdom and moderation of his conduct, in ufing every endeavour with the ftates general, to avoid proceeding to extremities; and the fulleft affurance that, with a firm and determined refolution, they will fupport him against all his enemies, in the profecution of this juft and neceffary war, for the maintenance of the honour of his crown, and of the rights and interefts of his people.The minifter clofed his motion with an obfervation, that the address was drawn up in language the most proper for the houfe to adopt, and he therefore moved it. The motion was feconded with fpirit and ability by Lord Lewifham, who obferved, that the most wanton wars had been undertaken against Holland in those periods, when the interefts of the crown and of the people were distinct and different in this country; thence, he faid, in the infamous reign of Charles the Second, they had not been more frequently than unjustly commenced. But in the prefent reign, when the interests of the king and of the people were one and the fame, no rupture upon thofe principles could take place; and the war now commenced against Holland was fo far from being wanton or unjustifiable, that it would appear, even from a flight view of the conduct on both fides, to be a war of unavoidable neceffity on that of Great Britain. He attributed to the baneful influence of French gold, that treacherous conduct which he afcribed to the Dutch; faid it was better to have to deal with an [*]'4 open open enemy, than with a treacherous friend; and declared, that he wished not to live to fee that day, when this country fhould be obliged to put up with thofe infults, which her honour called upon her to refent. The apology made by the minifter, with refpect to the adjourn ment, did not by any means leffen the feverity of oppofition on that fubject. The minifters, they faid, had every year fome work upon their hands, which they did not chufe to do in the face of parliament. It had been their frequent practice to fettle matters of the first importance during the holidays, and when the houfe met after the recefs, then to call upon parliament to fupport them under all the confequences of their ill conduct. In this manner the house had been led into the American war, that fource of all our calamities; in this manner the treaty was ftolen between America and France, without the poffibility of their timely interference; in like manner the minifters announced the French, and in the following year the Spanish refcript; and now they come to declare that they have commenced war with Holland, our old and our natural ally. Thus, year after year, had the noble lord in the blue ribbon come down to inform the houfe of fome new enemy; but in that whole courfe of time, he never once brought them the welcome news of our having gained a new ally. The prefent minifters had explodefl the old fyftem of continental connections; they abandoned the continent, and most unfortunately, as we now experience, the continent, in return, has abandoned us. In thofe glorious and happy days, when our affairs were conducted by Whig minifters, and upon true Whig principles, we had the better half of Europe fighting by our fide, in pulling down the power, and humbling the pride of the Houfe of Bourbon, But where now are our allies? We have adopted an oppofite fyftem of principles, and are abandoned by all the world. Holland, our natural, our most refpectable, and at length our only ally, is forced into the arms of Bourbon, Are these the benefits for which we are to return thanks to the crown? They denied the neceffity of the war with Holland. We loft Holland, faid they, by our arrogance, By that domineering, infolent spirit, through which we loft America, and which has united half Europe against us in an armed neutrality. The haughty memorial of 1777, which is fo cautiously kept back from the house by the minifters, they urged, was juftly obferved by the ftates general, to hold language not fitting to be offered to or received by any independent ftate. It was not poffible that any Hollander, who felt as he ought to do for the honour of his country, fhould not refent fuch a public infult. France, and the French party in Holland, naturally, and not unfairly, took the advantage of this temper. You fee, faid they, the treatment you receive from your boafted friends and protectors. much fuccefs has changed the nature, or perhaps only expofed to view the real difpofition, of thofe haughty island Too ers. ers, Instead of being the affertors The reign of Charles II. they faid, was fufficiently infamous, But they thought the obfervation rather unlucky at the prefent time. We had loft more, in a few years, through the prefent minifters, than by the whole race of Stuarts. The mischiefs brought on by the Stuarts were speedily repaired by a happy revolution. But the mifchiefs brought on by the prefent minifters are irreparable. The prevalence of a faction in Holland was attributed to the influence of French gold; it would be happy if the influence of French gold, or, which was the fame thing, English gold, operating in French interefts, did not prevail, much nearer the capital of Great Britain. But why was not fome of that gold fent over to counteract the operation of the French? The noble minifter complained, that the Dutch had broken the treaties fubfifting with this country; but had proper means been ufed to induce them to abide by thofe treaties? Was the noble lord to be informed, that treaties never bound any nation in oppofition to ftrong paffions or intereft? Had any pains been taken to keep thofe of Holland on our fide? Was not our conduct in numerous inftances the direct reverfe? When we were throwing away the American commerce, were we fo blind as not to fee, that its advantages would be eagerly grafped at by other nations? Could we imagine that a people, wholly commercial, would not fooner or later follow the example of others, and endeavour to partake of thofe advantages? We fhould either have taken measures to provide for or to prevent this effect; or we should have refrained from the frantic measures which tended to produce it. They obferved, that when France was confidered as the most formidable power in Europe, the nations on all fides confederated against her. We ourselves took the lead in that confederacy. We fhould have derived wifdom from that example, in which we had fo great a fhare; and when this country rofe to an envied and alarming pitch of greatness, a juft apprehenfion of a fimilar hoftile confederacy fhould have taught us juftice, moderation, and wifdom. But fo far were we from adopting fuch a prudential mode of conduct, that the pride and arrogance of our councils difgufted or alarmed all mankind, and difpofed them to any combination, whether for the leffening of our power, or the punishing of our infolence. In that state of things the British minifters, equally blind to our fituation, and deaf to all remonftrance and reafon, precipitated us headlong into the American war; thereby, through the pity and indignation which it ex- our allies. He faid, no man could cited, and the weakness which their miferable incapability of conducting it caufed and revealed, not only increafing the general difpofition of ill-will, but giving the fullest and most unhoped for effect to the combination. It had often, as they faid, been urged by the fupporters of minif try, that it was vain and fuperfluous to enquire by what means the difficulties of our fituation had arifen, the only matter of confideration or enquiry being, by what means we fhould extricate ourfelves? Events have fufficiently confuted that reasoning. For if we had inveftigated the causes, and punished the authors of the American war, they would not have been able to involve us fucceffively in thofe with France and Spain. If we had thus enquired, we fhould have avoided the war with Holland. While it is poffible to add one more to the number of our enemies, until all reafon for exertion is fuperfeded by utter defpair, the reafons for enquiry will continue in full force. The first step towards advancing our affairs, is to prevent them from declining. As this cannot be effected without inveftigating and removing the caufe of the progreffive declension of our profperity, the retrofpect now recommended, fo far from impeding, is effential to the efficacy of all our future exertions. The minifter warmly refented, and indeed much more fo than he had done upon former occafions, the charge of a change of political fyftem, of abandoning continental connections, and of our being therefore abandoned by all be a warmer enthufiaft in refpect to the Whig principles and fyitem of King William's reign, than he was himfelf: no man could with more eagerly for continental alliances, upon the fame principles, and in pursuit of the fame fyftem, which then prevailed or was adopted. The Whig fyftem of that reign was the direct line of conduct now pursued. The object of all that king's wars, and indeed of his life, was to check the power of the Houfe of Bourbon, and to preserve the balance of power in Europe. What are we fighting for at this moment?— the very fame object. But it is faid that we have no allies; does that prove that we do not pursue the fyftem of King William's reign? If we have no allies, it only proves that we have not all the advantages of that fyftem : advantages that are incidental, that depend on time, on circumftances, on that infinite variety of events, which deftroy all poffibility of perfect parallel in hiftory. The policy of Europe, he faid, had unfortunately changed of late years; and Holland, though her ruin muft inevitably follow that of Great Britain, if the Houfe of Bourbon fucceeded, rejects the old policy and adopts the new one; fhe is no longer the friend and the ally of Great Britain, but has joined France, and broke her faith with this country. Great Britain had uniformly adhered to her old fyftem, and complied with the conditions of her treaties, whenever her allies were attacked, and claimed her affiftance. Unfortunately for Great Britain, the other powers of Europe had not acted acted with equal fidelity. He de-' clared he was firmly perfuaded, that, had the Duke of Marlborough, had King William's and Queen Anne's Whig minifters, been now alive, and at the head of affairs, our national fituation would have been exactly the fame that it is at this moment. He juftified the memorial of 1777, (to which the prefent rupture was attributed by the speakers on the other fide) by the circumftances which produced it, and by the ftate of public affairs at the time. He denied that the war with Holland had been made or fought for by the minifters; on the contrary, nothing could have been more adverfe to their inclinations. The Dutch had provoked the war. He trusted he had proved that they had taken a decided part against this country, and had thrown themselves into the hands of France. Under thefe circumftances, and when it was evident, from the anfwer of the ftates-general to Sir Jofeph Yorke, that they only meant to gain time and trifle with Great Britain, it would have been madness to have loft a moment, or to have paufed upon the bufinefs; the time was arrived when our interefts and our honour were equally at ftake, and indecifion would have been no lefs ruinous than fhameful. So far was he from meaning to depart from that line of found policy, which for fo many years had cemented an union between this country and Holland, that after all that happened, if he faw France turn her arms against Holland, and attempt to deftroy the liberty of the United States, he fhould fill confider it as a British caufe, and act as if the treaty of Weftminster had never been violated. On the other fide it was replied, that the application to Holland for furnishing the fuccours ftipulated by treaties, was, in the present state of things, exceedingly improper, ill-judged, and impolitic. That the ftates-general, in not complying with the requifition, had not only acted wifely, under the circumftances of the time, but had done us, in fpite of ourselves, a very great fervice. For what, faid they, would have been the immediate confequence, if they had furnished the 20 fhips of war, and the 6000 troops, which they were bound to by the treaty of Westminster? Why, that Holland would have been immediately invaded, and probably overrun, by a powerful French army; that the muft then not only have withdrawn her own futcours, but muft have demanded from us a much greater force, which we were bound by the fame treaty to furnish for her defence. But that would not have been all; for as our fate would have been involved in the prefervation of Holland, we must, overborne as we already were, have encountered the whole force of France, in a land war, upon her own borders. Had we a fingle ally that would have fupported us in the unequal conteft? At a time too, when our armies were difperfed all over the globe, and either wafted in the American war, or perifhing under the rigours of a tropical fun. Every body knows what the state of Holland is in the prefent day, with refpect to her own military force. The oppofition in general reprobated the war with Holland, as 1 |