the fquadron already at New York would have given him fo decided a fuperiority, that De Graffe muft either have relinquifhed his defign, abandoned the coafts of North America, and thereby defeated the whole scheme and hope of the campaign, or otherwife have fallen a victim to his own temerity. The leaft fortunate of thefe events, they say, would, in a great measure, have changed the nature and fortune of the war; but the other would have done it entirely.

Inftead, they added, of purfuing thefe vigorous and happy meafures, the admiral abandoned his charge at the moft critical period, that had been, or could have been, in this or any war; and at the fame time brought away the best ship in the fleet from the fcene of action and fervice, merely for the conveyance of his own perfon to England. But this was but a trifle, they say, compared with the confequences of the arrangement and difpofition of the fleet which he made before his departure. That he frittered away its force into Imall parts without an object. That, instead of drawing any strength from Jamaica to affift in counteracting the grand defign of the enemy, he fent three fhips of the line there, at a time when they could not be wanted; and left others in the Leeward Islands, where they had no longer an enemy to encounter ; the French not having left a fingle fhip of the line in all that quarter. That even the fending of a convoy to Europe, in fo critical a feafon of emergency and danger, was a measure which fhould have been deferred, until the great ob

jects of the campaign were decided. And that these various errors, which were finally concluded and wound up by the fending of Sir Samuel Hood, with a force totally inadequate, to oppofe De Graffe at the Che fapeak, opened the way, and led directly to, that fatal catastrophe, which foon fucceeded in Virginia.

On the other fide it has been answered, that the admiral's ftate: of health, rendered his return to England a matter of neceffity.' But that if no fuch neceffity exifted, the expedition to the Cheapeak, or any other, could not have been committed to a braver or better officer, than to Sir Samuel Hood: a man, who the admiral could not hold himself fuperior to in any refpect. That, although the Cambridge was undoubtedly a prime fhip, and a capital failor, yet, that fome part of the iron work of her rudder had been fo much worn, that its repair was indifpenfible before the proceeded upon farther fervice. That confidering the great convoy which De Grafle had under his charge, the feafon of the year, and the crazy state of many of his fhips, it was not to be expected or fuppofed, but that he would have fent the greater part of his fleet along with the merchantmen to France, and it was fairly to be prefumed, that he would only have retained those which were in condition to undergo the American fervice. But that independent of that circumftance, Hood's force was tantamount to its purposes; and that was all a commander in chief had to confider. For if Admiral Graves had kept his fquadron en[H] 3.

tire,

W

E are now to purfue the courfe of events and action, from the Weft Indies to the coafts of North America. Lord Cornwallis, upon taking the command in Virginia, found the enemy in no condition to oppose him with any degree of effect; and the people being at mercy in that open country, numbers came in daily, both to his own immediate army, and to the corps which he placed under the conduct of Gen. Leflie at Portsmouth, in order to give in their paroles, and to receive protections. He first advanced from Petersburgh, on the Appomatox, to the River James, which he paffed at Weftover, and thence marching through Hanover county, crofled the South Anna, or Pamonky River; the Marquis de la Fayette conftantly foliowing his motions, but at a guarded distance, in every part of his progrefs.

From the South Anna, he difpatched the Colonels Tarleton and Simcoe, with feparate detachments, to scour the interior country, As they penetrated into the inmoft receffes, which had hitherto been free from fpoil, they were enabled to do great mifchief to the Americans. Bendes deftroying feveral thousand stand of arms which were under repair, with large quantities of gunpowder, falt, harnefs, and other matters, which were either de

figned for, or capable of being applied to military fervices, they were very near falling upon the Baron de Steuben, who with 800 men was posted at a place called the Point of Fork; and who with difficulty faved his rear from being cut off.

Upon the return of these detachments, Lord Cornwallis fell back with the army to Richmond, on the River James; and afterwards, moving ftill nearer to the fea, paffed the Chickahominy, and towards the latter end of June arrived at Williamsburg, the capital of Virginia, which hes fomething about mid-way between the great rivers of York and James. In the courfe of the march, befides ar ticles fimilar to thofe which we have already specified, above 2000 hog fheads of tobacco, with fome brafs, and a great nuraber of iron ordnance, were deftroyed; and a few of the moft valuable of the former, with a quantity of fhot and fhells, brought off. On their approach to Williamsburg, Simcoe's corps, which brought up the rear, were purfued, and warmly attacked by a fuperior force of the enemy; but after a brifk action, the affailants were repulfed; each fide boafting the greater lofs fuftained by the other, as well as the fuperiority of its force.

The Marquis de la Fayette be.. ing now ftrongly reinforced by the [H] 4 arrival

arrival of General Wayne, with the Pensylvania fuccours, and ftill farther by the junction of the Baron de Steuben's troops, as well as of fuch militia as Virginia herself was by this time able to arm and affemble, the enemy were become fo powerful, as to retrain all diftant operations on the British fide, and even to render the collective movements of the army a matter of guarded caution. Lord Cornwallis was now likewife to look to the ultimate object of the campaign, which was the eftablishment of a strong poft and place of arms, that by embracing fome good harbour, or commanding one of the great navigable rivers, fhould equally facilitate the future operations by fea and land. We have formerly feen, that in one of the earliest expeditions to the Chefapeak, Portfmouth had been strongly recommended, and unwillingly quitted by the commanders then on that fervice, as a poft eminently calculated for maintaining by land a kind of warfare, at once defenfive on their part, and extremely diftreffing to the pro vince, and at the fame time for affording such a station to the British fleets and cruizers, as would render them entirely mafters of that great bay. A measure which, it was expected, would annihilate its foreign and domeftic commerce, in a great meafure cut off the communication between the furrounding provinces, and lay them open to continual defcent and invafion, in their most unguarded parts. All ideas at that time, of the utility of fuch a poft, were indeed founded on the con

fidence of a conftant naval fuperiority for its protection, as well

as of its being defenfible by a moderate force on the land fide.

This measure of eftablishing a permanent poft, in a good fituation for naval enterprize, in Virginia, had for fome time become a very favourite object with the minifters at home; and feems, from thence, to have been at length adopted by Sir Henry Clinton. It is however to be obferved, that the victory at Guildford, Gen. Arnold's uninterrupted progrefs, together with the reinforcements which had, this year, been fent from Europe to New York, had excited a full expectation at home, that the prefent campaign would have been decifive with refpect to the fubjugation of the more fou fou + thern colonies. It was accordingly urged, that the war in Virginia fhould be profecuted with every poffible degree of exertion, as well for the purpose of fecuring. the Carolinas, as with a view to the intrinfic value and importance of that province.

It does not feem, that the commander in chief in New York, and Lord Cornwallis, entirely coincided in opinion, with respect to the mode of conducting the war in Virginia. The former, under an expectation of being himself attacked by the combined forces of America and France, wished to recall a confiderable part of the troops for the fecurity of New York, and only to leave fuch a number on that fervice, as would be neceffary for the maintenance of fuch a poft as we have mentioned. On the other hand, Lord Cornwallis, who formed his judgment on the fpot, feems to have been of opinion, that nothing lefs than an offenfive war, could an

fwer

fwer any effectual purpose in Virginia; and that a confiderable army would be neceffary for that end; as an infufficient force, however fuccefsful in the beginning, would, in his judgment, at length be overborne. He likewife held, that the reduction of that province was effential, both to the fubjugation, and the retention of the Carolinas. But as his whole force, without any reduction, was utterly unequal to that purpofe, and that he likewife feems to have placed no great truft in the advantages to be derived from the establishment of the propofed poft, it became evident that he felt his fituation yery uneafy and difagreeable, not only with regard to the difficulties which he forefaw in the fervice, but with respect to the weight of refponfibility to which he would be liable.

He therefore wifhed much to return to his command in South Carolina, where the illness of Lord Rawdon rendered his prefence highly neceffary. This, however, could not be complied with; the commander in chief probably thinking it too hazardous to quit New York himself in the prefent ftate of affairs, and perhaps judging, that the fervice in Virginia would require all the abilities of the prefent commander.

Upon a perfonal examination of Portsmouth, with a view to the intended poft, Lord Cornwallis found it totally incompetent to the purpofe; for befides the fituation being exceedingly unhealthy, and that it would require little lefs than an army for its defence, it was incapable of receiving fhips of the line, whofe protection, if neceffary, and a fecure ftation at

all times, were the principal objects of the defign. Point Comfort, which had likewife been propofed, was found no lefs incapable or defective; and the pofts of York Town, on the river of the fame name, with Gloucester Point, on the oppofite fide, afforded the only remaining choice. Thefe, however, required the whole force which Lord Cornwallis poffeffed to render them effective; and Sir Henry Clinton, upon that information, at length relinquished the defign of recalling any part of the troops. The uncertainty, however, upon this point, feems to have confiderably delayed the conftruction of the works for the defence of thofe pofts.

The hot and fickly feason, which was now for a time to reftrain all military operations on both fides, occafioned Lord Cornwallis's departure from Williamsburgh, with a view of paffing the River James, in order to examine the fituation of Portsmouth, Hampton, and thofe other places on that fide, which had been held out as capable of being converted into the intended fortified poft. The army, upon this movement, having encamped in an open field near James Town, but under the cover of their fhipping, preparatory to their paffing the river, the American commanders were now grown fo confident, that the Marquis de la Fayette immediately pushed forward the Generals Wayne and Muhlenburg, with the light troops and van, while he followed himfelf with the remainder of the army, in order to take fome advantage of their fituation, or to interrupt their defign.

Lord Cornwallis re

ceived intelligence that July 6th.

the