and personally took the command. ing officer prifoner. The lofs was very moderate on both fides; and Hamilton, in his report to the Marquis de la Fayette, boafts (with what juftice will be decided for themselves, by thofe who have attended to the tranfactions of the war) that the foldiery under his command, incapable, as he expreffes himself, of imitating examples of barbarity, and forgetting recent provocations, fpared every man that ceased to refilt.

The French were equally fuccessful on their fide, but their lofs was more confiderable; amounting, by their own acknowledgement, to about an hundred in killed and wounded. The emulation

between the two nations, appeared in their labour, as well as in action; and the two redoubts were included in the fecond parallel by daylight.

The taking of thefe two redoubts may be faid to decide the fate of the army. Lord Cornwallis, in a letter which he wrote on the following day to Sir Henry Clinton, confiders their fituation as being fo defperate, that he could not recommend to the fleet and army to run any great rifque in endeavouring to fave them. Indeed nothing could be more hopeless; for, as he fays himself in the fame letter, they dared not to fhew a gun to the enemy's old batteries, and they expected that their new ones would be opened on the following morning.

The British commander, however, left nothing untried which could procrastinate, if it was impoffible to prevent, that final iffue, which was not more dreaded than expected. Being fenfible that his

works could not ftand many hours after the opening of the batteries of the fecond parallel, he did every thing that was poffible to interrupt that work, opening new embrazures for guns, and keeping up a conftant fire with all his howitzers and fmall mortars.

The troops had been fo much weakened by fickness, as well as by the fire of the enemy, that the general could not venture any confiderable number in the making of fallies, and the enemy had fo well fecured their flanks, and proceeded in all their operations with fo much regularity and caution, that nothing less than a strong and well-fupported attack could produce any effect. The prefent emergency was, however, fo critical, that a little before daybreak, on the morning of the 16th, he ordered a fortie of about 350 men, under the conduct of Lieut. Col. Abercrombie, to attack two batteries which appeared to be in the greateft forwardness, and to spike the guns. A detachment of guards, with the 80th company of grenadiers, under the command of Lieut. Col. Leake, was appointed to one of thefe, and another of light infantry, under Major Armftrong, to the other battery. Both attacks were made with an impetuofity which could not be refifted. The redoubts that covered both batteries were forced, eleven pieces of cannon fpiked, and the French troops, who had the guard of that part of the entrenchment, fuffered confiderably.

Though the vigour and gallantry difplayed in this brifk and fuccessful action, did the greatest honour to the officers and troops that were engaged, yet it produc

ed

ed no essential service. The cannon, which were haftily fpiked, were foon again rendered fit for fervice; and the induftry of the enemy was fo great, that, before dark, the whole parallel and the batteries feemed nearly completed. At the fame time, the works were fo ruined, and the batteries fo overpowered, that there was no part of the whole front attacked, in which the befieged could fhew a fingle gun; and their fhells, which were the last fource of defence, were nearly expended.

In thefe unfortunate circumftances, Lord Cornwallis had no other choice left but to prepare for a furrender on the following day, or to endeavour to efcape with the greatest part of the troops. He determined upon attempting the latter, under the confideration, that though it fhould prove unfuccessful in its immediate object, it might at least delay the enemy in the profecution of farther enterprizes. The adverse current of fortune gave a contrary effect to a defign well calculated to delay the fate of Lord Cornwallis's army.

Boats were prepared, under other pretexts, to be in readiness for receiving the troops at ten at night, in order to pass them over to Gloucester Point. The arrangements were made with the utmolt fecrecy; and the intention was, to abandon the baggage, and to leave a detachment behind, in order to capitulate for the town's people, and for the fick and wounded; Lord Cornwallis having already prepared a letter upon the fubject, which was to be delivered to General Washington upon his departure.

The firit embarkation, confift

ing of the light infantry, the guards, and a part of the 23d regiment, had arrived at Gloucefter Point, and the greater part of the troops were already landed, when, at that critical moment of hope, apprchenfion, and danger, fortune proved adverfe, and the weather, which was then moderate and calm, inftantly changed to a moft violent ftorm of wind and rain. The boats, with the remaining troops, were all driven down the river, and the defign of paffing was not only entirely fruftrated, but 'the abfence of the boats rendered it impoffible to bring back the troops from Gloucester. Thus, weakened and divided, the army, by this untoward accident, was involved in a state of the most imminent danger.

To increase the anxiety and peril of this ftate of things, the enemies batteries were opened, with great force and effect, at daybreak; and the paffage at Gloucefter point was now much expofed to their fire. The boats, however, happily returned; and the troops were brought back without much lofs in the courfe of the forenoon.

But things were now drawing to that crifis, which could no longer be averted. The works were every where finking under the weight of the enemy's artillery; and Lord Cornwallis himself could not but concur in opinion, with the engineer and principal officers, that they were already affailable in many places, and that a continuance of the fame fire, only for a few hours longer, would reduce them to fuch a condition, that it would then become defperate to attempt their defence. While

they were expofed to fo heavy à fire from the enemy, they could not return a gun, and only about 100 cohorn fhells remained. The troops were not only diminished by lofs and by ficknefs, but the ftrength and fpirits of thofe in the works were exhaufted and worn down by conftant watching, and unremitting fatigue, And while they were to be attacked and overborne on all fides by land, the French fhips, in the mouth of York River, feemed prepared to fecond and complete the general ftorm, by water.

In fuch circumftances it would have been cruelty in the extreme to have facrificed fuch gallant, and in every refpect deferving troops, to a point of honour, which the improved ftate of civilization has wifely exploded, that of ftanding an affault, which could not in the nature of things but prove fuccefsful. Lord Cornwallis accordingly wrote a letter to Gen. Wafhington on the fame day, the 17th, propofing a ceffation of arms for 24 hours, and that commiffioners might be appointed on both fides for fettling the terms of capitulation.

The pofts of York and Gloucefter were furrendered on the 19th of October. The troops, with the fame honours which had been granted to the garrifon of CharlesTown, were of neceffity obliged to become prifoners of war. They were compofed of British and German regiments, the light infantry, detachments from the guards, and Tarleton's cavalry, They amounted to between five and fix thousand men; but fuch was the number of fick and wound

ed, that there were only 3,800

of all forts, capable of bearing arms, in both pofts, on the day of furrender. Fifteen hundred feamen underwent the fate of the garrifon. The officers and foldiers retained their baggage and effects; but all property taken in the country, if visible, was liable to be reclaimed. The Guadaloupe frigate of 24 guns, with a number of tranfports, were furrendered to the conquerors; and about 20 tranfports had been funk or burnt during the fiege. They obtained a numerous artillery of various forts, but not of weight fufficient for their late purpose of defence in a fiege.

or

Lord Cornwallis ftrove in vain to obtain better conditions; particularly that the British and Ĝerman troops might be returned to their refpective countries, as prifoners on parole, on condition of not ferving against France America until they were exchanged. Some favourable conditions which he wished to obtain in behalf of the inhabitants of YorkTown, and other Americans, who were under the protection, as they had fhared the fortune, of the British army, were likewife refufed, upon the footing of their being civil matters, which did not come within the authority of the military commanders. To extricate thofe Americans who would have been expofed to imminent danger, he, however, made it a condition, that the Bonetta floop, which was to convey his difpatches to New York, fhould pafs without fearch or examination, he being only ahfwerable that the number of perfons fhe conveyed fhould be accounted for as prifoners of war upon exchange. With a retro

fpective

fpective eye to the breach of conditions which the late convention army had fo forely experienced, Lord Cornwallis took care to have it ftipulated, that no article of the prefent capitulation fhould be violated, under any pretence of making reprifals.

The general himself, with all civil and military officers, excepting thofe of the latter who were neceffarily left behind for the protection and government of the foldiers, were at liberty to go upon parole, either to England or New York; and the troops, divided as much as poffible into regiments, were to be retained within the three governments of Virginia, Penfylvania, or Maryland. Lord Cornwallis obferves, in his public letter, that the treatment which he and the army had received in general from the enemy fince the furrender, had been perfectly good and proper; but he fpeaks in warm terms of the kindness and attention fhewn to them by the French officers in particular; "their delicate fenfibility," he fays, "of our fituation, their generous and preffing offers of money, both public and private, to any amount, has really gone beyond what I can poffibly defcribe, and will, I hope, "make an impreffion on the "breaft of every British officer, "whenever the fortune of war fhould put any of them into our

66

with the fhips and furniture, were affigned to M. de Graffe, as a compliment to, and return for, the French naval power and affistance, It was remarkable, that the commiffioner appointed by the Americans to fettle the terms, and who himself drew up the articles of a capitulation, by which a British army became prifoners to his country, was Col. Laurens, fon of that Mr. Laurens, late prefident of the Congrefs, who was then, and had been for a confiderable time, a clofe prifoner in the Tower of London. The Viscount, de Noailles was the commiffioner appointed on the fide of France, to act in conjunction with Colonel Laurens.

Such was the very hard fate of the remains of that conquering and gallant army, which had been fo highly diftinguished in the fouthern war! We fhall fay nothing of the fhare which their noble commander bore in the common misfortune, as he lives in an age which knows how to diftinguish the want of fuccefs from the want of merit. Neither himself nor his army forfeited any part of their former character. Their pofition was in many refpects a very bad one, and probably would have continued fo in any state of fortification; but in its prefent, it was no more than an entrenched camp, and subject to be enfiladed in different parts; while their new halfformed works, were much lefs capable of withstanding the powerful artillery of the enemy, than they would themfelves of oppofing their vaft fuperiority of force in the open field. It was pitched upon in one of thofe unfavourable conjun&tures which allow of no

good

good expedient, and where inconveniences must be balanced rather than advantages fought, The troops made the best amends for the difficulties of their fituation, by the patience with which they endured an unremitting duty and the greateft fatigues, as well as by the firmnefs and intrepidity with which they ftood a fire of fhot and fhells, which has feldom been exceeded in magnitude. The French expended 16,000 fhot and fhells in the fiege, 3000 of the latter being of the first dimenfions; and the fire of the Americans was not lefs.

The British fleet and army arrived off the Chesapeak on the 24th of October, being five days after the furrender of York-Town. They foon received the unwelcome tidings; but as they were only reports, they waited fome days, until the misfortune was fully authenticated. The French fleet, fatisfied with their prefent fuccefs, made no manner of movement; and the only object of the expedition being now loft, the British commanders neceffarily returned to New York.

Such was the iffue of the Virginian war. The lofs of Lord Cornwallis's army was too heavy a blow to be foon or eafily recovered. It was evident, that it muft entirely change the nature of the war on the fide of Great Britain; and that it could no longer be carried on offenfively by land, at leaft to any confiderable extent. Indeed the furrender at YorkTown, may be confidered as the clofing fcene of the whole continental war in America. There are few periods in history more capable of rouzing attention and exciting reflections; whether we confider the original policy, and the difcuffions which enfued; its various events, and fudden chan ges of fortune; on one fide the magnitude of the preparations, and diftance of operation from the feat of power, and on the other, the difficulties, pertinacy, and final fuccefs of the refiftance; or whether we confider the effect this revolution may in future operate on the political ftate of the whole human race, we fhall in every refpect find it extraordinary. Undoubtedly a new fcene is opened,

CHAP.