Dialectics: A Controversy-Oriented Approach to the Theory of Knowledge

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SUNY Press, 1 янв. 1977 г. - Всего страниц: 128
This book explores a disputational approach to inquiry. Such a focus on disputation is useful because it exhibits epistemological process at work in a setting of socially conditioned interactions. This socially oriented perspective reflects the anti-Cartesian animus of the dialectical approach to epistemology. It strives to avert the baneful influence of the egocentric orientation of recent approaches in the theory of knowledge.

The traditional and orthodox emphasis on the epistemological questions How can I convince myself? and How can I be certain? invites us to forget the fundamentally social nature of the ground rules of probative reasoning--their rooting in the issue of how we can go about convincing one another. The dialectic of disputation and controversy provides a useful antidote to such cognitive egocentrism by affording a point of departure in epistemology which blocks any temptation to forget the crucial fact that the buildup of knowledge is a communal enterprise subject to communal standards.
 

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The disputational background of dialectic the structure of formal disputation
1
2 The structure of a disputation
4
3 The formal analysis of dialectical moves and countermoves in disputation
5
4 Probative asymmetries
17
5 The microstructure of the dialectic of disputation
18
6 The determination adjudication of a disputation
20
Some dialectical tools burden of proof presumption and plausibility
25
2 Presumption and the concept of a provisionally adequate case
28
6 Conclusion
66
Recent ventures in inconsistencytolerant logics
67
Dialogue as an instrument of logical exposition
71
What justifies the dialectical rationale of probative rationality?
73
2 Probative mechanisms as requisites of rationality
75
3 Is Rationality a Matter of Ethics?
76
A dialectically based critique of scepticism
81
2 Scepticism and rationality
82

3 Presumption and burden of proof
30
4 The locus of presumption
35
5 Plausibility and presumption
37
6 More on presumptions
42
7 The need for a termination process in rational controversy
43
Unilateral dialectics a disputational model of inquiry
46
2 The platonic aspect of dialectic
48
3 Dialectic as evidential costbenefit analysis
49
4 A digression on written exposition
50
5 The isomorphism of the disputational and probative versions of dialectic
51
6 The issue of evaluation and assessment
53
7 The probative isomorphism of controversy and inquiry
56
Facets of dialectical logic
59
abandoning the law of contradiction
60
abandoning ex falso quodlibet
62
abandoning the law of double negation
64
3 The role of certainty
86
4 Scepticism and the rules of language
90
5 Scepticism and praxis
91
6 Scepticism and the methodological turn
93
7 The pragmatic basis of cognition
95
Evolutionary epistemology and the burden of proof
98
2 Humes problem
102
3 Shifting the burden of proof against the sceptic
103
The disputational model of scientific inquiry
108
2 Presumptions in science
111
3 The probative significance of the history of science
114
4 Confirmationism vs falsificationism
117
5 The communal aspect
121
Name Index
123
Subject Index
125
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Nicholas Rescher is University Professor of Philosophy at the University of Pittsburgh. He is the author of The Coherence Theory of Truth, Methodological Pragmatism, Conceptual Idealism, and other publications.

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